

Military Review

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Other Services See Dangerous Action

Colonel Neal H. Bralley, U.S. Army, Retired, Lansing, Kansas—I read Major General Robert H. Scales’ article, “Urban Warfare: A Soldier’s View,” in the January-February 2005 Military Review, with interest. However, I have reservations about several of his assertions. These few statements detract from what began as an excellent article on an important topic facing our soldiers in Iraq, today.

I agree our infantry soldiers pay a high cost in combat losses: theirs is a most noble, necessary, and highly dangerous task. However, other soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines die in combat actions, too. Some of these actions in which our servicemembers have died haven’t necessarily been deemed acts of war by our government, but they are within the definition of the law of war: they clearly meet the threshold.

On page 10 of his article, Scales mentions [that] the last major ship-to-ship action was in the Battle of Leyte Gulf, October 1944. I can list seven instances of U.S. Navy ships being attacked or suffering damage, and in five of these instances, loss of life occurred due to enemy sea action whether by air, surface, or sub-surface mine attack:

USS Liberty, AGTR-5, 8 June 1967 attacked by Israeli aircraft (much debate surrounds the intent of the Israeli armed forces, but it is widely held by many people to have been a purposeful attack). Deaths: 34 USN sailors. I would assert that these 34 sailors died from enemy air action. When someone is attacking your ship with guns, bombs, and torpedoes, from a combat aircraft, it is very much a hostile action. The captain of the USS Liberty, Commander William L. McGonagle, USN, received the Medal of Honor for his actions on 8 June 1967. Servicemembers don’t receive the

Medal of Honor for noncombat actions.

USS Pueblo, AGER-2, on 23 January 1968, was intercepted, attacked, and forced into the port of Wonsan, North Korea by North Korean patrol boats. The USS Pueblo was in international waters at the time of attack. Deaths: 1, and 82 sailors were imprisoned for 11 months. The United States is still technically at war with North Korea.

USS Stark, FFG-31, on 17 March 1987, was attacked by an Iraqi Mirage F-1 aircraft which launched an Exocet missile. Deaths: 37 USN sailors. Considering this attack followed an attack by two other aircraft earlier the same day on a Cypriot tanker, both attacks were hostile acts of war.

USS Samuel B. Roberts, FFG-58, on 14 April 1988, struck a mine resulting in the injury of 10 sailors.

USS Tripoli, LPH-10, struck a floating mine on 18 February 1991 in the Persian Gulf resulting in significant damage to the ship.

USS Princeton, CG-59, also struck a submerged mine resulting in multi-million dollar damage to the ship and injuries to three sailors.

USS Cole, DDG-67, was attacked on 12 October 2000 by two Al Qaeda terrorists in a small boat filled with explosives. This attack in Aden Harbor, Yemen, resulted in 17 deaths and 39 injured sailors. While this attack happened before the 9/11 attack, it was clearly a precursor to the Global War on Terrorism.

Al Qaeda had previously attempted to attack the USS Sullivans, DDG-68, on 3 January 2000, but its bomb-carrying boat sank before being able to fulfill its intended mission.

Scales’ assertion about the last serious air-to-air combat action being in Operation Linebacker II during the Vietnam war may be true. The USAF, USN, and USMC aircraft have recently achieved stun-

ningly favorable air-to-air combat successes; however, they have had less success against surface-to-air missile threats. The USAF took serious losses during a ground terrorist attack at Khobar Towers, Dhahran, Saudi Arabia on 25 June 1996. This attack resulted in the deaths of 19 USAF personnel and injuries numbered in the hundreds.

On page 12, Scales asserts, “The enemy can hide inside urban structures, but aerial dominance robs him of the ability to move freely and mass.” Within urban areas, particularly urban areas having row buildings, tenements, and large apartment complexes, forces may easily move through buildings by blowing holes through walls, and they can enter sewage systems to move freely without any threat of observation by USAF or other aerial platforms. The enemy can mass within cities much more easily than he can in open terrain.

Scales’ comments regarding the origin of U.S. forces’ small arms, while interesting, has no real bearing on urban warfare. U.S. forces need weapons that fire reliably and accurately in all environmental and combat conditions. The Army, the service having Title 10 responsibilities for small-arms weapons acquisition, has done well in keeping effective weapons in the hands of our soldiers. There have been times when our enemies may have had a better weapon, but such events aren’t limited to just rifles, pistols, or machineguns. Our field artillery cannon haven’t always had the longest ranges, but our entire field artillery system of cannons, missiles, ordnance, survey control, fire direction, meteorological data, communication, and target acquisition—all combined is unrivalled. The same is true for many other systems within our Army and our Armed Forces.

On page 18, Scales makes the

statement, “Even the most advanced bombing system cannot kill any object, even a large one, on the move.” There are missile systems capable of destroying large, and even not-so-large, moving targets. Hellfire missiles, for example, have been used to kill automobiles and their passengers from unmanned aerial vehicles. This may still be a challenging endeavor, but his use of the words “cannot kill any” are not wholly correct. Ground combatants must make use of every available fire support asset, and then they must select the optimal system for a particular target. One can easily get into semantics concerning the finer points between bombs, missiles, rockets, and other weapons. However, U.S. airmen are capable of killing moving targets; it may not be easy, but it can be done. In fact, field artillery weapons systems employing specific munitions, Copperhead, for instance, can hit and kill moving targets.

I was disappointed in what appeared to be a lack of a “fair and balanced” joint perspective within Scales’ article.

Editor’s note: Bralley used information from the following sources: <www.history.navy.mil/photos/pers-us/uspers-m/w-mc-gngl.htm>; <www.usspueblo.org>; <www.globalsecurity.org/intell/library/imint/pueblo-imagery-1.htm>; <<http://eightiesclub.tripod.com/id344.htm>>; <www.defp.navy.mil/mc/museum/Princeton/mim91.htm>; <www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/khobar/khobar.htm>; <www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/news/news_stories/cole.html>.

Understanding versus Appreciating Cultures

Lieutenant Colonel Alan Farrier, U.S. Army—I am writing in reference to the “Military Cultural Education” article in [the] March-April 2005 Military Review by Colonel Maxie McFarland. My opinion is my own and does not represent my employer or Army Reserve unit, the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command Airborne.

McFarland makes several good points in his article. The army needs to expand its already formal regional studies program to include soldiers outside the special operations community. Officers should be encouraged to learn a foreign language, particularly one not normally heard

in the United States. I would add that officer professional development at the unit level should focus as much time on other cultures as we do OERs [Officer Evaluation Reports] and counseling.

Unlike McFarland, I would not “learn more about states or cultures with whom we are most likely to form a coalition or participate in a multinational campaign” [page 65]. I think the United States is just as likely to form coalitions with the usual group (NATO countries, for example) now as it has in the past. The real challenge is learning about those countries and cultures the United States rarely comes into contact with and yet stand as the most likely to be adversarial.

That said, I pull up short when McFarland suggests “culturally literate soldiers . . . appreciate and accept diverse beliefs, appearances and lifestyles” [page 63], and that soldiers and leaders “must appreciate, understand, and respect those norms . . .” [page 63].

I do not appreciate and accept judicial punishments in some societies where flogging and amputation are part of the cultural or religious norm. Nor can I accept the legitimacy of female genital mutilation, slavery, or that life is pre-ordained by stone gods, the stars, or tea leaves. On the other hand, I do understand that other people think this way. I do understand that these views are important to some people in some cultures. Knowing and understanding, however, are not the same as appreciating and accepting.

The reason why our soldiers need to understand other cultures and languages is so that they can better serve the mission of their commands and the ultimate objective of armed conflict—winning wars. As soldiers, we are members of the armed services, not the social services.

Has the author forgotten the words from the Code of Conduct? “I am an American fighting in the forces that guard my country and our way of life . . . I will never forget that I am an American fighting for freedom, responsible for my actions, and dedicated to the principles, which made my country free. I will trust in my God and in the United States

of America” (emphasis added). Or perhaps the author should consider the words of writer Gilbert K. Chesterton, “Tolerance is the virtue of the man without convictions.”

Effects-Based Operations and the Exercise of National Power—A Response

Major Bryan Boyce, U.S. Army, Retired—I only recently read the January-February 2004 article on EBO [Effects-Based Operations] by Army Major David W. Pendall. I wonder what comments you received after that issue by those [who] must have felt [that] Pendall’s take on EBO was not at all the EBO that JFCOM [Joint Forces Command] is advocating. The “effects” in EBO are not what blue does to red. This is not a correct understanding or use of “effects-centric” or EBO in general. “Effects” in this usage [is] not created by blue forces, as described with “effects-based targeting,” rather, according to JFCOM Effects Planning and Assessment Processes, the key characteristics of effects are [that] “they must support the objective . . . , they express a single idea . . . , they must be achievable . . . , they must be measurable . . . , they must be observable . . . , they are not descriptions of blue actions or adversary motivations . . . , they describe how we want the adversary to act . . . [and] they can also express how we want to shape the battlespace to achieve our objectives.” This is a common misperception that continues to be promulgated because it sounds reasonable.

According to JFCOM, “effects” are “the physical and/or behavioral state of a PMESII [political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information] system that results from a military or nonmilitary action or set of DIME [diplomatic, information, military, and economic] actions.”

Correction

Colonel Kim L. Summers, U.S. Army, Retired, is an Associate Professor of Military Art and Science, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, and Committee Chief for the Center of Army Tactics.

Winning the Peace

The Requirement for Full-Spectrum Operations

Major General Peter W. Chiarelli, U.S. Army
Major Patrick R. Michaelis, U.S. Army

You [military professionals] must know something about strategy and tactics and logistics, but also economics and politics and diplomacy and history. You must know everything you can know about military power, and you must also understand the limits of military power. You must understand that few of the important problems of our time have, in the final analysis, been finally solved by military power alone.—John F. Kennedy¹

FOR THE LAST 3 decades serving as an Army officer, the traditional military training model prepared me to win our Nation's wars on the plains of Europe, or the deserts of the Middle East. I envisioned large, sweeping formations; coordinating and synchronizing the battlefield functions to create that "point of penetration," and rapidly exploiting the initiative of that penetration to achieve a decisive maneuver against the armies that threatened the sovereignty of my country. But in Baghdad, that envisioned 3-decade-old concept of reality was replaced by a far greater sense of purpose and cause. Synchronization and coordination of the battlespace was not to win the war, but to win the peace. Penetration did not occur merely through synchronization of the battlefield functions, but that and more: local infrastructure improvement; training of security forces, understanding and educating the fundamentals of democracy; creating long-lasting jobs that would carry beyond short-term infrastructure improvement; and, an information operations (IO) campaign that supported the cultural realities of the area of operations.

The proverbial "point of penetration" for the 1st Cavalry Division and the coalition occurred on 30 January 2005. Millions of eligible Iraqi citizens, from across the sectarian divides, triumphed over a fractured insurgency and terrorist threat in a show of defiance never before seen across the Middle East. The purple index finger, proudly displayed, became a symbol of defiance and hope. The Iraqi people proved to the world their willingness to try democracy in whatever unique form evolves.

Task Force Baghdad's campaign to "win the peace" in Iraq has forced us, as an instrument of national power, to change the very nature of what it means to fight.² Although trained in the controlled application of combat power, we quickly became fluent in the controlled application of national power. We witnessed in Baghdad that it was no longer adequate as a military force to accept classic military modes of thought. Our own mentality of a phased approach to operations boxed our potential into neat piles the insurgent and terrorist initially exploited.

We found that if we concentrated solely on establishing a large security force and targeted counterinsurgent combat operations—and only after that was accomplished, worked toward establishing a sustainable infrastructure supported by a strong government developing a free-market system—we would have waited too long. The outcome of a sequential plan allowed insurgent leaders to gain a competitive advantage through solidifying the psychological and structural support of the populace.

Further, those who viewed the attainment of security solely as a function of military action alone were mistaken. A gun on every street corner, although visually appealing, provides only a short-term solution and does not equate to long-term security grounded in a democratic process. Our observation was born not from idealism, but because it creates the essence of true security, protecting not only our soldiers, but Iraq, the region, and, consequently, our homeland.

On 3 August 2004, following a tenuous cease-fire agreement between Task Force Baghdad and the forces of Muqtada Al Sadr in Shi'a-dominated Sadr City, over 18,000 city residents went to work for the first time earning sustaining wages by rebuilding the decrepit infrastructure that characterized the 6- by 8-kilometer overpopulated area located on the northeast corner of Baghdad.

For the first time, visible signs of the future emerged with clear movement toward a function-

ing sewage system, a functioning fresh water system, electricity being wired to every house, and trash being picked up out of the streets. Those performing the projects were residents from Sadr City. The extraordinary effort by the leaders and soldiers of Task Force Baghdad to synchronize the elements needed to implement the “first mile” projects within Sadr City were to pay big dividends not only to the people of Sadr City, but to the force protection of the soldiers of Task Force Baghdad.

But on 5 August 2004, 72 hours after an entire city had been mobilized to improve their infrastructure, Muqtada Al Sadr’s forces attacked. He broke the fragile 6-week-old cease fire and mounted an offensive against coalition forces.

The jobs in the northern two-thirds of Sadr City stopped. The repair to infrastructure stopped. The question is: why?

Multi-National Division-Baghdad (MND-B), Task Force Baghdad, at its zenith a 39,000-soldier, 62-battalion coalition task force centered in and around Baghdad, conducted a relief in place with the 1st Armored Division on 15 April 2004. This relief in place was midstride of an unforeseen 11-day-old multiparty insurgent uprising that left many soldiers injured or killed and rocked the foundation of Task Force Baghdad’s campaign to achieve decisive results in the influential center of gravity of Iraq.

But the task force, through adherence to an overall thematically based commander’s intent, maintained orientation on a well-founded operational campaign plan balanced across five integrated conceptual lines of operations (LOOs). Each LOO was tied to a robust IO capability (equating to a sixth LOO), moving incrementally and cumulatively toward decisively accomplishing the ultimate goal of shifting Baghdad away from instability and a fertile recruiting ground for insurgents, to a thriving modern city encompassing one-third of Iraq’s population. Baghdad had to be secure not only in its sense of self-preservation, but its economic future had to be led by a legitimate government that radiated democratic ideals across Iraq. This article examines Task Force Baghdad’s approach and methodology in implementing full-spectrum operations.

Operational Art in an Urban Environment—Baghdad

With the mass migration of humanity to cities and the inability of developing nations to keep abreast of basic city services relative to growth, discontent erupts. Such conditions create advantageous conditions ripe for fundamentalist ideologue recruitment.

Baghdad, a city about the size of Chicago in population density, and Austin, Texas, in landmass, divided through the center by the Tigris River, is, like many overpopulated yet underdeveloped cities, subdivided into neighborhoods with distinct demographic divergences, reliant on a social system of governance based on tribal and religious affiliations, and interconnected by modern lines of communications and technology. The neglect by Saddam Hussein and the gray period following initial coalition combat operations created those “ripe” conditions in Baghdad.

The Demographic Battlespace

In accurately defining the contextual and cultural population of the task force battlespace, it became rapidly apparent that we needed to develop a keen understanding of demographics as well as the cultural intricacies that drive the Iraqi population.³ Although tactically distinct in scope, density, and challenges, we operationally divided the populace into three categories that help define the battlespace: anti-Iraqi forces, supporters, and fence-sitters.

Anti-Iraqi forces. The first group defined as insurgents (and terrorists) were those who cannot be changed, who cannot be influenced, and who, although politically and ethnically different in scope, had essentially the same desired endstate—to perceptually de-legitimize the current Iraqi Government and drive a wedge between the Iraqi populace and coalition forces.⁴ Through forcing a demonstration of the inability of the government to bring security, projects, hope, and prosperity to the city of Baghdad and greater Iraq and increasing the psychological distance between coalition forces and the Iraqi populace through increased limited use of force, they turn the populace to accept their message.⁵ Their aim is disruption for political gain; their organization is cellular based and organized crime-like in terms of its rapid ability to take advantage of tactical and operational gaps. Iraqi insurgents take full advantage of the Arab Bedouin-based tribal culture so important to understanding the battlespace. They target the disenfranchised neighborhoods that see little to no progress, recruiting from those who see, through the insurgent, basic services being fulfilled, societal leadership, safety being provided, and ultimately, direction given.

When the insurgent achieves his goal, the methods of resistance among the populace take a spectrum of forms ranging from avoidance to sympathetic obliviousness or passing of information to direct attacks against coalition forces. Intimidation of the people, in particular, those who work for the

coalition, public sector employees, and government officials is a technique used quite effectively. The insurgents are small in relative size and cellular in design operating normally off of intent, but their effect can and does achieve tactical and operational significance. It takes few insurgents specifically targeting a small group of select individuals to achieve resonance across a large portion of the population.

In an effort to describe the effect, a corollary would be the effect the D.C. Sniper had on the Capital and Nation in 2002. Fear gripped the city and the Nation, producing a paralysis that had a quantifiable effect on the economy. Every white van was suspect. People feared stopping at gas stations and parking at retail establishments because they could be the next victims. Multiply this 100-fold and you can understand the effect and role anti-Iraqi forces have from an intimidation perspective on the populace.

What made our challenge completely different from any other our military has endured is the unique variable of international terrorism. Terrorist aims do not lie with the interests of the Iraqi populace but, rather, global objectives played out on the world stage through manipulation of media and the resonance associated with a “spectacular event.”

Direct-action killing or capturing the terrorist was (and is) the only option to immediately mitigate their strategic effect. We also chose an indirect approach, through co-option of the populace using information operations, to deny the terrorist physical and psychological sanctuary in an effort to thwart their objectives.

Supporters. The second demographic consisted of supporters who represented the coalition force base of support throughout neighborhoods, districts, and the government. The supporters see the future of Iraq through cooperation with the currently established Iraqi Government and coalition forces. The reality is that, when queried, most supporters preferred the removal of coalition forces from Baghdad and Iraq, but they simultaneously recognized the relative importance of the security provided and the flow of funding from these contributing nations to the short- and long-term future of Iraq.

While a large majority of Iraqis do not like the presence of coalition forces, during a February 2005 Baghdad survey, the question was posed as to when coalition forces should leave Iraq. In the Task Force Baghdad area of operations, 72 percent of those polled stated that only after certain security and economic conditions were met would it be appropriate for coalition forces to leave. This clearly demonstrated to the task force that

although the Iraqi populace inherently did not like the presence of coalition forces in their country, they understood the value of that presence and the need to first establish certain conditions before withdrawal began.

Fence-sitters. Finally, we had those on the proverbial fence. We considered the fence-sitters as the operational center of gravity for both Task Force Baghdad and insurgent forces. They are the bulk of the populace, and they are waiting to decide who will get their support. From the intelligentsia to the poor and uneducated who have little or no hope, the fence-sitters are waiting on clear signs of progress and direction before casting their support.

The fence-sitters become the base from which power is derived. Strong evidence exists that suggests Muqtada Al Sadr’s attacks against coalition forces in early August 2004 were initiated because of the visible signs of progress manifested by the number of projects and local labor force hires that threatened his scope of power and ability to recruit fighters within the Shi’a population.

Insurgents can clearly influence the fence-sitters by attacking visible symbols of government services and provoking government repression, both of which discredit the legitimacy of the government. In a further demonstration of potency, the insurgents then step in and provide a shadow government.⁶

In one example, insurgents attacked electrical distribution nodes outside the city of Baghdad and severely limited the already overworked electrical grid, knowing the Iraqi populace abhorred attacks on infrastructure. The insurgents deftly placed blame for the “lack of power” squarely on the impotence of the fledgling Iraqi Government and supporting coalition forces, citing the historical truth of power always being available under the Saddam regime.⁷

During the coordinated insurgent uprising in April 2004, Muqtada Al Sadr, as one of his first acts, gained control of the electrical substations in Sadr City. By providing uninterrupted power, something not seen since the fall of Saddam Hussein, he was able to sway support. A shadow government able to provide services, with governance by religious decree and enforcement by Sharia courts, Muqtada Al Sadr was able to provide a viable, attractive alternative to the coalition. Together, the Iraqi Government and the coalition must send clear signals of their own, directly targeting those waiting for direction through a full-spectrum campaign that mitigates the insurgent base with visible and tangible signs of progress within a legitimate context.




Figure 1. Full Spectrum Operations

Right or wrong, the fence-sitters (and the population as a whole) believe that because America put a man on the moon, it can do anything—and do it quickly. When we fail to produce because of lack of authority, shortage of resources, or bureaucratic inefficiencies, they believe it is because we, as a coalition, do not want to fix it. Therefore the alternative becomes clear.

From Task Force Baghdad’s perspective it was clear: shape operations for decisive results by optimizing the support of those who see through the coalition a future; kill, capture, or disrupt the insurgents and terrorists by denying influence and sanctuary; and, finally, decisively engage the operational center of gravity for insurgents and coalition forces—those on the fence—through promotion of essential infrastructure services; establishing a capable, legitimate government; and creating opportunities for economic independence through a free market system.

**The Balanced Approach:
Full-Spectrum Operations**

Tackling the task of executing multiple operational themes into a full campaign plan, the task force defined through contemporary, historical, cultural, and doctrinal analysis and through observation and collaboration with the 1st Armored Division, critical conceptual lines of operations oriented on truly demonstrating in Baghdad, as the coalition center of gravity, viable results to achieve the campaign objective.⁸ What became clear to the task force during mission analysis and mission preparation was that to achieve the operational goal the task force had to simultaneously work along all five equally balanced, interconnected lines of

operations. What also became clear was that the traditional phased approach, grounded in U.S. doctrine, might not be the answer; rather, an event-driven “transitional” approach might be more appropriate based on a robust set of metrics and analysis.⁹

Combat operations. Combat operations, the foundation of our skill set, was oriented on targeting, defeating, and denying influence to the insurgent base throughout the area of responsibility through lethal use of force. Precision analysis of insurgent networks, logistics, financing, and support, integrated with tactical human intelligence

and national-level collection and exploitation assets, helped shape the effect desired by disrupting insurgent and terrorist capabilities across the task force.

The tenaciousness of U.S. soldiers in taking the fight to the enemy cannot be emphasized enough. One hundred sixty-nine soldiers from the task force lost their lives, and over 1,900 were seriously injured in moving Baghdad toward sovereignty. But even in the execution of combat operations, they balanced the effect across the other lines of operations and cultural empathy. Understanding the role of our actions through the eyes of the populace was a critical planning, preparation, and execution factor.

Train and employ Iraqi security forces (military and police). The migration of training and equipping foreign internal security forces from the unconventional to the conventional force presented challenges and opportunities to task force leaders. Following the April 2004 uprisings, the task force had to create a police force of about 13,000 men and a military security force approaching two brigades, and provide the requisite staff and resources to assume areas of responsibility. The task force then had to integrate these forces into planning and executing full-spectrum operations.¹⁰

Over 500,000 hours of dedicated training by an embedded advisory staff, who lived, ate, and trained with the Iraqi Army, resulted in over 3,000 Iraqi missions executed independent of coalition presence in and around Baghdad. This critical step in the progress toward establishing full independence was accomplished through a robust advisory system where the division embedded over 70 full-time military advisory teams per Iraqi battalion

over the course of the deployment. Resourced down to the platoon level, the advisers leveraged the cultural importance of relationships to the Arab people to build trust and rapport and to create momentum toward a truly professional military force. These forces were trained to conduct counterinsurgency operations 24 hours a day, as opposed to the culturally desirable strike-force model.

A critical step toward validation of this training and equipping strategy (which continues today) manifested itself through transfer of authority of large swaths of the most contentious neighborhoods of downtown Baghdad to an Iraqi Army brigade in early February 2005.¹¹ Under the watchful eye of task force leaders, the brigade operated as an integral team member contributing to the battlespace situational understanding through integration into the task force C2 system.

In addition to training and equipping Iraqi Army forces, the task force also conducted task training and resourced the Iraqi Police Service (IPS).¹² Although still lacking in sheer numbers and throughput for training (basic estimate is that about 23,000 are needed to properly police the streets of Baghdad), the symbolic and practical importance of a robust police force to the people of Baghdad was abundantly clear: 72 percent of the local populace stated there was a direct correlation between their sense of security and the presence of the IPS.¹³

One of the challenges associated with training and equipping the Iraqi Police Service centered on the Ministry of Interior’s view toward application of police forces. There have always been traditional Middle East tensions between defense and interior ministries, and Iraq is no different. If given leeway, the propensity is to establish police “strike forces” that conduct blitz operations rather than operate as the “cop on the beat.” Although coalition vetting and recruitment of Iraqi police throughout the deployment was on par to achieving the level needed to support a city of from 6 to 7 million, the reality was that many of those recruits, after graduating from one of the two academies, were siphoned off to support strike-force operations or into an already over-populated police bureaucracy. This practice severely hindered the desired need of the Baghdad populace for established local security. The complexity of managing and resourcing the Iraqi Army and, to a greater

extent, the Iraqi Police Service, both of which exist within an Arab-style chain of command, operationally under task force control yet subject to the whims of the ministries who own them, presented numerous leadership and engagement challenges for those tasked with overwatch.

The previous two LOOs (Combat Operations and Train and Equip Iraqi Security Forces) are two missions that we, as a military force, are extremely comfortable conducting. Our training and doctrine reinforce the simple, direct-action approach to accomplishing military objectives. With a firm grasp of the complexity of the Arab culture and the value placed on extreme concepts of “honor above all,” the task force concluded that erosion of enemy influence through direct action and training of Iraqi security forces *only* led to one confirmable conclusion—you ultimately pushed those on the fence into the insurgent category rather than the supporter category. In effect, you offered no viable alternative. Kinetic operations would provide the definable short-term wins we are comfortable with as an Army but, ultimately, would be our undoing. In the best case, we would cause the insurgency to grow. In the worst case, although we would never lose a tactical or operational engagement, the migration of fence-sitters to the insurgent cause would be so pronounced the coalition loss in soldiers and support would reach unacceptable levels.

To understand how this limited view of operations will never contribute to a total solution, it is important to understand that the Arab and Iraqi culture is grounded in extreme concepts of the importance of honor above all, so much so that “lying” to defend one’s honor is a cultural norm—something that we, with our Western value set, cannot comprehend, is accepted.

One prime example that demonstrates this concept, which has been repeated numerous times over




Figure 2. The Three Constituencies – Option 1
Percentages are for illustrative purposes only and do not constitute the size of opposition.

How You Breed Insurgents




Figure 3.

Sadr City is an example of the direct correlation between enemy actions against Coalition forces and lack of basic services.

the last 12+ months, occurred in the southern Al Rasheed district of Baghdad. In May 2004, on the death of approximately 100 potential IPS recruits at a police station targeted by terrorists using a car laden with explosives, an amazing thing happened: on the following day there were over 300 potential recruits standing tall, ready to join the Iraqi Police Service—not out of nationalistic feelings, but to “honor those who have fallen.” Tribal, religious, and familial honor drove a new batch of recruits to defend the honor of those killed—and this was not an isolated occurrence. This clear understanding of cultural norms directly applied to our actions when planning, preparing, and executing *all* operations.

We operated many times on limited intelligence in order to defeat insurgent activity and exercised extreme moral judgment when targeting potential insurgent sanctuary. By integrating the Iraqi Police Service and Iraqi Army into all of these operations, we put Iraqis front and center as a clear indicator that Iraq is in charge of Iraq. But the cultural reality is that no matter what the outcome of a combat operation, for every insurgent put down,

the potential exists to grow many more if cultural mitigation is not practiced. If there is nothing else done other than kill bad guys and train others to kill bad guys, the only thing accomplished is moving more people from the fence to the insurgent category—there remains no opportunity to grow the supporter base.

Cultural awareness and an empathetic understanding of the impact of Western actions on a Middle East society were constantly at the forefront of all operational considerations, regardless of the complexity. Clearly, traditional methods of achieving ends in Baghdad, as the Iraqi center of gravity, were severely lacking. The situation was much more complex. The task force could win engagements by killing or capturing an insurgent emplacing an improvised explosive device, and it could win battles by targeting, disrupting, and killing off insurgent cells. But it could only win the campaign if the local populace revealed insurgent and terrorist cells and, accordingly, denied sanctuary.

Cultural awareness and understanding how insurgents gain support from the center of gravity

became the important campaign consideration. From this, the task force adopted the next three nontraditional lines of operation to achieve sustainable gains across Baghdad and greater Iraq.

Essential services. When U.S. forces liberated Baghdad, it was a city with virtually no traditionally functional city services, although there had been far-reaching plans dating back to the early 1980s to update decrepit city services (relative to projected growth). But Saddam Hussein’s orientation on Iran during the 1980s and Kuwait during the early 1990s, followed by U.N.-imposed economic sanctions and his propensity to build self-serving monolithic creations to himself, caused Baghdad to become a city lacking basic services even as the population grew.

As the “first among equals” line of operation, opportunities for direct infusion of visible and tangible signs of progress with repair (or creation) of basic first-mile city services through use of local contractors and labor (creating jobs) became a critical component of the task force campaign plan to deny the insurgent a base of support, thereby leading to enhanced force protection. Creating symbols of true progress by establishing basic local services and providing employment within neighborhoods ripe for insurgent recruitment directly attacked the insurgent base of support.

The task force’s understanding of the importance of establishing essential city services came from analysis of enemy actions in relation to current infrastructure. Cell congregations, red zones, and anticoalition, antigovernment religious rhetoric originated from those areas of Baghdad characterized by low electrical distribution, sewage running raw through the streets, little to no potable water distribution, and no solid waste pickup. Concurrently, unemployment rates rocketed in these extremely impoverished areas and health care was almost nonexistent. A direct correlation existed between the level of local infrastructure status, unemployment figures, and attacks on U.S. soldiers. The findings were an epiphany to the task force—this was about force protection. These were breeding grounds for anti-Iraqi forces. The choice was to continue to attrit through direct action or shape the populace to deny sanctuary to the insurgents by giving the populace

positive options through clear improvement in quality of life.

The division dedicated the expertise of the engineer corps (enhanced by a robust preparation phase of training with the Texas cities of Austin and Killeen) and established a cooperative effort with the University of Baghdad to identify, fund, and work with local government officials, contractors, the U.S. Department of State, and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to provide the essential services critical to demonstrating those visible first-mile signs of progress in areas most likely to produce insurgent activity.¹⁴

Most of the task force commander’s actions were weighted toward shaping funding to support the tactical commander’s desired infrastructure-repair effort. The U.N. had estimated the total bill for rebuilding the infrastructure of Iraq at about \$60 billion. In late 2003, the administration signed into law an \$18.4 billion supplemental dedicated to infrastructure improvement for Iraq. The distribution of monies was heavily weighted toward large capital projects, such as landfills, sewage and water treatment plants, and electrical-generation plants, and relied on other donor nations to fund projects that connected large-capital projects to local neighborhoods.

The failure for these funds to be immediately provided created the need to reprogram portions of the \$18.4 billion supplemental to affect the immediate signs of progress at the local level, or what we considered the “first mile.” Concentrating on local-level infrastructure repair led to an abrupt realization of the complex interconnectedness




Figure 4. The First Mile.

(Below) The sudden emergence of large numbers of infrastructure rebuilding jobs when funding came available denied the insurgents their power base in Sadr City. (Inset) The accounting office of Baghdad's southeastern landfills distributes pay to its workers, July 2004.



US Air Force

US Army

city system. Sewage, water, electricity, and solid waste removal all exist below the noise level of normal city life.¹⁵ In reality, there is a vast city-planning effort that keeps services flowing and balanced. Many areas of Baghdad never had these basic services to begin with. This compounded the dilapidated nature of the already existing but un-maintained and un-synchronized systems. If solid waste was not removed, it would clog the sewage lines, which would back up and taint the water supply. Further, that same sewage would probably have no place to go if the sewage lift stations were not working because the electrical grid was not functioning. Large swaths of Baghdad were left with raw sewage running freely through the streets, piles of garbage, a polluted water system (where there was any at all), and intermittent electricity.

The restructuring effort of already programmed funding moved swiftly to effect immediate local re-

coupled with hiring local labor. This effort achieved a two-pronged result: it provided a job alternative to the locals who had no job, and it produced visible signs of progress in their neighborhoods. Earning from \$5 to \$7 a day to feed your family became a viable alternative to \$300 a month, payable at the end of the month, to fire rocket-propelled grenades at U.S. forces. And, there is no sewage running through the streets of your neighborhood.

In Al Rasheed, a capital-level project became a local labor success. In building the southern Baghdad landfill, we saw a hiring opportunity. Instead of using advanced machinery to dig the landfill, employing a minimal number of workers, the task force worked closely with the firm designated to manage the project to mobilize the local economy. Working through local tribal leaders, the project hired up to 4,000 local laborers at from \$5 to \$7 per day, using handheld tools, to help create the landfill. This meant that the approximately 4,000




Figure 5.
Some level of criminal activity will always exist, so not all can be attributed to AIF/MM incidents.

people, who on average supported a household of from 10 to 15 people, factoring in the additional 0.5 more service-oriented jobs per job created as economists proclaim, potentially took out of the insurgent base a pool of about 60,000 men.

It took another 10 weeks of intense fighting to bring Muqtada's forces to the concession table in Sadr City. By the time he conceded, he had dug deep into the well of the local populace for a fighting force. Average approximate ages of fighters had sunk to 13-15 years.

But rather than 6 weeks to completely mobilize and begin local-level infrastructure projects, the division had prepared by coordinating with local- and national-level contractors, local government, and the U.S. mission to implement an event-driven plan that would have up and running, within 72 hours of a cease-fire being implemented, over 22,000 jobs oriented on local infrastructure repair within the most lacking areas of the city that correlated to the power base of Muqtada's lieutenants. The quickness of execution and the visible infrastructure projects that were immediately recognized by the local populace took away the power base from the insurgents.

The task force had given the populace another option. During the 10-week period of fighting from early August to mid-October 2004, attacks against the coalition topped out at 160 a week. From the week following the cease-fire until the present, they averaged fewer than 10.

In mid-February 2005, over 200,000 residents of Sadr City awoke to the first running water system the city had ever seen. Built by local labor, the system created a psychological divide between the in-

surgents and the fence-sitters. It created another option, and it gave hope. Across Baghdad, infrastructure repair became the immediate impact theme that set conditions for long-term security.

Will Muqtada Al Sadr or his lieutenants attack again? Probably. But the support for the attacks will be waning at best and will not last if infrastructure improvements continue and progress is matched alongside the other LOOs. He will have to go elsewhere to find true support. The people just will not support a resumption of large-scale violence in the face of clear signs of progress.

Governance. Integral to infrastructure improvement was the promotion of both the legitimacy and capacity of the Iraqi Government to govern on behalf of the populace. The government's ability to "secure and provide" targeted the shadow-government attempts of the insurgent.

In Baghdad, tribal and religious influences date back thousands of years and are coupled with the subjugation of the Iraqi populace over the previous 35 years and the inherent Middle East culture of corruption (by Western standards). Each presented a unique set of challenges in educating and transitioning to a government reliant on democratic ideals.

The method set in motion to create an ability for the local and national government to govern and to develop legitimacy within the eyes of Iraqi citizens, was through reinforcement of the Coalition Provisional Authority-emplaced neighborhood, district, and city advisory councils. Project funding provided by the \$18.4 billion supplemental was conditionally approved by local government representatives as part of a full-fledged effort to force legitimacy and build local government capacity with assistance and guidance from the coalition and the U.S. mission in handling the administration of government.

Advisory assistance from the task force internally created the governance support team (GST). Under the leadership of the division's chief engineer, and created from an array of city planning and contracting expertise within the task force, the GST provided the connecting tissue between the U.S. mission; nongovernmental organizations (NGOs); task force leaders; and local, city, and



The 1st Cavalry Division and Baghdad government restored the Abu Nuwas Park along the Tigris River in order to demonstrate a return to normalcy in the city and spur business activity in the area, August 2004.

US Army

national Iraqi Government entities. The Amanat and Baghdad Governate were forced to expand to develop the capacity to manage and resource the project process, subsequently developing legitimacy in the eyes of the populace.¹⁶

All levels of command were intimately involved in educating and mentoring the emerging Iraqi federalist-based, democratic system. In many instances there was a degree of unlearning that needed to occur. Although the population despised the rule of law under Saddam Hussein, it was the only model they knew, and they were prone to fall into patterns of governance reminiscent of that regime. Careful structuring, checks and balances, training, and funding help instill democratic, rather than autocratic, ideals.

Economic pluralism. We cannot create a sustained economic model by creating essential service jobs alone—these last only as long as the contract is open, and although they create spinoff, they are not enough to promote a mature economy. This line of operation—economic pluralism—with the previous four, is the most sequential in terms of execution. We created “economic incubators” in each neighborhood, with heavy investment in goods and services where we helped provide (through coordination with the government) the physical space, funding, and education on how to create a business plan. We brought together those who needed loans with those who gave loans and

located spaces where businesses could be situated. In this manner, we launched the process of creating the conditions for a true free market.

Most large metropolitan areas are concerned with bringing in investment and opportunity by “gentrifying” city centers and creating business parks. One example of successful investment was Abu Nuwas, a district of Baghdad along the Tigris River across from the International Zone. The area, formerly a park district, was closed by Saddam Hussein in the 1990s and later used as a forward operating base during Operation Iraqi Freedom I. The mayor of Baghdad asked for help in restoring Abu Nuwas as a symbol of the return of Baghdad to normalcy. His secondary goal was to use the area as an incubator for business generation. The division, coupled with the local Iraqi Government, began restoring the park, which resulted in some amazing consequences. Within the first month of restoration, local fish restaurants and markets began to populate areas adjacent to the riverside park, which sparked other service-oriented business endeavors to spring up in support of the park and local restaurants. This one example of an incubator was a model in helping create conditions for long-term growth across all neighborhoods in Baghdad.

Another example is the agricultural facet of the Iraqi economy. Our estimate was that the area around Baghdad, if resourced and irrigated, could

easily feed all of Iraq. But the antiquated farming methods were only providing for 25 percent of the country's needs, forcing imports of most foodstuffs. Although the \$18.4 billion Iraqi supplemental did not provide for any agricultural improvements, we were able to import, through reprogrammed funding, over 2,000 tons of grain, fertilizer, and feed. Immunizations, coupled with rejuvenating the irrigation apparatus around Baghdad, created conditions for economic independence.

Promoting economic pluralism by working closely with NGOs and through the local government's identification of potential areas

of exploitation (simultaneously working toward achieving the objective for the governance LOO, legitimizing their purpose) and basic business practices and methods, we helped local and city governments create business centers and warehouse districts and develop the capacity for the city to sustain economic development with limited foreign investment well beyond our departure.

One of the looming indicators of economic progress (and the inability of the fledgling government to keep pace) was the length of the wait at gas pumps. There were only about 109 gas stations within Baghdad, and normally, only a fourth to a half of the pumps were actually operational at any one time. Lines of people waiting for fuel were relatively short in the early stages of the task force campaign, but by the time we conducted our relief-in-place with the 3d Infantry Division, waiting lines had grown to unmanageable lengths and people were waiting for hours to purchase fuel. Paradoxically, the increase in wait times was a positive sign of economic growth: it indicated that the purchasing power of the common Iraqi had grown. Conversely, it was a troubling sign that the Iraqi-controlled distribution mechanisms could not keep pace with growth. The result was long lines and an entrepreneurial (or contraband) system of gas being sold on the street.

We tracked closely the price of goods and services throughout Baghdad and looked hard at average wages. If there was a demand for higher wages based on basic supply and demand, it was a definite sign of economic progress.

The last three lines of operations—essential services, governance, and economic pluralism—




Figure 6. The Three Constituencies – Option 2
Percentages are for illustrative purposes only and do not constitute the size of opposition.

coupled with aggressive counterinsurgent operations and training and equipping Baghdad's police and security force, produced an integrated, synergistic approach to accomplishing objectives within the Task Force Baghdad Campaign Plan. We restructured the staffing functions and headquarters to achieve a capacity that equally weighted each line of operation against the other. The importance of an economic engagement could trump a combat engagement if it was deemed more important to achieving the division's ultimate campaign objective. This became an education process across the division in mentally shifting from that which we were comfortable with (combat operations and training) to a far broader set of critical tasks.

A robust set of measures of effectiveness, relying on the Balanced-Scorecard approach, allowed the division to gauge, through each line of operation, whether we were meeting campaign objectives or, based on environmental reality, needed to shift or change to reflect current reality. This allowed a transitional rather than a phased approach to the campaign plan that allowed nontraditional approaches to campaign accomplishment to have the same weight as traditional methodologies.

Information operations. A significant reality of the task force campaign is that it is fought on the local, national, and international stages. The actions of soldiers and leaders and their efforts on the ground can resonate at a strategic level in an instant. Shaping the message and tying that message to operations is as important, if not more so, to the desired individual effect as the previous five lines of operations. Understanding the effect of operations as seen through the lens of the Iraqi culture

and psyche is a foremost planning consideration for every operation.

The speed of understanding the media cycle is as important at the local level as it is on a global scale. On the night before the successful elections of 30 January 2005, a crudely fabricated rocket landed in the international zone, killing two U.S. citizens. The news rapidly moved across the media landscape and created an impression of instability toward the election within Baghdad, greater Iraq, and the world at large. (From our polling data we knew over 90 percent of Baghdad's citizens got their news about the election from television.)

Moving swiftly and using targeting-pattern analysis, the task force was in the right place at the right time to observe the launch of the rockets on tape. Detaining the insurgents, quickly declassifying the footage, and releasing it to the media outlets within hours of the event helped calm local and global fears—an IO event that leveraged a successful combat operation through integration of the public affairs apparatus designed to counteract the exact effect the insurgents were attempting to achieve.

In many ways, the manifestation of the five lines of operations by enhancing information operations became the indirect approach to targeting the terrorist threat. We knew visible signs of progress, an understanding of the uniqueness of governance through democracy and a federalist system, and the creation of jobs in concert with training Iraqi security forces and directly combating insurgent activity could in essence reduce and freeze insurgent influence and recruitment by creating an irreversible momentum. But, only through co-option of the people of Baghdad and Iraq could we defeat the international terrorist threat.

Through use of our IO venues we not only radiated the accomplishments of the fledgling Iraqi Government but also provided causal proof of the inability of the Iraqi populace to move forward toward democracy because of terrorist actions. In addition, we provided an anonymous venue to give information to the coalition through which to directly target terrorist, insurgent, and criminal activity in the face of intimidation.¹⁷

The full spectrum of information operations within the task force ranged from consequence management before and after conducting direct action to the education of the intricate complexities of a democracy, local safety announcements, and infrastructure status, to a Command Information Program. What was the message? How would it be received? How can we influence and shape the message to support the action? And vice versa: how can we influence and shape the action to support the message?

To target the operational center of gravity, infor-

mation operations, in concert with actions, rose to a level of importance never before deemed necessary, and it was well known that the insurgents knew the value of an information operation executed at the right opportunity. Unless coalition-initiated projects were methodically thought through and publicized, insurgents would claim credit for the results, using posters, graffiti, or even sermons to inform the people they were the ones responsible for improvements.

Our Changing Role from an Operational Perspective

It is no longer sufficient to think in purely kinetic terms. Executing traditionally focused combat operations and concentrating on training local security forces works, but only for the short term. In the long term, doing so hinders true progress and, in reality, promotes the growth of insurgent forces working against campaign objectives. It is a lopsided approach.

The reality is that there are cultural mechanisms at play that demand a more integrated plan. No longer is it acceptable to think sequentially through stability operations and support operations by believing that if you first establish the security environment, you can work sequentially toward establishing critical infrastructure and governmental legitimacy then drive toward economic independence.

From an organizational perspective, the Army has successfully created the most modern, effective set of systems for rapid execution of combat operations on the planet. We can achieve immediate effects through command and control of our organic systems. What we have not been able to do is create the systems and processes to execute the nonlethal side as effortlessly as combat operations. Our own regulations, bureaucratic processes, staff relationships, and culture complicate the ability of our soldiers and leaders to achieve synchronized nonlethal effects across the battlespace. Our traditional training model, still shuddering from the echo of our Cold War mentality, has infused our organization to think in only kinetic terms. This demands new modalities of thinking and a renewed sense of importance to the education of our officer corps.

Critical thinking, professionally grounded in the controlled application of violence, yet exposed to a broad array of expertise not normally considered as a part of traditional military functions, will help create the capacity to rapidly shift cognitively to a new environment. We must create an organization built for change, beginning with the education of our officer corps.

Our strategic environment has forever changed. It demands a realignment of the critical tasks needed to be successful as a military force. Those

critical tasks must be matched to how we execute the tools of national power from a structural and cultural perspective.

The move toward modularity is of prime importance to the future of our force, yet advocating radical surgery to mission requirements might not be the optimal solution. The 1st Cavalry Division was able to rapidly make the change from a traditional armored force and focus quickly on a new environment because of the adaptability of soldiers and leaders who had developed the necessary leader skills and team comfort based on training fewer, rather than more, training tasks. Concern arises when you diffuse the valuable, nonreturnable resource of time by increasing the number of tasks to be trained. In the case of an uncertain future, less might be more.

From the perspective of asset allocation, this same move toward modularity, without considering its full effects, could hinder the immediate operational resource needs of a unit of employment (UEX) headquarters. The full-spectrum campaign approach forces the imperative of achieving balance across multiple lines of operations. This predictably will cause shifts in the main effort, but the force multipliers, traditionally located at the division (now the UEX), are no longer readily available and, instead, are committed Unit of Action (UA) assets. The friction of reallocation through mission analysis then slows the tempo needed to achieve operational balance.

Our joint doctrine requires phased operations, which leads us to believe there is and always will be a distinct demarcation between major combat operations and stability operations. It would be helpful if the insurgents and terrorists we encounter would follow the same doctrine, but they have not in Iraq, and they will not in the future. Transitional

indicators associated with the full spectrum of operations weighed against a campaign plan tailored for the environment might be a better method of conflict evolution. We should consider paraphrasing Clausewitz: full-spectrum operations are the continuation of major combat operations by other means.

This campaign's outcome, as the outcomes of future similar endeavors will be, was determined by the level of adaptation displayed and the intense preparation by the small-unit leader. Field grade and general officers became a supporting cast who existed to provide guidance and to resource the needs of small-unit leaders. Whether it was money, training, intelligence, or access to information in a usable format, our junior leaders could win engagements that, collectively, could offset the goals of adversaries who were comfortable operating within our decision cycle based on their flat organizational structure and communications methods.

Even our own C2 systems and process, oriented on providing clarity above, had to be turned upside down to focus on providing the tip of the spear with the information and actionable knowledge needed to determine the best course of action within the commander's intent, guidance, rules of engagement, and law of land warfare. Doing this was effective in mitigating and offsetting—on a collective scale—the consequences of our own anachronistic cultural hierarchy against the networked, flat, viral nature of insurgents and terrorists.

Although arming small-unit leaders with knowledge so they can determine the right course of action is the correct procedure, there was rarely (if ever) one decisive operation that would unequivocally shift the currents of change toward certain victory. Rather, it was the net effect of many microdecisive actions performed along all interconnected lines of operation that left the indelible mark of true progress. Transition along the interconnected lines of operations began with acknowledging that it was a battle with multiple indicators and multiple conceptual fronts.

A decisive, exhilarating “win” along one of the lines of operations would only create a salient to be predictably eroded by the insurgent. The broad collection of small, decisive victories along all the lines of operations, supporting each other in a delicate balance of perception and purpose, would move the campaign toward positive results.

Simultaneous vs. Sequential Effect




Figure 7. The Lopsided Approach.

The campaign plan executed by Task Force Baghdad created the conditions to keep our soldiers safe and our homeland sound. Although we train and are comfortable executing wide sweeps through the desert, warfare as we know it has changed. The demographic progression toward large urban areas and the inability of local governments to keep abreast of basic services breeds cesspools for fundamentalist ideologues to take advantage of the disenfranchised. Using our economic strength as an instrument of national power balances the process of achieving long-term, sustainable success.

Exploitation

The election of 30 January 2005 was the “point of penetration” in accomplishing U.S. objectives in Iraq. Accurately expressing in words alone the culmination of emotions that rippled throughout Task Force Baghdad that incredible day is simply impossible. Every soldier in the task force who witnessed democracy in action will forever look at the simple act of voting in a different way. But, as I reflect on the last year, I am concerned about the “exploitation” phase through the shaping and immediate targeting of the remaining funds associated with the \$18.4 billion supplemental and other donor-nation contributions. How you target that funding is just as important as getting the funding. Within Task Force Baghdad, we were still short funding of approximately \$400 million to

accomplish what was needed to achieve the same effect encountered in Sadr City, Haifa Street, Al Rasheed, Al Soweib, and other areas across all of Baghdad to completely isolate insurgent influence.

Many people question why a military force is concerned with infrastructure repair, governance, and economic pluralism: why not rely on the state, USAID, and NGOs? It comes down to a simple answer of capacity relative to the situation. The U.S. military is built to create secure conditions. But true long-term security does not come from the end of a gun in this culture; it comes from a balanced application of all five lines of operations within a robust IO apparatus.

It is easy to advocate a lopsided approach of physical security before infusing projects, economic incentives, and governance for short-term political gain or bureaucratic positioning. But true progress, in the face of an insurgent threat that does not recognize spans of control or legalistic precedence (yet takes advantages of those same inefficiencies of organizations designed for another era), should be weighed against accomplishing the mission and protecting the force by using a more balanced, full-spectrum, transitional approach.

It is time we recognize with renewed clarity the words of President Kennedy, who understood “that few of the important problems of our time have, in the final analysis, been finally solved by military power alone.”¹⁸ **MR**

NOTES

1. President John F. Kennedy (remarks to the graduating class of the U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland, 7 June 1961), on-line at <www.jfklink.com/speeches/jfk/publicpapers/1961/jfk232_61.html> accessed 18 July 2005.
2. Mayor Tamimmi, discussion with MG Peter W. Chiarelli, Abu Nuwas District, Baghdad, July 2004.
3. During the deployment to Baghdad, over 22,000 soldiers went through training on cultural awareness, which became an integral part of any operation. During the ramp-up to Ramadan, the division enacted a full-spectrum command information operations campaign to create understanding and empathy for the religious event.
4. Bard O’Neil, *Insurgency & Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare* (Dulles, VA: Brassey’s Inc., 1990). O’Neil defines categories of insurgents across seven objectives: anarchist, egalitarian, traditionalist, pluralist, secessionist, reformist, and preservationist. When talking of insurgents, we run the spectrum from anarchist to pluralist. The current foreign terrorist element in Iraq can be characterized through an anarchist objective. Anarchists do not necessarily fit the traditional description of insurgent as we discuss them. Although in size and scope they are relatively small, the effects they achieve resonate on a strategic scale.
5. A clear example of limited use of force is the vehicle-borne improvised explosive device, or suicide car bomb. Limited use causes citywide suspicion. Coalition forces are forced to interact with the Iraqi populace from a defensive posture, effectively driving a psychological wedge between the people and the protectors.
6. O’Neil, 82.
7. Saddam Hussein routed all power in Iraq toward the capital. During the early days of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), equity became the mantra across Iraq, cutting back normally accepted electrical expectations across Baghdad.
8. U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], 2001), 5-33.
9. Robert S. Kaplan and David P. Norton, *The Balanced Scorecard: Translating*

- Strategy into Action* (Boston, MA: Harvard Business School, 1 September 1996). The task force implemented Kaplan and Norton’s balanced-scorecard methodology to track and update multiple LOO-specific metrics as a way to analytically gauge by LOO where the task force lay along the spectrum of operational success criteria.
10. Iraqi Armed Forces work for the Minister of Defense; Iraqi Police Service works for the Minister of Interior.
11. As of February 2005, there were seven operational Iraqi Army battalions and one Iraqi Army brigade under the operational control of the U.S. task force brigade. The task force used a building-block approach, coupling a robust adviser team with each element, using U.S. mission-essential task list assessments to track progress and skill-set-specific command post exercises to attain proficiency.
12. In January 2005, the Iraqi National Guard was renamed the Iraqi Army by the Iraqi Interim Government.
13. Task Force Baghdad resourced the Baghdad city-wide survey, January 2005.
14. The task force prepared to become fluent in these unmilitary-like tasks by studying the complexity of managing a large southern U.S. city. We examined how a city plans, prepares, and executes the services we consider “a right” rather than a privilege. We laid those plans on top of a fully functional model of the cultural norms of the Arab people, the current status of Baghdad services and government, and the networked strategy and actions of the insurgent and terrorist influence.
15. The task force also concentrated on hospitals, schools, communications, and emergency response networks.
16. Amanat is the title of the Baghdad city hall.
17. The division established a TIPS hotline through the local cell-phone network to allow anonymous reporting. The IO campaign to support this had a refrigerator-magnet effect ubiquitous to the entire population: it was always there in the background.
18. *Ibid*, Kennedy.

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An Organizational Solution for DOD's Cultural Knowledge Needs

Montgomery McFate, Ph.D., J.D., and Andrea Jackson

OVER THE PAST few years, the need for cultural and social knowledge has been increasingly recognized within the armed services and legislative branch. While much of this knowledge is available inside and outside the government, there is no systematic way to access or coordinate information from these sources. We can mitigate this gap quickly and effectively by developing a specialized organization within the Department of Defense (DOD) to produce, collect, and centralize cultural knowledge, which will have utility for policy development and military operations.

Know Your Enemy

Recently, policymakers, combatant commanders, Soldiers, and Marines have been calling for cultural knowledge of the adversary. In July 2004, *Proceedings* published retired Major General Robert Scales' article "Culture-Centric Warfare," which expresses his view that the conflict in Iraq requires "an exceptional ability to understand people, their culture, and their motivation."¹ Similarly, the 2005 "Defense Language Transformation Roadmap" notes that "[l]anguage skill and regional expertise are not valued as Defense core competencies yet they are as important as critical weapon systems."²

Although a number of institutions within the military community design and run programs with a cultural knowledge component, the programs are dispersed, underfunded, or not easily accessible to military commanders and policymakers from all agencies and services.³ The result is widespread confusion about how to gain access to needed information and resources and a subsequent reliance on informal means of gaining information, such as discussions with taxi drivers about public opinion in their country of origin.

The Defense Science Board's (DSB's) 2004 "Summer Study on Transition to and from Hos-

tilities" contains a number of recommendations for collecting, compiling, and sustaining cultural knowledge and notes that this requires an attention span far longer than the short-term focus common among today's collectors and users of information. The DSB suggests the creation of a National Center for Contingency Support, to be organized as a federally funded research and development corporation, which would have country and functional expertise to support contingency planning and joint interagency task forces. The DSB also suggests that regional combatant commanders (RCC) establish offices for regional expertise outreach to support country and regional planning and operations. The proposed RCC offices would maintain close working relations with country teams, regional centers, U.S. and foreign academia, think tanks, and so on.⁴

Pressing Concerns

Although the DSB's suggestions are excellent, they do not adequately address a number of needs within the defense community. Creating an organization solely dedicated to contingency task force support would not serve the ongoing needs of policymakers and Office of the Secretary of Defense permanent staffs who also require cultural and social information. Decentralized offices located at the RCC level will lead to a duplication of resources and effort, and a combination of contingency support and expertise dispersed at the RCC level would not address—

- Ethnographic field research.
- Cultural training.
- Advisers.
- Programmatic applications.
- Analytic studies.

Ethnographic field research. While some foreign area expertise exists within the military community, many of these cultural-knowledge resourc-



1st Cavalry officer discusses civil military operations initiatives in Kabul, December 2002.

science research has not been a priority within the defense science and technology research portfolio. As a result, individual researchers have selected their own areas of study, often based on intellectual whims and the vagaries of philanthropic funding. Thus, academic research is often not available for specific areas of interest, such as Al Anbar or Diyala provinces in Iraq, or research used to support the military is often outdated. For example, Task Force 121 used British 19th-century northwest-frontier anthropology to prepare for Afghanistan. Also, using intelligence assets to collect this type of information is not sufficient, since they lack the requisite training and skills. Furthermore, the objective of the intelligence-collection process often concerns targeting and orders of battle as opposed to understanding a complex social system.

Cultural training. Currently, cultural training within the military is generally not operationally relevant. For cultural training to have any value, Soldiers and Marines must be able to employ it in

while many cultural-training programs note that Iraqis value honor, this knowledge is useless unless soldiers know how to confer it, on whom, and when. Much so-called cultural-awareness training is not specific or local in focus and is often conducted on a train-the-trainer basis. The consequence of a lack of training (or inadequate training) is a misunderstanding that can complicate operations.

Advisers. Operational commanders frequently identify an urgent need to understand local culture, politics, social structure, and economics. Lacking access to this type of expertise, other staff members, such as the information operations officer, the S5/G5, and the intelligence officer, must act as de facto cultural advisers. (Only rarely can commanders engage a foreign area officer [FAO] as an adviser since this is not a FAO's official role.)

Because the officer corps generally lacks skills in anthropological field work, political science, sociology, development economics, and area



Figure 1. Pilot proposal: Office for Operational Cultural Knowledge

studies, commanders must muddle through with inadequate—and sometimes wrong—information. This skills gap is particularly acute at the battalion level and below, where much of the interaction between the U.S. military and the population actually occurs. Until changes in the professional military education (PME) system can fill this gap, commanders would benefit from cultural advisers who can identify legitimate leaders and the interests of the population in the area in question; ethno-religious, class, and tribal groups; and help develop courses of action for institution building and economic development, among other things.


Programmatic applications. With no centralized office for cultural knowledge, no natural home exists for programs such as the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Task Force pilot program on the cultural preparation of the environment or the Iraq Predeployment Training Program sponsored by the U.S. Army G3. As a result, such programs become buried within the bureaucracy and are not distributed or used in a timely and appropriate fashion.

Analytic studies. Demand for ad hoc social science research in support of planning and operations has been on the rise throughout the last 10 years. At present, staff officers with limited social science skills and minimal access to unbiased information on the subjects they are researching conduct much

of this research. Asked how he got information on other cultures, how other societies are organized, and what is important to their populations, one staff officer said the best resource he had was Google, which is hardly a solution to the pressing problems the United States currently faces.

DOD should create and house an organization of social scientists having strong connections to the services and combatant commands. The organization should act as a clearinghouse for cultural knowledge, conduct on-the-ground ethnographic field research, provide reachback to combatant commanders, design and conduct cultural training; and disseminate knowledge to the field in a useable form. (See Figure 1.) Among other things, this organization should be responsible for the following tasks:

- Provide on-the-ground ethnographic research (interviews and participant observation) in all areas of strategic importance (such as Eastern Europe, the Maghreb, Sub-Sahara Africa, the Middle East, Southwest Asia, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia) to support development of training, education, wargames, Red Teams, planning, and concepts.
- Develop and conduct predeployment and advanced cultural training on specific countries, help develop PME curriculum as needed, develop and produce computer-based training on society and culture, design and produce training that units can



Purpose: augment the military’s ability to effectively plan, train, and operate in the complex human terrain of weak states by conducting unbiased, accurate field research in countries of interest and administering related programs. TOTAL STAFFING: 75 persons in 5 sections.

Figure 2. Office for Operational Cultural Knowledge optimal organizational structure.

give in-house at training facilities, and so on.

- Respond to demands from within DOD for sociocultural studies on areas of interest (such as North Korean culture and society, Iranian military culture, and so on), and conduct case studies of coalition partners’ lessons learned on cultural training, such as the British experience in Iraq where cultural knowledge was applied to good effect, particularly in the organization of local councils to co-opt the tribal sheiks in Basra.

- Provide cultural advisers for planning and operations to commanders on request and provide reachback as needed and who would also be available to lecture at military educational institutions and military commands, with particular emphasis on operational commands.

- Take the lead in identifying and implementing experimental sociocultural programs, such as the cultural preparation of the environment—a comprehensive and constantly updated database

tool designed for use by operational commanders and planners that includes map overlays of tribes, religions, and demographics.

Establishing an office for operational cultural knowledge would solve many of the problems surrounding the effective, expedient use of adversary cultural knowledge. (See Figure 2.) Unfortunately, DOD’s archaic organization, which has not changed substantially since the Cold War, makes it almost impossible to create a centralized organization that serves policymakers as well as the uniformed services. DOD’s functional dispersion, Byzantine funding systems, and bureaucratic protectionism result in a tendency to seek ad hoc, temporary solutions to complex, long-range problems. Building an organization to capture operational cultural knowledge will require visionary leadership and tremendous persistence from someone inside the system who will not take no for an answer. **MR**

NOTES

1. Robert Scales, "Culture Centric Warfare," *Proceedings* (October 2004).
 2. Department of Defense (DOD), "Defense Language Transformation Roadmap," 2005, on-line at <www.languagepolicy.org/dodlangroadmap.pdf>, accessed 1 June 2005.

3. Among the agencies that come to mind are the Defense Intelligence Agency, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, U.S. Marine Corps Training and Education Command, and the Office of Naval Research.
 4. DOD "Roadmap."

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Patterns of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency

John A. Lynn, Ph.D.

WHETHER OR NOT we welcome the prospect, counterinsurgency operations are in our future. Statebuilding and counterinsurgency are primary tasks for U.S. Armed Forces. As U.S. Marine Corps General Anthony Zinni has noted, “[M]ilitary conflict has changed and we have been reluctant to recognize it. Defeating nation-state forces in conventional battle is not the task for the 21st century. Odd missions to defeat transnational threats or rebuild nations are the order of the day, but we haven’t yet adapted.”¹ For Zinni, statebuilding, peacekeeping, and counterinsurgency are not military operations other than war; they *are* war.

In *The Pentagon’s New Map*, Thomas Barnett argues that to extinguish terrorism we must integrate the entire world into the global economy and thus give everyone a stake in it, which amounts to saying that if the terrorists are on the train they will not want to blow up the tracks.² Barnett adds that when incentives fail in a quest for the greater good, we might have to force reluctant regimes to get on board. This would require maneuver forces to execute a coerced regime change, followed by statebuilding to create stability and security in the face of some level of insurgency.

As we anticipate future insurgencies, we gain by examining past examples. Enter the military historian. The past does not supply us with rules, but it does alert us to important issues and dynamics. The past can never substitute for knowledge of the current challenge, but it can help us interpret that challenge.

Basic Model of Insurgency/Counterinsurgency

The historical model of insurgency and counterinsurgency present in this article is an attempt to make sense of insurgent warfare during the second half of the 20th century to understand

threats arising in the 21st. During the Cold War, an insurgency’s “home” was usually a country, but an insurgency could also arise within a subdivision of a country. By contrast, an insurgency today is more likely to cross borders, particularly those drawn without respect to ethnic, cultural, or religious realities. The model represents home as a box defined by geographic, ethnic, economic, social, cultural, and religious characteristics. Inside the box are governments, counterinsurgent forces, insurgent leaders, insurgent forces, and the general population, which is made up of three groups: those committed to the insurgents, those committed to the counterinsurgents, and those who simply wish to get on with their lives. Often, but not always, states or groups that aid one side or the other are outside the box. Outside-the-box intervention has dynamics of its own.

In past anticolonial, nationalist, and Marxist “wars of liberation,” the ruling government and its insurgent adversaries fought over the crucial, complex issue of legitimacy; that is, which government is thought to be the rightful authority. Governments claim legitimacy based on history, ideology, culture, economics, force—and, at times, political representation. Before the decline of the Soviet Union, Marxist, nationalist, or in the case of Afghanistan, religious ideology buttressed the insurgency’s claims to legitimacy, but specific grievances against the ruling regime usually supplied the most compelling arguments for the claim to legitimacy. In any struggle for allegiances, the ruling regime might not be able to co-opt the insurgency’s ideology, but it might be able to challenge its claims to legitimacy by addressing and resolving grievances.

However, while instituting reform implies well-meaning progress, reform was, and is, a two-edged sword. When a relatively secure government

inaugurates timely reform, it proves its good will and adds to its legitimacy, but hastily improvised reform can be read as evidence of weakness, a last-ditch effort to hold on to power. When an outside power dictates reform, as in Vietnam, reform is often seen as subservience to an alien force and alien principles. Reform to change the box and eliminate grievances does not automatically erode support for an insurgency; it depends on the circumstances. Moreover, reform does not simply take place inside the box; it changes the box itself, often with unknown consequences.

Historically, the critical test of legitimacy is the ability of one side or the other to guarantee the security of the population. To understand this, we must consider the nature of popular support. Those who rely on the government defend its claims of legitimacy. They might have more high-minded reasons for supporting the ruling regime, or they might simply benefit from the status quo in a purely material sense, as a wealthy class of landowners, for example.

On the other end of the spectrum are those strongly committed to the insurgents. This segment of the population denies the legitimacy of the government and accepts that of the insurgents. An insurgency's existence implies a base of popular support that actively aids or at least insurgents. Mao Tse-tung spoke of fish in the sea, a metaphor that suggests a great sea of support exists and that fish cannot survive outside it.


The necessity for a base of support always shapes the actions of both insurgents and counterinsurgents. Between the committed segments of the population lies the majority, which is essentially neutral in the partisan struggle. The contesting party—whether government or rebel—that best guarantees security wins the majority's support, however grudging. Here the government's task is more difficult than the insurgents'. The government must demonstrate that it can fight the insurgents effectively while also protecting the population. Insurgents only have to demonstrate they can best protect a population or, far easier, inflict enough mayhem and destruction

to demonstrate that the existing authorities cannot. Insurgents can exert leverage by convincing a population that peace will return only if the insurgents gain what they demand. Insurgents can be effective by destruction, and it is always easier to destroy than to create. It requires the genius of a Leonardo DaVinci to paint a portrait of Mona Lisa, but it only takes the malevolence of a maniac with a boxcutter to rip it to shreds.

Violence is central to war. Insurgents attack government institutions and personnel, counterinsurgent troops, and the progovernment population. Government institutions under attack include administrative offices and agents as well as economic and political infrastructure. Counterinsurgents respond by attacking insurgent leaders (perhaps already formed into a shadow government), insurgent forces, and their committed supporters. But while violence is central, we must make an important distinction between the kinds of violence involved.

In his classic *War in the Shadows*, Robert Asprey differentiates between what he calls quantitative violence and qualitative violence.³ Quantitative violence is essentially indiscriminate. We can measure it in quantitative terms, for example, by the number of rounds fired tons of bombs dropped,

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such a way as to minimize collateral damage while maximizing political effect. In conventional war, troops taking fire from a village would be likely to call in an air strike, but insurgents faced with the same situation would be more apt to target village leaders and kill them, but in such a way as to leave a lasting impression of terror. To put it bluntly, in quantitative violence, how many you kill matters; in qualitative violence, who you kill matters.

Quantitative violence is appropriate against insurgents organized and equipped for conventional war. But, more often, counterinsurgency works best when it identifies an enemy and concentrates only on him. The use of violence leaves a deadly residue. Those who are harmed or whose family and friends have been victimized do not embrace the perpetrators of violence but harbor hatred and seek retribution against them. Killing large numbers of insurgents might not weaken the enemy but simply gain him new adherents.

Insurgents and counterinsurgents vie for the allegiance of a people, but an intervening power does well simply to gain willing compliance with its policy. To speak of winning hearts and minds is probably misleading. The words seem to place kindness and ideology first, but acts of kindness are not a particularly good fit for vigilant armed warriors. Winning people over to new beliefs is at best a long process and a notably difficult task for outside forces coming from different cultures and speaking different languages. But if the model here is correct, providing security goes a long way toward earning allegiance and compliance.

The use of force can provide security, but only when applied with care. Counterinsurgents have to pursue, capture, or kill the bad guys, but poorly conceived attacks that victimize a neutral population undermine security. Restraint—not hurting the wrong people—is the key to success, but restraint is inimical to the warrior spirit. A better word is “focus” (violence aimed at the proper target and striking only it), using sniper fire, for example, not an artillery barrage. Ruthlessness against a known foe must not be indiscriminate or misdirected, and focused ruthlessness requires bravery. In reserving violence for known adversaries, one becomes vulnerable to enemies who hide in the crowd. The mission to defeat the insurgency has to come before the desire to protect oneself against any possible threat.

Telling friend from foe requires good intelligence. Insurgents depend on information furnished by their own activities, by the proinsurgent popula-

tion, and by that portion of the neutral population under their influence. Conversely, counterinsurgents depend on intelligence from their own efforts, from the progovernment segment of the population, and from those who believe their security is best served by the counterinsurgents. Intelligence has always been indispensable to successful counterinsurgency operations, and it has always been far easier for insurgents to spot government agents than for counterinsurgents to locate insurgents immersed in the sea of the population.

While not all acts of terrorism qualify as acts of war, terrorism, like war, is violence intended to achieve a political result. Insurgents often employ terrorist tactics as a form of discriminate violence. In fact, the difference between insurgency and terrorism is not so much in the character of the violence used as in its frequency and scale. Terrorists typically work in small cells, or even alone. Guerrillas, being more numerous and enjoying wider support, strike with greater frequency and employ a wider range of tactics than do terrorists. Mao spoke of three phases of an armed struggle: guerrilla war; the coordination of guerrilla and limited main force units in a more intense struggle; and ultimately, conventional warfare. To these we might add a fourth—terrorism—when it is the initial phase of an armed struggle prior to having enough support to mount a guerrilla war.⁴

During the Cold War, outside powers complicated the dynamics of insurgency because outside supporters viewed such conflicts as limited war in Clausewitzian terms.⁵ Although victory promised advantages, defeat did not threaten the existence of the outside state; this was not a struggle for survival, even if the war was total, unlimited, and winner-take-all for the adversaries inside the box. Insurgency is a form of asymmetrical warfare not only because opposing sides use different levels of weapons and tactics, but also because they have different levels of commitment.

In the second half of the 20th century, the most effective way to neutralize outside support to counterinsurgents was to turn sentiment in the outside country against the intervention. Support declines when the penalties for withdrawal seem remote and few and the war's expense and loss of life are evident. Many of those who protested the Vietnam War were moved by conscience, but the United States withdrew from Vietnam because of the cost, not the cause. At a certain point, continuing the fight was just not worth it. The same could be said for Soviet withdrawal from the Afghan Civil War.

Outside aid to insurgents is a different matter because those who aid insurgents usually have preferred to send weapons, supplies, money, and other forms of support, rather than to put boots on the ground. In fact, should large foreign forces go into another country to attack its ruling government, that would be an invasion, not an insurgency. It is true that North Vietnam dispatched regular forces to fight in the South in an invasion of sorts, but North Vietnam believed it was fighting a civil war. The critical fact is that the Soviets and the Chinese did not dispatch large numbers of troops. Because outside aid for insurgents is primarily material support, the best way to stop it is by interdicting the flow of equipment, not undermining popular support within the outside power. This fight is more physical than political.

Successful Insurgency

A Cold War insurgency was proof of strong sentiment in opposition to an existing government. Grievances that fueled resistance were widely perceived to be real. Ruling regimes were incapable of alleviating grievances for political, economic, social, or cultural reasons. For example, if economic inequity was the issue, those who held wealth and land supported the government precisely because it maintained their dominance; the government could offer little to the poor and landless w its most important power base. Cou faced an uphill battle in defense of little legitimacy.


If supported by only a small segment of the population, the government and its counterinsurgent forces could be trapped in a self-defeating cycle, a kind of death spiral. To act effectively required intelligence; but the smaller population base cooperating with the government provided only limited intelligence. Lacking intelligence, the government cannot focus its attacks; it conducted large-scale operations, such as sweeps and search-and-destroy missions that were most likely to inflict violence on the general population. As a result, the government eroded the security of its own people and, consequently, its own legitimacy.

When the government acted like an enemy of the population,

the population refused to aid the government by furnishing intelligence. Clumsy government assaults against insurgents thus become attacks on its intelligence flow. As a result, the government became even more blind and dependent on the wrong kind of counterinsurgent operations and resorted to illegal actions contrary to its laws and its own people’s concept of justice. Arrest without clear cause, imprisonment without trial, torture, and summary executions could produce short-term results, but undermine the government’s legitimacy and eventually lead to defeat. For example, French counterinsurgency forces used harsh methods in Algeria, which might have helped in Algeria but eroded support for the war in France. The counterinsurgency most often touted as a success—the defeat of Marxist insurgents in Malaya—adopted as a principle that the government should refrain from disobeying its own laws.

Although brutally repressive dictatorships use terror and torture against their own people and survive by doing so, the United States cannot afford to use such tactics. It is given that whatever U.S. forces do will be subjected to intense media scrutiny: secrets are nearly impossible to keep. Morality should guide us, but even if the cynical might cast it aside, realists would still have to admit that if the United States were to support hor-

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Cold War, many were willing to overlook our allies' tactics, but even then there were limits. The photograph of a Saigon police official rendering street justice by shooting a suspected Viet Cong in the head became a symbol for war resisters in the United States.

During Cold War insurgencies, support faltered when an outside power's population became sympathetic to the insurgent cause or, more commonly, became alarmed by the high costs of counterinsurgency. Algerians won their independence by outlasting French resolve to compel them to remain within the French orbit. A decade later, Americans turned against involvement in Vietnam in revulsion over mounting casualties in what seemed like an endless war.

The departure of an outside power weakened counterinsurgents by removing forces and material aid. It also gave insurgents momentum, and in war, momentum is worth battalions.


Successful Counterinsurgency

Haunted by failure in Vietnam, Americans often forget that successful counterinsurgencies have occurred, such as the Filipino victory over the Huks (1946-1954) and British success in Malaya (1948-1957). Some say U.S. support of the counterinsurgency in El Salvador during the 1980s was also a victory, but that is debatable. Insurgents might have been held off, but only by providing a small, oppressive elite. Those who follow the "Salvador option" as worth following tend to take a cynical view of counterinsurgency.⁶ Nonetheless, it is possible to learn lessons from failed efforts, including U.S. involvement in Vietnam.

Ideally, a successful counterinsurgent effort is based not only on effective military action but on real reform by a government that has its people's loyalty. Such reform can alleviate grievances that gave the insurgency legitimacy in the eyes of its supporters, and increased popular support brings increased intelligence, which makes it easier to conduct focused actions against insurgents. This was the case when government forces fighting the Huks increased popular support by increasing the security of the population and conducting coun-

terinsurgency operations in a way that minimized casualties among noncombatants. In both the Filipino and Malayan cases, police and small military unit operations were the rule, not large sledgehammer operations. Military forces learned to act in a way that did not convey the impression that they regarded the general population as enemies. A population that increasingly saw counterinsurgents as providing security was increasingly likely to support them and provide them with vital intelligence.

Focused violence by small numbers of counterinsurgents produced greater rewards with less residue. However, it is debatable whether such a principle justified the use of "murder squads" as in the Phoenix program in Vietnam or in El Salvador. Certainly, an insurgency's leaders are legitimate targets, but for such a policy to be effective, intelligence must be accurate. Sometimes those who identify individuals for attack are simply settling personal scores. In El Salvador, assassination was used to quell legitimate voices of reform, not simply to decapitate the insurgents. In such a case, "focused" action became evidence of authoritarian dictatorship and corruption. And deeper questions existed as well. In a struggle for legitimacy founded on justice, can a government execute its opponents without trial? That was what



Without undermining their legitimacy, the British effectively weakened the insurgents in Malaya by isolating them from their supporters. This was possible because supporters could be identified as a specific minority—ethnic Chinese working at the plantations. By relocating this population into fortified settlements, the British locked the pro-insurgent population in and the insurgents out; that is, they deprived the fish of the sea. The isolation achieved in Malaya was literal and physical, but in a more figurative sense, counterinsurgents must be able to isolate insurgents from their support base to achieve victory.

For a counterinsurgency to succeed, the majority of the population must eventually come to see insurgents as outsiders, as outlaws. The sea must dry up. When this happened during the Cold War insurgents in decline adopted tactics that only caused the population to resent them. Insurgents became a source of insecurity, not hope. Insurgents needed money, food, and recruits, and if they did not secure them from willing supporters, they extorted them from the unwilling. They changed from noble to ignoble robbers.

Lessons Learned

What does a historical model based on Cold War experience teach about the struggle in Iraq? Success cannot be achieved without providing the general population with security. Intelligence remains the key resource to fight effectively because military action must be focused to spare noncombatant casualties and unnecessary destruction. Popular support within the United States is our most vulnerable center of gravity. Yet several important factors are different. Insurrection occurred in Iraq only after a conventional campaign took down Saddam Hussein's regime. It did not begin as an attack against an indigenous regime; it has been directed toward U.S. forces and those Iraqis

working with them. Whereas major outside states intervened on the part of insurgents during the Cold War, in today's era of globalized economies and globalized insurgency, assistance comes from nonstate actors—individuals and radical Islamic groups eager to attack what they see as the anti-Islamic United States. Superpower rivalries and Marxist ideology played roles before, but now insurgents speak in terms of religion and ethnicity. Such concerns seem more immutable, but one can still hope for the victory of ballots over bullets. Only time will tell.

American troops must concentrate on state-formation and peacemaking, which require different tactics than conventional operations and a different psychology than the warrior ethos. To succeed, the United States must gain the support, or at least the compliance, of the majority of Iraq's population, but this will mean U.S. troops have to accept risks. Sending patrols out into the streets is a great deal more dangerous than bombing from 10,000 feet up.

The most short-sighted statements I hear are: "They only understand force." Or, "If only we could take the gloves off, we could win." The truth is that everyone understands force, and everyone can be battered or intimidated by violence, but such use of violence generates the three "Rs": resentment, resistance, and revenge. People who argue that the enemy only understands force imply that force wins respect. In reality, force usually only instills fear. We are not trying to recreate Saddam's regime of fear, so we must use more than force.

The wisest analysis of the counterinsurgency in Iraq came from an unidentified colonel on CNN who stated that we cannot really win the hearts and minds of the Iraqis but we can provide security and establish trust. In security lies the support of the majority and the environment in which a new and better state may emerge. **MR**

NOTES

1. Tom Clancy, with GEN Anthony Zinni, U.S. Marine Corps, Retired, and Tony Koltz, *Battle Ready* (New York: G.P. Putnam and Sons, 2004), 424.

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Is There a Deep Fight in a Counterinsurgency?

Major Lee K. Grubbs, U.S. Army, and Major Michael J. Forsyth, U.S. Army

IS THERE a deep fight in counterinsurgency operations? Based on our experience as planners in Combined Joint Task Force 180 during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) IV in Afghanistan, we say, “Yes.” Our previous military education and training taught us that depth on the battlefield was physical in nature. Field Manual 3-0, *Operations*, states that “depth is the extension of operations in time, space, and resources.”¹ This is a decidedly linear construction of the battlefield based on industrialized warfare between conventional enemies. Because little has been written about the deep battle in an insurgency environment, this article examines depth in the non-linear battlefield and how planners might develop operational effects to defeat insurgencies.

A New Environment

The Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) operating environment is both nonlinear and noncontiguous. The enemy has no national borders or traditional infrastructure. Doctrine concerning the concept of deep battle describes “areas used to shape enemy forces before they enter the close area.”² Doctrinal writers envisioned a hierarchically structured enemy system with a conventional force that predominately defined success as defeat of its opponent on the battlefield. Application of military force in depth against a conventional enemy creates physical and electronic isolation and removes flexibility from the enemy’s command structure. Also, depth has a predictable relationship to time. Hierarchical enemy forces defined distance between echelonments and maintained military systems with known capabilities. Thus, the doctrinally defined deep area of the battlefield constitutes a location and predictable time structure that enable a commander to develop the close fight to his advantage by attacking high-payoff targets.

High-payoff targets are critical nodes in the deep area that if attacked successfully will paralyze the enemy and set him up for a knockout blow in the close battle. Critical nodes in conventional warfare that provide this paralyzing effect (operational shock) include logistics depots, transportation nodes such as railyards, and command and control centers.³ But the enemy in the GWOT does not have a traditional infrastructure to support his forces and, therefore, no deep areas that fit the traditional understanding of the term. This leads to two questions: Does the contemporary enemy have a deep area? and how do U.S. forces achieve the paralyzing effect of operational shock in this environment? Without a clear conception of deep operations in an insurgency, military planners might attempt to defeat it using tactical solutions where operational-level answers are required.

The Insurgency Deep Area

The classic insurgency has a deep area in the traditional physical sense as well as in the psychological or cognitive sense. Physical depth in an insurgency plays an important role in providing logistics and refuge to insurgents within a contested population or space. These physical deep areas are also the support zones that insurgents use to recruit, plan, train, and conduct psychological operations. Denying such areas to insurgents can produce an operational effect reducing the insurgents’ future capabilities and options.

The characteristics of the enemy system’s depth are substantially different from a nation-state’s conventional force. Traditional targets that might create an operational effect in an insurgent’s physical deep area are usually dual-use. Insurgents use the same communication nodes, avenues of approach, and shelter used by the population that friendly forces are trying to positively influence. Traditional

targeting with remote sensors and joint fires typically does not meet the basic cost-benefit analysis test, so ground forces capable of discerning the enemy from the population must do the targeting.

Deep areas can also be contiguous to the contested area or hundreds or thousands of miles away. The irrelevance of political boundaries to an insurgent becomes a strength, while a nation-state's strict adherence to them becomes a constant tactical vulnerability. For example, the Kosovar Albanians conducted their most effective fundraising and information operations against the Serbian Army through an active diaspora in Switzerland.⁴ During OEF IV, planners faced a similar problem. Most of the enemy systems' critical functions took place in the provinces of Waziristan, Baluchistan, and other areas in Pakistan and in difficult-to-reach areas in Afghanistan. Creating effects in these areas often required intra-agency support primarily found at combatant command headquarters.

History provides several examples of how to approach an insurgent's physical deep area. Government forces, from U.S. Army General George Armstrong Custer's Seventh Cavalry to French colonial forces in Africa, have used the flying column to conduct raids against food stores and massed insurgents. This primarily tactical approach to the insurgent's deep area relies only on military force and attempts to bring decisive firepower against an enemy, but it denies prolonged contact to government forces. Such an approach to an insurgent's deep area has little long-term effect because government forces do not create a permanent presence or influence with the population.

By the late 19th century, French colonial forces in Africa began to understand the requirement to gradually and permanently remove the insurgent's deep area. French colonial forces introduced the concept of progressive occupation and economic penetration combined with the use of military force and political and economic instruments to permanently change the condition of the insurgent's deep area.⁵ U.S. Army forces used a similar approach at the turn of the 20th century during the guerrilla war in the Philippines. The Army used "attraction" and "chastisement" in the insurgent deep areas by combining deliberate civic action such as road construction, education, and improvement of local security forces with the occupation of villages and raids against key leaders.⁶

While the concept of physical depth in an insurgent system has been clearly articulated during past military campaigns, the understanding and targeting of cognitive depth is rarely found. Cogni-

tive depth is not defined in terms of space, but in terms of extended time and how insurgents adapt to friendly forces. Understanding how insurgents adapt in time is necessary to properly link friendly force tactical actions to operational effects and the strategic end state.

Cognitive depth has its theoretical foundation in the concept of spatial depth and the area of influence. When spatial depth and time had a predictable relationship, an area of influence provided commanders and planners with the critical tool of anticipation, which played an irreplaceable role in the science of decide, detect, deliver, and assess against conventional enemy forces.⁷ However, insurgent forces are more complex than conventional forces, so anticipation has lost much of its usefulness.

Attacking an Insurgency

Insurgent forces usually do not present the immediate, observable reaction to a stimulus or tactical effect that friendly forces like to create. So how does a friendly force produce a desired effect on an insurgency's psychological or cognitive depth if insurgent forces do not present an immediate, observable reaction? Insurgent forces do what complex biological systems do to survive—they adapt. Friendly forces should focus less on the enemy's immediate physical reaction and more on how insurgents adapt in order to seek a new advantage or repair damage to their critical leadership, population, or logistics assets.

In Afghanistan, planners attempted to identify second-tier insurgent leaders so that in the event friendly forces successfully removed key insurgent leaders in an area, they could immediately increase the priority of effort against second-tier leaders before the insurgents could solidify their command and control. Anticipating the insurgents' adaptation to the loss of key leaders and then acting immediately created a greater effect on the insurgency in the area. We also identified villages that provided support along critical avenues of approach. If we denied the enemy a set of infiltration avenues, how would the insurgency react? Which villages and tribes would become of greater importance? Affecting cognitive depth does not produce a reaction, but it mitigates insurgent leaders' options before they are presented with the need to adapt.

If we understand cognitive depth, we can develop ways to paralyze the insurgent system or produce operational shock. Colonel John A. Warden III, an architect of the Persian Gulf War air campaign, introduced his Five Rings Model


as a methodology for successfully attacking and paralyzing a conventional enemy system in depth (figure 1).⁸ An adaptation of this model depicts tangible targets that together constitute depth in the insurgent battlespace (figure 2).

Leadership is central to both conventional and insurgent forces because it provides direction for continued resistance. An insurgency is a contest for the sympathy of a population because the population provides logistics support, intelligence on government targets, and protection within which to hide or disperse when necessary. The insurgency requires energy in the form of resources, and the insurgent generates resources through fundraising and other financial activities to purchase materiel, information, and ma

model contains field and terrorists. This cy's depth and prov Using Joe Strang sity model for dev of gravity (figure 3 targets and create lin friendly forces can


tacking each CV simultaneously in an unrelenting fashion denies the enemy the critical requirements (CRs) and critical capabilities (CCs) he needs to sustain the fight, thus shocking the system and collapsing his operational center of gravity. For example, an operational center of gravity in a hypothetical insurgency might be a sanctuary within a sympathetic population. Denial of sanctuary would theoretically cause the insurgency to wither because of an inability to establish a safe base of operations. But, how do we develop a way to deny that sanctuary? The answer lies in identifying the enemy's depth using the models in figures 2 and 3.

Sanctuary to move weapons, personnel, and ammunition unhindered is contingent on the criti-



Conventional Targets

LEADERSHIP	PRODUCTION FACILITIES	INFRA-STRUCTURE	POPULATION	FIELDED FORCES
GOVERNMENT	ELECTRICITY	RAIL BRIDGES	MILITARY ELITES	STRATEGIC AIR DEFENSES
NATIONAL COMMO NETWORK	RETAIL PETROLEUM		POLITICAL ELITES	STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS
INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES	WEAPON PRODUCTION FACILITIES		MIDDLE CLASS	



Insurgent Targets

LEADERSHIP HIERARCHY	FINANCIAL ACTIVITIES	MOVEMENT INFRA-STRUCTURE	POPULATION	ARMED INSURGENTS
TOP TIER LEADERS	PURCHASING AGENTS	INFIL ROUTES	ELITES	ARMED BANDS
COMMO SYSTEM	DONORS	TRANSIT NODES	CLERICS	TERRORISTS
PROTECTIVE SHIELD (SYMPATHETIC SUPPORTERS)	BANKING TRANSACTIONS		"STREET"	
	LAUNDERING ACTIVITIES			

warfare.

the enemy system by de -
 ing freedom of movemen -
 critical requirement), thus,
 denying him the critical -
 pability of moving weapo -
 personnel, and ammunit
 unhindered.

This line of operat -
 paralyzes the enemy's a -
 ity to move freely throu -
 a safe base of operations
 simultaneously and relent-
 lessly attacking his criti -
 vulnerabilities. The elem
 of simultaneity reduces
 ability of insurgent le -
 ers to adapt to the assa
 on their system. Thus, critical vulnerabilities are
 physical targets in the cognitive realm that repre-
 sent depth in an insurgency and, ultimately, form a
 path through which we can deny sanctuary.

Anticipating Enemy Adaptation

The planner must remember that developing an
 operational concept is not a unique event or tactical
 action. Planners must devise campaign plans that an-
 ticipate enemy adaptation and develop appropriate ac-
 tions to prevent it across time. Only then will a linked
 series of tactical actions conducted simultaneously
 and relentlessly by various assets over an extended
 period accomplish operational and strategic objec-
 tives.¹⁰ This constitutes deep battle and cognitive
 understanding of the operational art in fighting a




Figure 3. Strange model of center of gravity analysis.

counterinsurgency; it is how planners in the contem-
 porary operating environment (COE) might develop
 a concept to defeat an insurgent enemy.

In a counterinsurgency, there is a deep fight.
 However, current Army doctrine does not provide
 a theoretical understanding of the deep fight or a
 methodology for fighting it. History provides vic-
 arious experiences that planners in the COE can
 study to learn how to fight and win the physical
 deep fight, but insurgent depth is also contingent
 on the elements of time and adaptation. While
 historical examples remain applicable, today's
 military planners must understand the nature of
 the insurgencies the Army faces. Planners must
 develop tangible solutions and campaign plans to
 defeat insurgents in the deep battle. **MR**

NOTES

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“Stay the Course”: Nine Planning Themes for Stability and Reconstruction Operations

Lieutenant Colonel David P. Cavaleri, U.S. Army, Retired

The object in war is to attain a better peace. . . . If you concentrate exclusively on victory, with no thought for the after-effect. . . , it is almost certain that the peace will be a bad one, containing the germs of another war.—B.H. Liddell Hart¹

WHEN U.S. President George W. Bush declared an end to Phase III (Decisive Operations) of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) on 1 May 2003, one could almost hear the global sigh of relief from a world that naively assumed the “hard work” was finished.² But those in a position to appreciate the complex operational environment understood all too well that the hard work was far from over.

Operation Iraqi Freedom has been underway for over 2 years, during which time the Army has conducted decisive combat operations as well as stability and reconstruction operations. Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, explains why the United States executed OIF: “When other instruments of national power (diplomatic, economic, and informational) are unable or inappropriate to achieve national objectives or protect national interests, the U.S. national leadership may decide to conduct large-scale, sustained combat operations. . . . In such cases the goal is to win as quickly and with as few casualties as possible, achieving national objectives and concluding hostilities in terms favorable to the United States and its multinational partners.”³

“Win quickly” the coalition did, if one defines “winning” only in terms of defeating an enemy’s conventional combat capabilities. However, JP 3-0 recognizes that achieving the intended end state of a campaign is much more complex: “Successful military operations may not, by themselves, achieve the desired strategic end state. Military activities across the full range of military operations need to be integrated and synchronized with other instruments of national power and focused on

common national goals.”⁴ In other words, the Army becomes involved in stability and reconstruction operations in addition to decisive combat when both are required to attain strategic objectives.

In his 1 May 2003 speech, Bush described a transition in the Central Command theater of operations from decisive combat operations to military operations other than war. Joint Publication 3-0 describes this transition as one component of the journey to a final campaign end state: “There may be a preliminary end state—described by a set of military conditions—when military force is no longer the principal means to the strategic objective. There may also be a broader end state that typically involves returning to a state of peace and stability and may include a variety of diplomatic, economic, informational, and military conditions.”⁵

Transition Planning Themes

Drawing on stability operations doctrine, an analysis of the U.S. occupation of Japan between 1945 and 1952, and the writings of military strategist Max G. Manwaring and others, I have identified nine specific planning themes applicable to stability and reconstruction operations conducted as part of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT):

- Legitimacy.
- Security.
- Commitment.
- Situational understanding.
- Unity of effort.
- Infrastructure.
- Economic status.
- Planning effort.
- Media.

The discussion that follows employs a case study of the occupation of Japan to demonstrate each theme’s applicability to postcombat planning efforts.

Legitimacy. Sociologist Max Weber defined legitimacy as a state of being “which arises from

voluntary obedience to a leader, a tradition, or a legal code.”⁶ For the purpose of this discussion, legitimacy applies to the form of governance and the mandate for the occupation/stabilization force as well as host-nation security forces. Political scientists and foreign affairs experts Manwaring and Edwin G. Corr considered this theme one of three that “contribute most directly to the allegiance of the population and the achievement of [a sustainable peace].”⁷ Military author Thomas Adams has asserted that legitimacy simultaneously empowers and limits a government’s right to coerce its citizens, ultimately resulting in an atmosphere of faith and trust.⁸

Effective application of legitimacy was essential to the United States’ success during the occupation of Japan. At the international level, the Potsdam Declaration represented an international mandate for the Supreme Commander for Allied Powers (SCAP), while the creation of the Far Eastern Commission (FEC) and the Allied Council for Japan (ACJ) served as additional sources of international legitimacy. At the strategic level, the combination of surrender instruments and State Department directives legitimized SCAP authority, not to mention the personal legitimacy afforded General of the Army Douglas A. MacArthur by both President Harry S. Truman and General of the Army and Chief of Staff George C. Marshall. Emperor Hirohito, even after his de-mystification as part of the SCAP democratization program, remained the legitimate sovereign of Japan in the hearts of the Japanese. His immediate, unreserved support of SCAP policy endorsed the legitimacy of the occupation, which, in turn, facilitated the subsequent transfer of legitimacy from SCAP back to the Japanese Government via the postwar constitution.

Our interest in this theme extends to practical applications in non-Western cultures encountered during the GWOT. If every form of governance needs legitimacy to survive, then how does one establish the perception of legitimacy? On what basis does one claim it? How does one maintain it? And how does one successfully transfer it, especially if the transfer results in a nondemocratic approach to governance? These are the questions commanders and planners must ask before embarking on a stability operation and when evaluating courses of action intended to support the creation of a legitimate government.

Security. Demilitarization and demobilization eliminated the possibility that a resurgent Japanese military might jeopardize a peaceful occupation and postwar reconstruction program. Demilitarization and demobilization satisfied specific Potsdam

Declaration and surrender stipulations and had second-order effects on domestic security and economic environments. However, the cost of compliance was steep. MacArthur predicated his initial occupation plan on the assumption that Japanese capitulation required an invasion followed immediately by an opposed occupation. He projected a requirement of approximately 685,000 soldiers.

Taking into account the relatively benign domestic environment, but still mindful of the need to compensate for the elimination of Japan’s self-protection capability brought about by a successful demobilization program, SCAP subsequently revised this number down to roughly 315,000 U.S. and 45,000 U.K. soldiers.⁹ By the end of 1945, the United States had stationed 354,675 troops in Japan as security forces and members of local military observation teams.¹⁰ That number represented a substantial commitment of combat power to establishing and maintaining a secure environment in a country little more than three-quarters the size of Iraq and two-thirds the size of Afghanistan—a fact even more significant given the Japanese people were not violently opposed to the occupation.

In 1950, the Japanese Government, with SCAP’s endorsement, created a 75,000-man paramilitary National Police Reserve to respond to large-scale domestic disturbances—this in a country whose society took pride in its heritage of social harmony and polite interaction. Establishing and maintaining security and, when appropriate, transferring responsibility for it was vital to occupation democratization and economic programs.

Security transcends the typical military definition centered on force protection; in the context of stability and reconstruction operations, military commanders and planners from every agency involved must recognize a responsibility to a much larger community. Under the provisions of the U.S. Law of Land Warfare and the Law of War, as codified in customary and conventional international treaty law, occupation forces must provide a secure environment for the host-nation population as well as all other elements having a legitimate reason to reside or conduct business in the area of operations.¹¹ This sounds straightforward, but the second- and third-order effects of security, or lack thereof, are important to remember. If the local populace is afraid to venture out to conduct business, or work, or vote, the legitimacy of the government and law-enforcement apparatus is in question. If the international community is unwilling to invest resources in what it perceives to be an insecure environment, stability operations risk

exceeding their capability to support the growth of an economic infrastructure.

Commitment. Aside from the troops provided by the United Kingdom, and minimal participation in the FEC and ACJ advisory bodies, the level of international commitment to the post-World War II stability operation in Japan was relatively inconsequential. The U.S. commitment of 7 years, several billion dollars, over 350,000 soldiers, and untold intellectual energy ultimately resulted in a tremendous payoff—a Pacific Rim ally who continues to grant basing rights, functions as a major international trading power, and serves as an example of how Western democratic principles can be successfully adapted to a non-Western society.

Various methods combined to demonstrate the U.S. level of commitment to the enterprise: the presence of U.S. troops visibly reinforced the message; MacArthur's provision of emergency food assistance tangibly demonstrated a level of compassion and commitment totally unexpected but graciously accepted; and SCAP's willingness to occupy Japan through a Japanese Government administrative structure demonstrated a real commitment to the principles of democratic governance the occupation worked to inculcate.

An additional measure, albeit somewhat intangible, was the decision to assign MacArthur as the Supreme Commander of Allied Powers. On the surface this made operational sense: MacArthur had commanded Allied operations in the Pacific and was capable of wielding similar authority in Japan. On a deeper level, however, MacArthur's selection demonstrated a remarkable sense of situational understanding and provided clear evidence of the level of U.S. commitment to this particular stability operation. That the United States committed one of its most prestigious military commanders to the occupation—a man whose talents could have been applied in any number of postwar venues—was not lost on the Japanese.

Ambassador William Walker, with the experience of several diplomatic postings on which to draw, placed a strong emphasis on this as a planning theme: "If you can't stay the course, don't go in. And 'the course' will likely include commitment and attention well beyond dealing with the immediate threat, and recognition that the issues at play are more complex, difficult to resolve, and resource-intensive than previously imagined."¹² Future military and civilian stability operations commanders and planners would do well to keep this occupation example in mind when estimating key resources—especially time—needed to demonstrate resolve and commitment to a transition where the effort will be continuous and the

population potentially ambivalent, if not outright hostile.

Situational understanding. The U.S. occupation of Japan did not proceed without controversy: this was, after all, a clash of cultures in every sense of the phrase. But the transition between combat and stability operations was much more efficient because MacArthur and SCAP planners demonstrated an appreciation of the environment they faced.

MacArthur's exceptional situational understanding of the Asian environment, in general, and the Japanese postwar situation, in particular, was firmly grounded in his earliest military experiences. In October 1904, he had accompanied his father, Lieutenant General Arthur MacArthur, on a 9-month inspection visit to the Far East to observe the Russo-Japanese War. During the trip, he developed an appreciation for the "boldness and courage of the [Japanese] soldier [and the] thrift, courtesy, and friendliness of the ordinary citizen. . . ."¹³ Although he was only lieutenant at the time, he recognized the critical role the Emperor played in Japanese society, especially with regard to the military: "His [the Japanese soldier's] almost fanatical belief and reverence for his Emperor impressed me indelibly."¹⁴

Some 40 years later MacArthur's challenge would be to de-mystify Hirohito without destroying a critical component of the Japanese social fabric. As historians Ray Moore and Donald Robinson observed, "Japan's public philosophy had to change. [I]t had to be transformed, incorporating the people's emotional attachment to the Emperor but explicitly and decisively rejecting the notion that he was the sovereign ruler."¹⁵ MacArthur's decision to work through the Emperor in pursuit of democratization, based to some extent on his understanding of this one man's influence, paid huge dividends and greatly impressed the postwar Japanese Government.¹⁶

MacArthur also recognized that his responsibilities as SCAP during Phase IV differed fundamentally from those he exercised as the Pacific Theater combatant commander during Phase III. During decisive operations his focus was on forcing a Japanese capitulation, but during stability and reconstruction operations he determined his professional military knowledge "was no longer a major factor." His highly developed sense of situational understanding led him to recognize he had to be, in his own words, "an economist, a political scientist, an engineer, a manufacturing executive, a teacher, even a theologian of sorts. [He] had to rebuild a nation that had been almost completely destroyed by the war."¹⁷

The need for situational understanding also applied to U.S. occupation soldiers and their interactions with the civilian population. Most Japanese citizens never saw MacArthur, senior SCAP officers, or even senior Japanese Government officials, but they interacted daily with occupation troops. Almost overnight several hundred thousand U.S. troops shifted from an invasion mindset to one of stability operations. American troops influenced every aspect of Japanese culture they came in contact, yet few disturbances were reported.¹⁸ The U.S. soldier's courtesy, professionalism, dignity, and discipline deserve much of the credit for the success of the occupation at the local level. So, too, must we credit SCAP efforts to train occupation soldiers, enhance cultural awareness, and supervise interactions between military teams in the field and in Japanese administrative agencies. The U.S. occupation of Japan shows that informed, adaptive situational understanding at all levels of a stability operation is a key combat multiplier in the fight for a sustainable peace.

Field Manual 3-0, *Operations*, defines situational understanding as the "product of applying analysis and judgment to the common operational picture to determine the relationships among the factors of [METT-TC]." But these factors do not do justice to the complexity and significance of situational awareness in the context of stability and reconstruction operations.¹⁹ Manwaring and Corr admonish us to redefine "enemy," "power," and "victory" when thinking about stability operations.²⁰ They state that once the transition has been announced the enemy is no longer a viable entity but, rather, becomes the much more complex notion of "violence" and its causes.

Pretransition power is combat power brought to bear by the joint force commander (JFC). During stability and reconstruction operations, however, power is a "multi-level and combined political, psychological, moral, informational, economic, social, military, police, and civil activity that can be brought to bear. . . ."²¹ To develop situational understanding, commanders and planners must become ever more proficient in combining cultural awareness, an innovative METT-TC analysis, and an informed intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB). Without it, they risk making decisions based on inaccurate or inapplicable data.

Unity of effort. A unified Allied effort was essential to Phase III's operational success in the Pacific Theater, but when it came to planning and conducting Phase IV, the international community's contribution was marginal. By and large, the United States found itself planning and executing

stability and reconstruction operations in Japan on its own.

Unilateral U.S. unity of effort, however, was instrumental in the transition to stability operations. Unity of effort began at the highest levels of the U.S. Government and extended down to military teams deployed throughout Japan. MacArthur, his staff, and the final occupation plan (Operation Blacklist) benefited from detailed expert planning efforts of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) prior to Japan's surrender. MacArthur enjoyed the support of the U.S. executive and legislative branches during the occupation. His staff understood his end-state goals and interim objectives for the demilitarization and democratization of Japan, and it was able to issue instructions to the Japanese Government to guide reform programs.

Unity of effort entails the idea that no stability operation can truly succeed unless it benefits from long-term multilevel commitment and support. This is not a new concept for military commanders in decisive operations, but the sheer complexity of the environment, and competing end-state goals envisioned by any number of external agencies, make this a critical stability operations planning component.

Manwaring and Kimbra Fishel believe unity of effort and legitimacy are the two most critical dimensions to explaining the strengths and weaknesses of traditional peacekeeping.²² The concept of unity of effort invites the reader to ask hard questions: Does the international community support the decisive operations phase of the campaign? Will it lend adequate support to the transition and stability operations phases as well? Are all elements of the JFC organization unified in their efforts to execute transition tasks? Are the JFC's interim objectives and end-state goals clearly understood by the entire force so the effort can be truly unified? Commanders and planners must work to leverage all possible resources, including nongovernmental and private volunteer organizations, not just military forces at their disposal.

Infrastructure. By 1945, key components of Japan's infrastructure were in poor condition. Manufacturing and transportation had either been destroyed, damaged, or subverted to the point of inefficiency. The military, media, key political advisory councils, and the public education system had been corrupted by militaristic ultranationalistic movements, and the role of religion in Japanese society had been rendered nearly inconsequential.

By working through the Japanese Government, MacArthur and his staff initiated aggressive economic, political, and military "purges" to reform

and rejuvenate these critical infrastructure elements. Immediate humanitarian assistance in the form of food shipments aided the Japanese population until home food production and transportation infrastructures were restored. Political reform focused on designing a governmental infrastructure that complied with the Potsdam Declaration mandate and set the stage for long-term development along democratic lines. Sweeping educational reform programs undertaken at MacArthur's direction strongly supported democratization efforts on a national level.

Immediately following its surrender, Japan was a collection of interdependent but disjointed infrastructure components. SCAP and Operation Blacklist applied adaptable solutions informed by situational understanding. The end result is widely recognized as an unqualified success.

Today's commanders and planners should take into account the unique attributes of interdependent infrastructure elements when designing and executing decisive combat operations and the transition to stability operations. Operational decisions made during Phase III of a campaign should not be made without considering how they will affect Phase IV efforts.

The indigenous population has the right to expect that the transition to Phase IV will bring a return to precombat levels of service and the potential for continued improvement over time. Commanders should be prepared to deal with infrastructure issues and the public and media fallout that invariably follows. One of the keys to a successful transition between decisive operations and stability operations is detailed, informed, innovative planning before the onset of combat operations and continuous, adaptive planning and execution during stability operations to support the government's efforts to rebuild and enhance the vital services infrastructure as quickly as possible.

Economic status. A key component of SCAP's economic recovery plan was the purge of most Japanese finance and manufacturing conglomerates. MacArthur and his staff decided to act immediately and decisively to remove key leaders who, by virtue of their ultranationalistic tendencies, could disrupt postwar reconstruction programs.

MacArthur also declined to provide overt support to the Japanese Government's economic rejuvenation program. On the surface this might seem contradictory, but in retrospect, the unique environmental conditions of the occupation supported this course of action. Truman and the U.S. Congress were sensitive to the political dangers attendant to expending funds to support two occupation efforts on opposite sides of the globe.

During the war, the Japanese industrial base had been severely damaged, but not destroyed. Even though the Zaibatsu purges significantly reduced the number of business, finance, and industry leaders, enough experienced men remained to form a foundation on which the Japanese Government could build.

Investing huge sums in the Japanese economy might have been more efficient in the short term, but such a policy would have alienated U.S. domestic support, slighted the Japanese work ethic, and undermined the Japanese Government's legitimate efforts to rebuild its economic infrastructure. Japan's legacy of economic vitality, sophisticated government bureaucracy, and highly developed financial systems did not disappear during World War II. MacArthur wisely limited reform programs to the minimum level needed to purge elements opposed to economic reform.²³

Commanders and planners must weigh many factors when determining the most appropriate course of action for economic reconstruction and stability. Immediate humanitarian needs, critical infrastructure repair demands, and employment requirements will compete for supremacy with long-term economic growth policies, and each stability operation will present a different set of conditions. Iraq's oil industry is a case in point. For years the country delayed modernization initiatives and in many locations ignored basic safety protocols. At some point, refineries must be shut down for extended periods of time to enable workers to make overdue repairs, and this will result in lost oil revenues. In this instance, Iraq's oil industry is caught between the proverbial rock and a hard place.

Iraq can elect to improve its infrastructure but temporarily lose much-needed revenue, or it can maintain revenue by assuming increased risk by continuing to push the safety envelope. Either way, the dilemma is a difficult one. Manwaring and Fishel invite commanders and planners to consider the basic tasks that await stability forces and subsequent legitimate governments: assisting in the repair of basic services infrastructure; generating employment opportunities; providing financial and technical assistance to regenerate and expand the domestic economy; and putting in place reforms, strategies, and relationships for economic growth and economic justice.²⁴ Depending on the state of the preconflict economy and the scope of combat operations, these tasks might require significant effort.

Planning effort. A study of the U.S. occupation of Japan reveals clear evidence of a dedicated, educated planning effort. Political scientist Robert

Ward believed the occupation “was perhaps the single most exhaustively planned operation of massive and externally directed political change in world history.”²⁵ Clearly, much of the occupation’s early successes should be attributed to the ground work initially led by the SWNCC and ultimately taken up by MacArthur’s staff.

Even so, Ambassador William J. Sebald’s recollection of SCAP’s planning capabilities is less than flattering. He states that senior SCAP officers were “hopelessly divided on how to approach the difficult political questions,” struggling over basic differences such as the degree of severity with which to treat Japanese war criminals and the extent and speed of political and economic reforms.²⁶ He also felt SCAP headquarters did not adequately solicit Japanese views when it established initial occupation policies. Furthermore, SCAP instructions too often included directives “conspicuously geared to American, rather than Japanese, psychology.”²⁷

The two perspectives represent different facets of the planning conundrum—on the one hand, the desire to develop a detailed stability plan before commencing Phase IV operations; on the other, the recognition that each environment is unique and the Western approach to demilitarization, democratization, and economic rejuvenation might not always be the most efficient solution. Key to immediate and long-term success during stability operations, then, is a command and staff team armed with a sound initial plan, possessed of a clear vision of end-state objectives, enabled by situational understanding, and prepared to adapt that plan to accommodate changing capabilities and environmental conditions.

Media. During World War II, the Japanese media filtered the truth about Japanese military operations, and during the early stages of the occupation, SCAP censored it. Over time, MacArthur observed a positive shift in Japanese media coverage once humanitarian relief supplies arrived.²⁸ Eventually, the Japanese media displayed an increasingly active interest in political reform initiatives, beginning with the coverage it dedicated to the constitution-development effort.

In the aftermaths of Vietnam, Operation Desert Storm, and OIF, one might be tempted to view widespread media influence as a relatively modern occurrence; the Japanese occupation provides evidence to the contrary, although one could say SCAP manipulated the Japanese media in support of democratization. Observer Marlene Mayo, for example, stated: “By one set of standards, civil censorship and propaganda dissemination in occupied Japan were highly successful in the overall reorientation goal. . . .” But she questioned the ap-

parent hypocrisy of a democratic power that, while attempting to foster democratic principles, engaged in media censorship.²⁹

Commanders and planners must acknowledge the capacity of the media to support Phase IV themes and convey positive stability operations messages to a global audience. At the same time they must recognize that the environmental conditions leading up to Phase IV might not have been conducive to widespread popular belief in the media, or as was the case in Japan, the media might have been little more than a propaganda arm of the government rather than a forum for democratic debate and the free exchange of ideas.

Questions for the Future

I suspect most commanders and planners would rather focus intellectual energy on Phase III than on any other phase. But truth be told, Phase III operations do not achieve the ultimate political end-state goal of a sustainable peace: they only set conditions for Phase IV activities. Accordingly, one can legitimately argue that Phase IV deserves as much detailed analysis and planning as does any other phase of a joint campaign.

Two questions arise: Can these nine transition planning themes meet the contemporary operational environment’s (COE’s) demands? And, will they prove as applicable to future stability operations as they were during the occupation of Japan? In my estimation, the answer is yes, but only if commanders and planners are willing to consider the following points.

First, some of these themes will always be more important than others by virtue of how they affect end-state goals. Legitimacy, security, and situational understanding are so critical to the long-term success of any stability operation that an inadequate effort in any one of the three areas is sure to result in significant challenges; miscarriage in all three will almost assuredly guarantee the failure of the entire stability operation. The remaining six planning themes deserve consideration on their own merits, but the reality is that legitimacy, security, and situational understanding represent the “big three.” Every operational decision made, every resource committed, every negotiation conducted, and every policy implemented should be done only after considering the long-term effect of that action on legitimacy, security, and situational understanding.

Second, no two stability operations will ever be alike. COE describes a constantly evolving world that encompasses the present while looking to the future and evokes the notion of an enemy (which in the case of stability operations, becomes violence

and all of its root causes) that is constantly learning, adapting, changing, and pushing the envelope of civilized conduct. Long gone are the relatively comfortable days when a doctrinal template, a solid IPB, and a stopwatch sufficed as analytical tools. Commanders and planners must apply these planning themes in a dynamic mode to fight for information, intelligence, and situational understanding, especially with regard to stability operations.

Third, commanders and planners must also recognize that all nine planning themes are interrelated. The U.S. occupation of Japan provided several examples of how decisions made with regard to one planning theme affected another. For example, MacArthur's masterful application of situational understanding to the issue of the Emperor's post-war status affected the security environment and the public perception of the Japanese Government's legitimacy. OIF provides several examples as well. The Coalition Provisional Authority's decision

to disband the Iraqi military and security forces continues to affect the region's security situation and economic recovery. In another example, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani's intercession with Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr to help end the battle of Najaf reflects the complex interdependency of situational understanding, security, and legitimacy.

At any time, the operating environment can force one of the planning themes to the forefront. In response to changing conditions, commanders and planners should remain flexible in their application of the nine transition planning themes as they conduct a holistic stability operations campaign.

Finally, commanders must always remember the immeasurable value of commitment and dedication to the long haul. The likelihood of decisions, actions, or policies receiving recognition in the form of positive press or popular support is slim. Stability operations' success is measured in generations, not months. **MR**

NOTES

1. B.H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy* (London: Farber and Farber, Ltd., 1985), 353.
2. The White House, "President Bush Announces Major Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended" (remarks by the President from the USS *Abraham Lincoln* at sea off the coast of San Diego, California, 1 May 2003), on-line at <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/05/iraq/20030501-15.html>, accessed 23 May 2005. Bush declared: "Major combat operations in Iraq have ended. In the battle of Iraq, the United States and our allies have prevailed. And now our coalition is engaged in securing and reconstructing that country."
3. Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], 10 September 2001), I-2.
4. *Ibid.*, I-4.
5. *Ibid.*, III-2.
6. Max Weber, *Law in Economy and Society* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1954), 31, cited in Thomas K. Adams, "The Establishment of Order and the Rule of Law: Legitimacy in the Traditions of Non-Traditional Operations (NTOs)," in Max G. Manwaring and Anthony J. Joes, *Beyond Declaring Victory and Coming Home: The Challenges of Peace and Stability Operations* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2000), 42.
7. Edwin G. Corr and Manwaring, "Some Final Thoughts," in Manwaring and Joes, 250-51. Corr and Manwaring identified the other two elements as "establishing security" and "regenerating and bolstering economic prosperity."
8. Adams, 42.
9. Theodore Cohen, "Remaking Japan: The American Occupation and New Deal," cited in James Dobbins, *America's Role in Nationbuilding from Germany to Iraq* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003), 30. The original required-strength estimates reflected 315,000 U.S., 135,000 U.K., 60,000 Nationalist Chinese, and 175,000 Soviet troops.
10. U.S. War Department, Office of the Adjutant General, Machine Records Branch, *Strength of the Army* (Washington, DC: 1 December 1945), cited in Dobbins, 34.
11. Field Manual (FM) 27-10, *Law of Land Warfare, Change 1* (Washington, DC: GPO, July 1976), chap. 6, para. 363. This entry reads: "Duty to Restore and Maintain Public Order: The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country."
12. Manwaring and Joes, foreword, xi. Ambassador William Walker's qualifications include Deputy Secretary of State during Operation Just Cause (Panama), 1989; Ambassador to the North in El Salvador, 1990-1992; Head of the UN Mission to Eastern Slavonia (Croatia), 1997-1998; and Chief of the Verification Mission in Kosovo, 1998-1999.
13. GEN Douglas A. MacArthur, *Reminiscences* (New York: De Capo Press, 1964), 30.
14. *Ibid.*
15. Ray A. Moore and Donald L. Robinson, *Partners for Democracy: Crafting the New Japanese State under MacArthur* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 329.
16. Shigeru Yoshida, *The Yoshida Memoirs: The Story of Japan In Crisis* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1962), 51. Yoshida, Japan's second postwar prime minister, said of MacArthur's level of situational understanding and its effect on occupation programs: "The fact remains that the respecting and understanding shown by the General [MacArthur] towards the Throne, and his decision to exculpate the Emperor from all and any relationship with war crimes, did more than anything else to lessen the fears of the majority of the Japanese

people in regard to the occupation and to reconcile them to it. I have no hesitation in saying that it was the attitude adopted by General MacArthur towards the Throne, more than any other single factor, that made the occupation an historic success."

17. MacArthur, 281-83.
18. William J. Sebald, *With MacArthur in Japan: A Personal History of the Occupation* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1965), 57-58. Sebald characterized the interaction between occupation troops and Japanese citizenry as follows: "The general behavior of American occupation troops, especially the combat men who first entered Japan, was particularly impressive. Collectively, they were exceedingly effective as ambassadors of good will. The country was surprised and pleased by the natural manner in which the early occupation soldiers acted and spoke; by their helpful behavior toward Japanese women and older men; and by the unmistakable pleasure they found in giving presents to the children. These men came close to the Japanese people, and gave them a worthy cross-section of America."
19. FM 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: GPO, June 2001), 11-15. The METT-TC factors are mission, enemy, terrain and weather, time and troops available, and civilians on the battlefield.
20. Manwaring and Corr, "Defense and Offense in Peace and Stability Operations," in Manwaring and Joes, 27.
21. *Ibid.*
22. Manwaring and Kimbra L. Fishel, "Lessons That Should Have Been Learned: Toward a Theory of Engagement for 'The Savage Wars of Peace,'" in Manwaring and Joes, 199.
23. Department of the Army (DA) Pamphlet (Pam) 550-30, *Japan—A Country Study* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1992), 115.
24. Manwaring and Fishel in Manwaring and Joes, 33-34.
25. DA Pam 550-30, 306. One might also consider Napoleon's elimination of the Holy Roman Empire in 1806 and the subsequent reorganization of the Germans from 300 states to 36 as being indicative of tremendously successful planning efforts, as was the subsequent effort led by German Chancellor Otto Von Bismarck that further reduced the number of those states to three.
26. Sebald, 43-44.
27. *Ibid.*, 44.
28. MacArthur, 285. MacArthur noted the Allied naval and air blockades had been quite effective, and consequently, Japanese food supplies were woefully inadequate. He was fully aware that, because Japanese occupation policy demanded that conquered Japanese territories feed Japanese troops, the civilian population of Japan would expect Americans to demand equal logistical support. Consequently, MacArthur's decisions to provide emergency food supplies and prohibit American troops from eating those supplies must have sent a powerful message about America, democracy, and the level of U.S. commitment to the occupation's success. In MacArthur's own words: "[A]s soon as the complete exhaustion of Japanese food resources was confirmed, I issued an order forbidding the consumption by the occupation forces of local food and requested Washington to begin at once shipment of relief supplies. The effect was instantaneous. The Japanese authorities changed their attitude from one of correct politeness to one of open trust. The press, which had been dubious at first, now began to voice unanimous praise."
29. Marlene Mayo, "Civil Censorship and Media Control in Early Occupied Japan," in *Americans as Proconsuls: United States Military Governments in Germany and Japan, 1944-1952*, ed. Robert Wolfe (Carbondale, IL: Southern University Press, 1984), 319-20.

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Defining Venezuela's "Bolivarian Revolution"

Harold A. Trinkunas, Ph.D.

FINDING A MOMENT in the history of U.S.-Venezuelan relations when tensions between the two countries have been worse than at the present time is difficult. Some in the U.S. Government perceive President Hugo Chávez Frias as uncooperative regarding U.S. regional policies on counternarcotics, free trade, and support for democracy. Venezuela's alliance with Fidel Castro's Cuba, its opposition to Plan Colombia, and its perceived sympathy for the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and other radical organizations are further irritants to the relationship. On the other side, Venezuelan leaders in the Chávez administration believe the United States is fundamentally opposed to the success of the Bolivarian revolution and that U.S. hegemony in the current world order must be checked.

Although officials in both countries occasionally express hope that relations will improve, this is unlikely to happen given the perceptions each country's foreign policymakers hold of each other.¹

Since he was elected president in 1998, Chávez has transformed Venezuelan Government and society in what he has termed a Bolivarian revolution. Based on Chávez's interpretation of the thinking of Venezuelan founding fathers Simón Bolívar and Simón Rodríguez, this revolution brings together a set of ideas that justifies a populist and sometimes authoritarian approach to government, the integration of the military into domestic politics, and a focus on using the state's resources to serve the poor—the president's main constituency.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or any other government office or agency.—Editor

The Bolivarian revolution has produced a new constitution, a new legislature, a new supreme court and electoral authorities, and purges of Venezuela's armed forces and state-owned oil industries. These policies consolidated Chavez's domestic authority but generated a great deal of opposition in Venezuela, including a failed coup attempt in 2002. Even so, after his victory in a presidential recall referendum during the summer of 2004, Chávez seems likely to consolidate his grip on power and even win reelection in 2006.

Although the Bolivarian revolution is mostly oriented toward domestic politics, it also has an important foreign policy component. Bolivarian foreign policy seeks to defend the revolution in Venezuela; promote a sovereign, autonomous leadership role for Venezuela in Latin America; oppose globalization and neoliberal economic policies; and work toward the emergence of a multipolar world in which U.S. hegemony is checked.² The revolution also opposes the war in Iraq and is skeptical of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). The United States has worked fruitfully in the past with Venezuela when the country pursued an independent foreign policy, but the last three policies run directly contrary to U.S. foreign policy preferences and inevitably have generated friction between the two countries.³

Still, the geopolitics of oil make it difficult for the United States and Venezuela to escape their traditional economic and political partnership. The United States is Venezuela's most important consumer of its main export—oil. As a market, the United States possesses key advantages for Venezuela, such as geographic proximity, low transportation costs, and

an ever increasing demand for energy. Access to large Venezuelan oil deposits across short, secure sea lines of communication is undoubtedly a strategic asset for the United States. Also, the United States and Venezuela have often found common political ground after Venezuela democratized in 1958, particularly as the rest of Latin America moved away from authoritarianism during the 1980s and 1990s.

Nevertheless, friction between the United States and Venezuela on trade policies, human rights, and regional politics is not new. What is different today about Venezuela's Bolivarian foreign policy is that it seems to be increasingly at odds with the United States precisely in the areas that once brought the two countries together—oil and democracy.

Venezuela is increasingly ambivalent about its role as a key supplier of oil to the United States, reaffirming its belief in the importance of the U.S. market yet threatening to deny access to oil as a strategic lever against U.S. policies. Chávez has reinvigorated OPEC, which seemed moribund during the 1990s, and he has sought to build direct ties to other non-OPEC oil producers, such as Russia, and new markets, such as China.

Ironically, just as U.S. President George W. Bush's administration has become more vocal about advocating democratization globally, Venezuela and the United States have fallen out of step. Increasingly, Venezuela espouses an alternative vision of participatory democracy that emphasizes mass mobilization and downgrades the role of institutions. Venezuela also views U.S. support for representative democracy in Latin America as thinly disguised meddling.

To what extent does Venezuela's Bolivarian foreign policy represent a historic break with the past? Does it represent a threat to U.S. interests? In some ways, current friction between the two countries is a replay of earlier disagreements over oil and democracy. What is new about Chávez's Bolivarian foreign policy is that it has moved beyond Venezuela's traditional efforts to maintain an independent foreign policy and maximize oil revenue to one of explicitly seeking out allies in a bid to check U.S. power and influence in Latin America. From the perspective of U.S. policymakers, this goal might seem unfeasible for a country with Venezuela's limited power and resources. Nevertheless, it is the main axis of Bolivarian foreign policy.

Cooperation and Conflict

The strategic importance of Venezuela to the United States only truly emerged after the discovery in 1914 of major oil deposits in Venezuela. In a sense, the United States was present at the creation of the Venezuelan oil industry. American oil companies and the Royal Dutch Shell Corporation created the physical infrastructure for Venezuela to become the largest oil exporter in the Western Hemisphere. They also were key in shaping Venezuelan oil legislation and the role this natural resource would play in politics. The strategic importance of Venezuelan oil to the United States was confirmed during World War II and reconfirmed time and again during each political or military crisis of the Cold War and beyond.

Despite or perhaps because of these close ties, friction arose between Venezuela and the United States over the U.S. preference for private ownership of the oil industry in Venezuela, led by international corporations, and Venezuela's preference for policies that maximized national control over this strategic asset. Beginning in the 1940s, Venezuelan democratic governments sought greater access to a share of the oil profit, initially through higher royalties and taxes but, eventually, by state control of the industry itself. Venezuela also promoted its views regarding the importance of national control of oil production in developing countries through its leading role in the creation of OPEC.⁴

To the credit of both governments, disagreements over oil policy were always resolved peacefully. Venezuela developed a reputation as a reliable supplier of oil to U.S. markets, particularly in moments of international crisis. One historic missed opportunity, at least from the Venezuelan perspective, was that the United States never appeared to be interested in institutionalizing a special relationship with Venezuela over oil, which they blamed on opposition by American oil companies.⁵

Oil wealth generated during the 1970s allowed Venezuela to pursue a more assertive foreign policy that often irritated the United States. Venezuela's leading role in OPEC gave it a new prominence during the oil crises of the period. Venezuelan President Carlos Andrés Pérez also promoted a Venezuelan leadership role in the nonaligned movement, which was often critical of U.S. policies.

In 1974, Venezuela reestablished diplomatic relations with Cuba.⁶ Venezuelan support for

the overthrow of dictator Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua in 1979 showcased a willingness to actively subvert governments once considered U.S. allies. Venezuela also sought to contain and change U.S. Central American policies during the 1980s through its leadership role in the Contadora group, promoting confidence building and regional peace negotiations as alternatives to a more confrontational United States stance with Nicaragua and Cuba.⁷

Certainly Venezuelan influence in the region during the Cold War, especially when backed by abundant oil money, occasionally frustrated U.S. designs. But these actions did not preclude frequent cooperation between the two countries. After the 1958 transition to democracy, Venezuela's political leaders were firmly convinced of the importance of supporting like-minded governments in the region and opposed the Cuban revolution model on both ideological and pragmatic grounds. U.S. Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson cooperated with the Venezuelans in defeating a Cuban-backed insurgency in Venezuela during the 1960s. United States and Venezuelan militaries developed strong mutual security and defense links through this experience.

Venezuela's first leader of the democratic period, Rómulo Betancourt, promulgated a doctrine of nonrecognition of both leftwing and rightwing dictatorships in the Americas. With respect to rightwing dictatorships, this was a step too far for the United States, which often saw rightwing authoritarian regimes as strategic partners in the Cold War.⁸ Venezuela and the United States found common ground in El Salvador during the 1980s when both provided political support to President José Duarte's Christian Democratic Government. Venezuela also provided funding and security assistance to assure the survival of the elected government of Violeta Chamorro in Nicaragua after the Sandinista Government ended in 1990. More important, the United States cooperated extensively with Venezuelan political leaders after the 1992 coup attempts to ensure the continuity of representative government.⁹

Until 1998, leaders in both the United States and Venezuela understood they had important common economic interests that required sustaining a generally positive bilateral relationship. In addition, both countries were democracies that valued freedom and individual liberty, placing them on

the same side of the Cold War divide. During this period, Venezuela essentially sought to maintain an autonomous and sovereign foreign policy, promote like-minded democratic governments in the region, and moderate U.S. foreign policy in Latin America. However, it was also careful not to place itself on a collision course with any core U.S. foreign policy interests.

Bolivarian Foreign Policy

The current distance in U.S.-Venezuelan relations is greater than any gulf between the two countries during the 20th century. Even on a superficial level, the tone of current government exchanges is often unfriendly, personalized, and frequently characterized by the use of derogatory language.¹⁰ This cannot be attributed entirely to U.S. policy toward Venezuela or Latin America, which differs only at the margins from the parameters established by U.S. administrations during the 1990s.

At its core, U.S. policy toward the region has pushed for free elections, open markets, and free trade. The steady trend toward the election of center-left governments in Latin America during the 2000s has produced little reaction from the Bush Administration other than a commitment to develop friendly working relations while mostly adhering to its basic policies on democracy, markets, and trade.¹¹ Even the greater willingness of the Bush administration to employ military force in support of foreign policy and GWOT has not translated into much of a difference for Latin America. The growing U.S. involvement in Colombia is only the continuation of a trend established long before the 2000 elections in the United States. In fact, the great reduction in the use of U.S. military force in the region since the end of the Cold War is notable when recalling previous U.S. efforts during the 1980s in Grenada, Central America, and Panama.¹²

The changing pattern of Venezuela's foreign relations since Chávez's election, particularly its growing closeness to traditional U.S. adversaries such as Cuba and Iran and such potential challengers as Russia and China, disturbs many in the U.S. foreign policy establishment. At the same time, the Chávez administration is completely convinced the United States is hostile to the success of its revolution, pointing to the April 2002 coup attempt as evidence, correct or not, of U.S. designs

on its survival. This begs the question: What are the aims of Venezuela's Bolivarian foreign policy, and are they the source of the growing political distance between the two countries?

Chávez's first foreign policy objective was revitalizing OPEC, and he has succeeded completely, although he did benefit from burgeoning demand for energy in China, India, and the West. Such an objective represents a return to Venezuela's 1970s policy of strong support for OPEC. Chávez has reached out to all other OPEC members whatever their politics, even those on Washington's short list of least favorite regimes, such as Libya, Iran, and Iraq (before the overthrow of the Hussein dictatorship).¹³

Chavez has also invested a great deal of time in building relations with Russia and China, the former because of its important oil production capacity, the latter because it is perceived as a major potential consumer of Venezuelan exports. Beyond oil, these two countries are key partners in Venezuela's Bolivarian foreign policy because they represent alternative sources of technology and military equipment, and their decisions to cooperate with Chávez are unlikely to be influenced by U.S. objections. The logical objective of this policy is to reduce Venezuelan political, economic, and military dependence on the United States. We should remember that Venezuela will find it difficult in the short term to escape its connection to the U.S. oil market because the refineries most capable of processing the particular variety of heavy crude oil increasingly produced in Venezuela are almost all located in the United States.¹⁴

In Latin America, Venezuela has sought to achieve a position of leadership and to rally support for regional policies and institutions that exclude the United States. One particular area of friction has been the U.S.-sponsored Free Trade Area of the Americas, to which Chávez has proposed an alternative—the Bolivarian Alternative for Latin America and the Caribbean.¹⁵ He also called for an alliance of state oil companies in Latin America,



Venezuelan officers seated with a U.S. major look over an operations order during a U.S. Southern Command exercise in 2001. Venezuela has since severed all military-to-military links with the United States.

US Army

called Petrosur, to foster stronger regional integration in the energy sector. At a hemispheric defense ministerial meeting in 2000, the Chávez administration unsuccessfully proposed integrating Latin American militaries and creating a regional defense alliance without U.S. participation.¹⁶ These proposals fit the Bolivarian theme of regional integration and suspicion of the United States.

The Chávez administration has also dissented from the regional political trend toward institutionalizing international policies that defend representative democracy in the region, such as the Organization of American States (OAS) Democratic Charter. Instead, it has showcased its own "participatory democracy" as a superior alternative. The election of Chilean José Miguel Insulza as secretary-general of the OAS with Venezuelan backing is a limited victory on this issue for Chávez.¹⁷ Chile has been one of the regional countries most supportive of representative democracy and resistant to Venezuela's Bolivarian foreign policy, particularly after Chávez's comments supporting Bolivian access to the Pacific Ocean at Chile's expense. However, the OAS may lower the profile of its democracy-promotion activities in the future.

In relation to security measures, Venezuela has suspended all military-to-military links with the United States and has sought alternative sources of military expertise and equipment from Brazil, China, and Russia. Given the central role the

military plays in supporting the Chávez administration in Venezuela, the United States takes the loss of these military-to-military contacts seriously. Clearly, Venezuela wants to reduce its dependence on the United States in security and foreign policy and develop an alternative network of allies.¹⁸

Chávez is now focusing on communicating his message more effectively internationally. As part of an effort to increase its regional political and communications reach, the Venezuelan Government is developing a regional alternative—Telesur—to U.S.-owned media outlets such as CNN. Telesur is also seen as an important mechanism to circumvent the role of privately owned Venezuelan media companies, which are perceived as actively hostile to the revolution.¹⁹

The Venezuelan Government has also provided support to sympathizers across the Americas, in the United States, and throughout the developed world, often sponsoring local *Círculos Bolivarianos* (Bolivarian circles) to bring together its supporters overseas.²⁰ This has provoked friction with a number of neighboring states, which suspect that the Chávez administration has aided political groups that are either semi-loyal (Bolivia) or disloyal (Colombia) to local democratic regimes. In particular, they worry that the boom in Venezuelan oil revenues might translate into substantial material support for forces opposed to the current democratic order in the politically volatile Andean Ridge.

Since Chávez came to office, U.S. policymakers have expressed concern about Venezuela's relations with Colombia and Cuba. Venezuela has always had a tense relationship with Colombia because of border disputes and spillover effects of its neighbor's multiple violent insurgencies. Tensions have worsened since Chávez became more vocal in his opposition to Plan Colombia.

Colombian accusations of Venezuelan material and moral support for the FARC have found a sympathetic ear among U.S. policymakers.²¹ One of the most salient indications of how much relations between the two countries have worsened is the case of the kidnapping of FARC leader Rodrigo Granda on Venezuelan territory in 2005. The Colombian Government paid a reward, allegedly to members of the Venezuela security forces, for the delivery of Granda to its territory. This led to weeks of tensions between the two countries and a border trade embargo by Venezuela against Colombia. Mediation efforts by Brazil and other regional powers

resolved the standoff, but not before revealing the lack of sympathy in the region for Colombia and its ally, the United States.²²

Venezuela also entered a de facto alliance with Cuba. Cuban leader Fidel Castro is an important political ally for Chávez, and Cuba is a source of technical expertise to support the Bolivarian revolution. The influx of Cuban doctors, educators, sports trainers, and security experts into Venezuela helps Chávez's administration meet the demands of its key constituencies. In particular, Cubans provide politically reliable personnel to staff new government poverty alleviation programs. For example, Barrio Adentro places Cuban medical personnel in many poor neighborhoods. In return, Cuba receives nearly 60,000 barrels of oil a day, either on favorable payment terms or as a form of trade in kind.²³ Given the longstanding hostility between Washington and Havana, it is not surprising that the new Caracas-Havana alliance has generated suspicions in the U.S. foreign policy establishment.

The Bottom Line

Venezuelan and U.S. national interests have never been identical. We should expect disagreement even in a relationship historically characterized by the mutual interdependence generated by oil, but when it comes to Chávez's Bolivarian foreign policy, politics trumps economics. Chávez seems likely to win reelection in 2006, and it appears he will be around for a considerable period of time, which puts the United States in a bind when it comes to dealing with the Bolivarian revolution.

A policy of engagement, which is what the U.S. Government attempted in the first 2 years of Chávez's administration, appears unlikely to generate a solid working relationship given Venezuela's Bolivarian foreign policy objectives. The United States' efforts to work with Venezuela since 1998, even on such noncontroversial issues as disaster relief, have met with rejection. However, there appears to be little sympathy, in Latin America and internationally, for a policy of confrontation with the Venezuelan Government. International reaction to the 2002 coup in Venezuela and the reaction in Latin America to the Venezuela-Colombia crisis over Granda's kidnapping confirm this. If Washington pursues such a diplomatic policy toward Chávez, he has already demonstrated that the likely

outcome would be the isolation of Washington and its regional allies—not of Venezuela.

Washington's dilemma does not mean Venezuela's Bolivarian foreign policy is likely to succeed to any great extent. Venezuela has achieved its minimum foreign policy objective—the defense of the revolution. However, its leadership role in Latin America is still limited at best, and its efforts to construct alternative regional institutions have failed. Brazil still remains South America's leading power with long-established ambitions of its own.

Venezuela has succeeded in revitalizing OPEC, although worldwide demand for energy in the 2000s was likely to provide this opportunity even in the absence of Chávez's leadership. Venezuela's alliance with Cuba serves mostly to strengthen the Chávez administration in domestic rather than international politics. Despite Venezuelan opposition to Plan Colombia, the Colombian state has become stronger and better prepared to deal with violent nonstate actors within its territory, and the FARC has lost ground since Chávez came to power.

Venezuela's new alliances with Russia and China are unlikely to produce much in the way of military advantage for this country vis à vis

its neighbors, particularly in light of Colombia's growing strength. Even the development of alternative markets for Venezuelan oil exports seems difficult to justify on anything other than political grounds since the economics of oil so strongly favor a U.S.-Venezuelan trade relationship.

A final question remains. Will Venezuela's new political model be emulated across the region? This seems unlikely. The Bolivarian revolution, which is not a coherent ideological model that can be replicated in other countries, depends on Chávez's personality, charisma, and drive. The Bolivarian revolution increasingly depends on distributing large amounts of oil income to serve key constituencies in Venezuela. Other Latin American countries lack such resources, and in the past have not had much success at redistributing wealth. This does not mean, however, that the underlying sources of political volatility in Latin America, such as poverty, extreme income inequality, and poor economic policies, will soon disappear. Much to the consternation of Washington, governments that sympathize with some elements of the new Venezuelan foreign policy will emerge, particularly in the Andean region where democracy seems most vulnerable. **MR**

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The Battle of Darwin-Goose Green

Robert S. Bolia

OFFICERS STUDY the history of past battles to learn how to be better commanders. Yet more often than not, military history is the study of failures rather than successes. Most interesting battles have been close affairs, in the sense that, at least at one point in the action, victory might have gone to either side. In many of these battles, the final result was decided not so much by what the winner did right, but by what the loser did wrong.

For example, the rapid, decisive character of the victory of Prussia over France in 1870-1871 owed as much to the French's incompetence as to the Germans' superior tactics. The same can be said of many of Confederate General Robert E. Lee's victories over Union armies in the American Civil War or of Israeli victories in 1948, 1956, 1967, and 1973. Indeed, it would probably not be much of an exaggeration to suggest that battles in which this was not the case are the exception rather than the rule.

The Falklands War between Argentina and Great Britain was not one of the exceptions. Although the invasion of the Falkland Islands began well enough for the Argentines, most subsequent operations did not. Despite being thousands of miles from their nearest base, the British were able to mount an unopposed amphibious landing at San Carlos, win every land engagement, and maintain air superiority throughout the campaign. While the Argentines did have some successes, including sinking at least six British ships, these came at a heavy cost in pilots and aircraft to the Argentina Air Force (Fuerza Aerea Argentina [FAA]) and Argentina Naval Aviation (Aviacion Naval Argentina [ANA]).¹

What is most interesting about the Falklands conflict is that, based on commonly accepted military doctrine and the forces available in the theater of operations, Argentina should not have lost so easily. From a strictly military point of view, an eventual British victory was inevitable, but it

should not have been such a walkover. Furthermore, such a victory might have required a higher cost in human lives than the British public was willing to pay, which might have led to a negotiated solution. Yet such a strategy of attrition could not succeed in the wake of repeated tactical and operational failures.

At least as interesting as the question of why Argentina so easily lost the war is why British historians have failed to consider the conflict from the Argentine perspective. Saying that the British were better trained or had better tactics and doctrine is fine, but war depends as much on what an adversary does as on what one does oneself. Among the dangers inherent in failing to consider an adversary's possibilities—even after the fact—are the learning of inappropriate tactical lessons and the complacency caused by overconfidence. Israel, for example, had fallen into both traps in the years leading up to the Yom Kippur War.²

After the unopposed landing of 3 Commando Brigade at San Carlos on 21 May 1982, the British occupied the hills surrounding the settlement and consolidated defense of the beachhead. Despite strikes by the FAA and ANA that resulted in the sinking of four British ships, the Argentine Army made no attempt to prevent the amphibious landing.³ First among the many reasons for this was that they did not have land vehicles capable of traversing the terrain of the islands, which had few roads. Second, British air superiority made it too dangerous to fly helicopters. Finally, a march was out of the question: the nearest Argentine troop concentration was at Goose Green, more than 20 kilometers away.⁴ By the time these troops reached San Carlos, the five British battalions would have already adopted their defensive positions in the hills.

Brigadier Julian Thompson, commanding the landing force, ordered Lieutenant Colonel Herbert "H" Jones, commanding 2 Battalion, Parachute

Regiment (2 Para), to plan a raid on Argentine positions at Darwin and Goose Green. These positions, located on a narrow isthmus connecting East Falkland with Lafonia, were of no strategic importance for Thompson, whose objective was Stanley, the capital. However, his brigade would not be ready to advance on Stanley for several days, and he wanted to use the time to “establish moral and physical domination over the enemy,” as instructed by Major General Jeremy Moore, who took command of the land forces when he arrived in the Falklands 2 weeks later.⁵ Nevertheless, when they discovered how little artillery could be moved with the helicopters available, the raid was called off. Thompson was not willing to risk a battalion by sending it without adequate artillery support in a raid that was not absolutely necessary.

Joint headquarters in the United Kingdom proved more willing to take the risk, concerned as it was that the war might not appear to be going well to the British people, who had seen no victories and four of Her Majesty’s ships sunk. Thompson was therefore ordered to send 2 Para to capture the positions at Darwin and Goose Green, regardless of the availability of artillery, to secure a victory for the British public. While 2 Para moved south to the Darwin isthmus, three of the brigade’s other battalions marched east toward Stanley, with the last battalion remaining at San Carlos to defend the beachhead.⁶

When planning the advance, Jones did not adhere to Helmuth Carl von Moltke’s dictum that “no plan of operations extends with certainty beyond the first encounter with the enemy’s main strength.”⁷ Instead, he planned a complex six-phase operation requiring exquisite timing and coordination between his three rifle companies and his patrols company. The battalion would march south to Camilla Creek House, about 8 kilometers north of Darwin, where it would reform and rest before crossing the start line halfway between Camilla Creek and Darwin. The plan was for one company to move down either side of the isthmus. The other companies were to follow to provide support and, depending on the phase, pass through to attack their own objectives. Artillery support would come from three 105-millimeter (mm) cannons, as well as from the guns of HMS *Arrow*, which would be available for naval gunfire support until forced by the onset of daylight to retreat to the relative safety of San Carlos Water. Much of the fighting was to be done before dawn.⁸

To meet the advance, Lieutenant Colonel Italo Piaggi, commander of the 12th Infantry Regiment and garrison commander at Goose Green, had an assortment of men from three different regiments

of infantry, including two companies (A and C) of his own 12th Regiment; a reduced C Company of the 25th Regiment; and a section of C Company of the 8th Regiment, which gave him a total of 554 officers and men, a total approximately equal to a British infantry battalion (620 officers and men). This mixed unit was named Task Force Mercedes after the city in which the 12th Regiment had its peacetime garrison. In addition to the infantry component, Piaggi had three 105-mm guns and a handful of anti-aircraft guns. Also at Goose Green were 202 Air Force troops under the command of Vice Commodore Wilson Pedrozo, who was charged with manning Air Base Condor. Pedrozo’s planes (Argentine-built Pucarás designed for counterinsurgency operations) had all been sent to Stanley for safety.⁹

Because the British had control of the air and sea around the islands, an attack on Goose Green could theoretically have come from the north, by a direct march from the San Carlos beachhead; from the south, by an airborne landing on Lafonia; or from the beaches on either side of the isthmus. With no intelligence on British intentions, Piaggi had to deploy his troops so he could meet a threat from any direction.¹⁰ As a result, he divided his forces, placing a detachment in the small hills north and west of Darwin, a detachment in the south, and a reserve at Goose Green. In the days before the British landings, the northern troops had positioned themselves across the isthmus, from where they could fire on troops approaching from the north and redeploy rapidly to meet an amphibious operation. In addition, they placed minefields and boobytraps in front of the prepared positions to further impede the British advance.¹¹

Despite the extensive defensive preparations, on 26 May, Piaggi was ordered to move out of the positions in the north and adopt a more aggressive response toward the anticipated British attack. So, when the British advance made contact with the first line of Argentine defenders on the morning of the 28th, the British were not confronted with an entrenched unit with minefields in its front but, rather, with a detachment out in the open with minefields along its line of retreat. Not unexpectedly, the surprised Argentine conscripts did not stand up well to the British advance and began to retreat almost immediately.¹²

The British advance along the eastern side of the isthmus drove the retreating Argentines back into their prepared positions, where they were able to regroup and halt the forward progress of the attack. Meanwhile, the troops on the British right had met heavy resistance—a company of reinforcements had arrived by helicopter from Stanley to shore

up the Argentine defenses and counterattack and stopped the British on the western side of the isthmus. In an attempt to break the stalemate, Jones led a charge toward one Argentine position on his left, but was hit by rifle fire from another trench. Although this resulted in Jones's death, it also provided the Paras with the momentum they needed to overrun the Argentine positions near Darwin. Outflanked on their right by this attack and on their left by a company of Paras sent along the beach, and suffering heavy casualties and a shortage of ammunition, the Argentine forces withdrew toward Goose Green.¹³

As the Argentines fell back to the settlement, the British began to encircle it, completely surrounding Goose Green by dusk. Although it seemed there was little hope for the men of Piaggi's task force, around this time they were reinforced by Combat Team Solari's 132 officers and men, who had been transported from Stanley by helicopter and landed just south of Goose Green around dusk.¹⁴ These troops increased the total number of combat troops available by nearly a third and might have been used effectively in a counterattack.

Major Chris Keeble, 2 Para's second-in-command, who assumed command of the battalion following Jones's death, felt there was no point in fighting any longer. He did not have enough men or ammunition for an assault on the village, but he knew both were on the way. The Argentines were surrounded and would eventually have to surrender or die fighting. Keeble did not want to have to fight his way into Goose Green, whose 114 residents—held during the battle in the community hall—might suffer in the subsequent combined artillery and aerial bombardment. In an ultimatum delivered to Piaggi, this is precisely what Keeble proposed to do. Specifically, the ultimatum note called for the surrender of the Argentine troops under Piaggi's command, the alternative to which would be the bombardment of the settlement. While artillery and air support had not been effective during the fighting, three Harriers had dropped cluster bombs near the Argentine positions just before dusk, and Piaggi and his men were well aware of what a precise strike on their position could accomplish. Keeble also pointed out that, because he was informing Piaggi in advance of the bombardment, the Argentines would be held responsible for any civilian casualties under the rules set forth by the Geneva Conventions.¹⁵

Piaggi did not see any point in continuing the struggle. He explained the situation to the joint commander at Stanley, who authorized, but would not order, a surrender. Ultimately it was up to the officers in the settlement to make the decision,

and they decided—although not unanimously—to avoid any further bloodshed.¹⁶ On the morning of 29 May—ironically, the Argentina Army's National Day—the soldiers and airmen of Task Force Mercedes surrendered to 2 Para, officially ending the Battle of Darwin-Goose Green.¹⁷

Should Argentina Have Won?

The Argentina Army had few natural advantages in the Falklands conflict. Its troops were not as well trained or as well supplied as those of the British. Nor could the Army benefit from naval gunfire or close air support. Despite these disadvantages, however, Argentine troops had at least four major areas in which they should have had the upper hand: parity in numbers, the ability to use airmen as infantry, counterattack, and national spirit.

Parity in numbers. In the early 19th century, Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz wrote, "Defense is the stronger form of waging war."¹⁸ Modern military doctrine has attempted to quantify this statement by recommending that when attacking prepared positions the ratio of attacking to defending troops should be three to one. While such a ratio is seldom attained, it does suggest the magnitude of the advantage held by defending troops. At Darwin-Goose Green, 2 Para did not come close to achieving that force ratio. Indeed, the numbers of troops engaged in combat on both sides were roughly equal. Further, this parity extended to artillery and machineguns, as well as to close air support, although the British failure with respect to the latter was largely caused by the weather. The Argentines could have done more to exploit the natural advantage granted by the defensive. Perhaps their greatest failure in this regard was the abandonment of their prepared positions for positions further forward in the days before the battle.

The use of airmen as infantry. Another way in which the Argentines could have exploited a defensive advantage would have been to use FAA troops as infantry, an option which they seem not to have even considered. Despite having not been trained as combat troops, the more than 200 airmen at Goose Green could certainly have been used to strengthen the defensive positions in the north, especially as they were serving no other useful purpose. This option would have given the Argentines a potentially decisive advantage over their British attackers at the point of the attack.¹⁹ Instead of having their value as fighting men impressed on them, they were left at Goose Green to defend the airport, a position they abandoned as the British approached, leaving a gap in the Argentine line that allowed the penetration by D Company, 2 Para, in

the afternoon. The airmen's withdrawal was made without Piaggi's knowledge or authorization.²⁰

Counterattack. The arrival of reinforcements on the evening of the 28th provided Piaggi with yet another option that might have turned the tide—counterattack. While most Argentine troops might not have been prepared to continue the struggle, the troops that arrived from Stanley on the afternoon of the battle should have been. Further, although the British had the advantage of momentum, the Paras were tired, cold, wet, and low on ammunition. Keeble himself noted, "If they had counterattacked at dawn they would have thrown us off the battlefield because we were totally outgunned and wrong-footed."²¹

National spirit. Finally, the Argentines had on their side what Clausewitz has called *Volksggeist*, or national spirit.²² For them, the recapture of the Falklands was a point of national honor. The islands had been claimed by Argentina since its independence from Spain in 1820, and the officers and men of the Army, Navy, and Air Force in 1982 had grown up with the idea that, someday, the islands would be recaptured from Britain (perceived as a colonial usurper), which had occupied them since 1833. To the Argentines, the Falklands were a part of Argentina and, despite their lack of economic or strategic value, something worth fighting for. Unfortunately, *Volksggeist* did not prove to be enough.

Why Did Argentina Lose?

Keeble, the officer to whom the Argentines surrendered at Goose Green, wrote: "I believe the Argentines *lost* the battle rather than the Paras *winning* it. In fact I suspect that is how most conflicts are resolved."²³ While this demonstrates humility, it also shows insight into the fundamental nature of combat. No matter how well or poorly the British fought, the battle was Argentina's to lose. It is important to note, however, that no single factor can be said to have produced the defeat.

Lack of intelligence was a major factor. While both Piaggi and the joint command in Stanley suspected a British attack on the positions at Darwin and Goose Green was imminent, they did not know when or from which direction it was coming. Furthermore, they did not know whether to expect a raid, as Thompson had originally planned, or a full-scale attack to capture the positions. In either case, they did not know how many troops to expect.

Operationally, this lack of intelligence translated into a front that was massively overextended. Because Piaggi did not know where to expect the attack, he had to place troops at both ends of the isthmus and still be able to cover the beaches

in case of an amphibious landing, which left an insufficient number of troops at every position.²⁴ Had the Argentines possessed better intelligence on British troop composition and movements, they might have placed the bulk of the task force in positions on the northern end of the isthmus to meet 2 Para's attack. This presumably would have made the attack more difficult for the British. Also, better intelligence at the end of the battle would have given Piaggi a more complete situational picture, which might have allowed him to consider a counterattack.

While a lack of intelligence to support good decisionmaking was one issue, the level at which decisions were made was another. For example, the order for the troops defending the northern sector of the isthmus to leave their prepared positions and move north did not come from Piaggi but from the Stanley joint command, which derived its view of the tactical situation only by radio communications with Goose Green. This resulted in Argentine frontline troops being in exposed positions when the British attacked, and having a minefield to their rear through which they would have to retreat.

Intervention by senior commanders is not unique to the Argentine Army. Indeed, the British advance to Darwin-Goose Green was precipitated by commanders at joint headquarters attempting to control events thousands of miles away. What is important to note here is not the occurrence of the problem but the fact it was made possible by the real-time communications link between Stanley and Goose Green. The idea that the proliferation of such links might tempt future commanders to exercise control at inappropriate levels has been discussed elsewhere.²⁵

Possibly, the perceived need to impose tactical orders on the troops at Darwin and Goose Green was caused by a failure on the part of the joint command to appoint a commander on the ground. Although Piaggi was the commander of Task Force Mercedes, composed of portions of the 8th, 12th, and 25th Infantry Regiments deployed on the isthmus, Pedrozo was actually the ranking officer at Goose Green. More than once, Piaggi asked his superiors at Stanley for clarification of the chain of command, but none was forthcoming. Even though Pedrozo was an Air Force officer untrained in the tactical employment of ground troops, he did not hesitate to involve himself in the direction of the battle. At one point Piaggi became so frustrated with this intervention that he told Pedrozo, "Please do me a favor, and get out of here."²⁶ One of their major disagreements concerned the surrender: Piaggi and Pedrozo had different opinions about how to proceed, and in this case, their actions

became an issue not only of authority but also of responsibility.²⁷

Piaggi's leadership at Darwin-Goose Green has also been questioned. Specifically, José Eduardo Costa has pointed out that while 2 Para's commander and all of the company commanders led from the front, Piaggi and his staff remained at their command post at Goose Green during the battle. Noting that the highest ranking Argentine officer at the front was a first lieutenant, Costa writes, "The experience of an Argentine commander at the front line of combat during the action would have been essential for the tactical conduct of the battle."²⁸

The most interesting aspect of this argument—the idea that the British were successful because their officers led from the front—is that one of the major British historians of the battle, Spencer Fitz-Gibbon, has devoted an entire book to precisely the opposite argument.²⁹ Fitz-Gibbon argues that it was not Jones's detailed planning or micromanagement that led to the British success. Instead, he points out the battle only opened up for the British after Jones's death, when Keeble gave his company commanders a free hand to accomplish their assigned tasks as they saw fit.

Another problem with Costa's criticism of Piaggi is that he fails to take into account the geographical distribution of Piaggi's troops and the dearth of available radios. From his command post at Goose Green, Piaggi was able to communicate by courier with his troops in both the north and the south, as well as by radio with the joint command at Stanley, from which he constantly requested close air support and resupply of ammunition.³⁰ Under normal circumstances, Piaggi would have deployed to the front with one or two noncommissioned officers (NCOs) and controlled the battle from there while his second-in-command remained at the command post and communicated with Stanley. However, the presence of only one radio—confiscated from one of the local residents—rendered such an organization impossible.³¹

Neither of these arguments is entirely conclusive. For one thing, *Auftragstaktik* requires commanders and their subordinates to share a mental model developed by means of common training and experience. However, Piaggi was new to the 12th Regiment and had not trained the company-grade officers to his way of thinking. Moreover, half of the officers present at Darwin and Goose Green were from either the 8th or the 25th Regiments and were even less familiar with Piaggi as a commander.

On the other hand, the commander's appearance at the front, once the direction of the British advance had been established, might have helped

inhibit the retreat. The presence of the commander in the trenches might even have set an example for the men and turned the tide. However, this is mere speculation, especially considering that most of the troops under his command were not familiar with Piaggi.

Criticism has also been leveled at lower ranking officers for not fighting with their men, although this seems to have little foundation, at least at Darwin and Goose Green where most, if not all, of the company-grade officers were in the trenches with their troops. Indeed, 1st Lieutenant Roberto Estévez was killed in action while defending the position near Darwin Hill, and 2d Lieutenant Guillermo Aliaga and 2d Lieutenant Ernesto Peluffo were seriously wounded during the fight.³² In general, the officers in command of sections or companies performed valiantly in the action on the Darwin isthmus.

The enlisted force also fought well, up to a point. But despite whatever *Volksgeist* they might have possessed, it could not make up for a lack of adequate training. The private soldiers of the Argentina Army were exclusively conscripts, who did a year of compulsory military service before going to work in the private sector. The only professionals in the Army were the officers and NCOs.

Several problems existed with such a system. First, the training period was not long enough. Second, soldiers called up for service would either have training that was not recent enough or too little training, as was the case with the most recent lot of conscripts. (The 12th Regiment had only 3 months of training before the invasion of the Falklands.) Third, the officer corps suffered because they were reduced to training raw recruits and did not have time to develop tactical or technical skills.³³

The Argentine troops had other problems that had nothing to do with training. One was the weather. Whereas the Paras had trained in cold weather climates before, but the men of the 12th Regiment came from a subtropical climate and were not used to cold. Further, as one of the last units sent to the Falklands, they had not been adequately provisioned and, indeed, had an insufficient supply of winter clothing, which made soldiering almost unbearable, especially in a region that was cold and always wet in April and May.³⁴

In addition to being wet, the troops were hungry. Provisions were inadequate and there was little hope of resupply. The distances between subunits and a lack of vehicles made it difficult to get food and water to the troops. The same problems arose with respect to ammunition. Mortar sections had the most trouble, having expended their

ammunition early in the battle. But the problem was not unique to the mortar sections. By 0930, frontline troops in the northern sector claimed to have exhausted 60 percent of their ammunition. Some sections were compelled to retreat only because they were without ammunition, even after replenishing their supply with ammunition taken from casualties.³⁵

Sadly, the major reason for the shortages was simply that many of the 12th Regiment's supplies had never left Argentina, including radios, artillery, mortars and heavy machineguns, and combat vehicles, as well as ammunition. The regiment had been ordered to the Falklands relatively late in the conflict to shore up the defenses against the British task force, then on its way south. The priority was to get the troops across and to worry about the equipment later. Unfortunately for the regiment, by the time the equipment was ready to be sent, the

British blockade of the islands had become sufficiently effective that it was considered too risky to send it. The soldiers were left to fight with what was available.

British victory at Darwin-Goose Green was not inevitable, and it was not due to an inherent superiority in either leadership or technology on the part of British forces. Instead, it was caused by a combination of factors on the Argentine side, ranging from multiple organizational dysfunctions to the inability to adequately provision troops in the trenches. Despite the inherent advantages of a defensive posture and an overall numerical superiority, as well as the will to win, the Argentines were not able to overcome the numerous logistical and organizational challenges they had created to defeat the better organized British battalion. The fact that they might have, however, is perhaps the most important lesson of the Falklands War. **MR**

NOTES

1. Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins, *The Battle for the Falklands* (London: Pan Books, 1997), and Martin Middlebrook, *The Falklands War, 1982* (London: Penguin, 2001), provide good overall treatments of the war in English. The most comprehensive book in Spanish is probably José Eduardo Costa, *Guerra Bajo la Cruz del Sur* [War under the Southern Cross] (Buenos Aires: Hyspamerica, 1988).
2. Failing to consider an adversary's perspective is not unique to Israel and the United Kingdom. Historical accounts of the Persian Gulf War are decidedly one-sided. The operation was a veritable walkover, although the so-called "100-hour war" could have been much bloodier for the United States. History contains many examples of armies continuing to fight in the face of impossible odds (the German Sixth Army at Stalingrad, for example).
3. The best accounts of the amphibious landing operation come from Michael Clapp and Ewen Southby-Tallour, *Amphibious Assault Falklands: The Battle of San Carlos Water* (London: Orion, 1996), and Julian Thompson, *No Picnic* (London: Cassell and Co., 2000). Clapp was the Commander, Amphibious Task Group, and Thompson was Commander, Land Forces, at the time of the landings. The best British account of the air attacks is by Sandy Woodward with Patrick Robinson, *One Hundred Days: The Memoirs of the Falklands Battle Group Commander* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1997), despite the fact that Woodward was not present at San Carlos. Argentine accounts of the air action are found in Rubén O. Moro, *La Guerra Inaudita: Historio del Conflicto del Atlántico Sur* [The unheard-of war: History of the South Atlantic Conflict] (Buenos Aires: Editorial Pleamar, 1986); and Benigno Hector Andrada, *Guerra Aérea en las Malvinas* [Air war in the Falklands] (Buenos Aires: Emecé Editores, 1983).
4. "Informe Oficial del Ejército Argentino. Conflicto Malvinas" [Official report of the exercise in the Falklands: Falklands conflict] (Buenos Aires: Instituto Geográfico Militar, 1983), II, anexo 15. A small detachment of about 60 men, led by 1st Lieutenant Carlos Esteban, was at Fanning Head, near San Carlos, but they were attacked by naval gunfire and special forces as the landings began and were unable to delay the amphibious operation. Those who were not killed or wounded escaped to Port Stanley. Some later participated in the fighting at Darwin-Goose Green. See Felix Roberto Aguilar, Francisco Cervo, Francisco Eduardo Machinandiarena, Martín Antonio, and Eugenio Alfredo Dalton, *Operaciones Terrestres en las Islas Malvinas* [Ground Operations in the Falkland Islands] (Buenos Aires: Circulo Militar, 1985), 135-39.
5. Thompson, 66-68.
6. *Ibid.*, 70-72.
7. Helmuth Carl Von Moltke, *Moltke on the Art of War: Selected Writings*, trans., Daniel J. Hughes and Harry Bell (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1993), 45. The overuse of detailed planning and the failure to employ Auftragstaktik is the theme of Spencer Fitz-Gibbon's *Not Mentioned in Despatches: The History and Mythology of the Battle of Goose Green* (Cambridge: The Lutterworth Press, 1995).
8. The plan is described in great detail in three books, each with a unique perspective: Fitz-Gibbon, 11-22; Mark Adkin, *Goose Green: A Battle is Fought to Be Won* (London: Cassell and Co., 1992), 145-68; and John Wiley, *H Jones VC: The Life and Death of an Unusual Hero* (London: Arrow Books, 2002), 256-63.
9. *Informe Oficial* [official report], vol. I, 78; Costa, 349; Adkin, 28, 366-67. The strengths given for the units on both sides include command and support elements that did not actively participate in the fighting. The number of combat troops engaged at the front was probably no more than 300 to 350 on either side.
10. The Argentine commanders were concerned the British could mount operations at the rear because of their advantage in helicopter support. They do not seem to have realized that the attack on the *Atlantic Conveyor* on 25 May had resulted in the loss of half of the British helicopter force, including four of five Chinooks, the only helicopters suitable for the rapid movement of troops and, equally important, heavy weapons.

11. Costa, 346-47.
12. *Ibid.*, 347.
13. *Informe Oficial* [official report], 84-87; Moro, 392-96, 399-401; Wiley, 269-83.
14. Middlebrook, 271-72; Carlos M. Túrolo, ed., *Así Lucharon* [How they fought] (Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamerica, 1983), 267-68.
15. Adkin, 351-52; Max Arthur, ed., *Above All, Courage: Personal Stories from the Falklands War* (London: Cassell and Co., 2002), 192-93.
16. Italo Piaggi outlines the views of the officers present for the discussion in *El Combate de Goose Green* [The Battle of Goose Green] (Buenos Aires: Editorial Planeta, 1993), 92-93.
17. Adkin, 357-59.
18. Carl von Clausewitz, *Vom Kriege* [On war] (Berlin: Ullstein, 2002), 372.
19. See Middlebrook, 299-300. While it is convenient to point out the failure to use the Argentine Air Force troops at Darwin-Goose Green, this was really part of a larger failure to make effective use of personnel. For example, the 5th Regiment and all but a section of the 8th Regiment spent the duration of the war at two locations on West Falkland, which was even more sparsely populated and never invaded by the British. Had these two regiments been at Goose Green—or at San Carlos—events might have unfolded differently.
20. Piaggi, E-mail to the author, 28 February 2004.
21. Michael Bilton and Peter Kosminsky, *Speaking Out: Untold Stories from the Falklands War* (London: André Deutsch, 1989), 149.
22. Clausewitz, 168.
23. Fitz-Gibbon, 184.
24. Aguilar, Cervo, Machinandiarena, Antonio, and Dalton, 150-51.
25. Robert S. Bolia, Michael A. Vidulich, W. Todd Nelson, and Malcolm J. Cook, "A History Lesson on the Use of Technology to Support Military Decision Making and Command and Control," in *Human Factors of Complex Decision Making*, ed., Malcolm J. Cook (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, forthcoming).
26. Piaggi, "Hazme el favor de retirarte" [Do me the favor of returning], *El Combate de Goose Green* [The Battle of Goose Green], 81.
27. There are numerous references in Piaggi's *El Combate de Goose Green* to the failure by the joint command to resolve the command relationship at Goose Green.
28. Costa also fails to note that the first lieutenants commanding A and C Companies were in fact the highest ranking company grade officers on the peninsula. In an e-mail to the author, dated 1 March 2004, Piaggi said the captains of the 12th Regiment had either been evacuated to the continent because of illness or were assigned other duties at Stanley.
29. The superiority of Auftragstaktik is one of the central themes of Fitz-Gibbon's book.
30. Middlebrook.
31. Piaggi, E-mail to the author, 1 March 2004.
32. Piaggi, chap. 5; Aguilar, Cervo, Machinandiarena, Antonio, and Dalton, 165.
33. Piaggi indicated that the conscript class of 1963 had received only 45 days of training and that 45 percent of them were illiterate. For a discussion of conscript armies in the Arab-Israeli wars, see John Laffin, *Arab Armies of the Middle East Wars, 1948-73* (London: Osprey Publishing, 1982), 6.
34. The cold and humidity are themes that pervade Piaggi's writing. His 12th Regiment was from the province of Corrientes, in northern Argentina. The original British task force was composed exclusively of troops who had trained extensively in cold-weather environments. While both Para battalions had been either in Northern Ireland or Germany, the three Royal Marine Commandos had trained in Norway as part of their NATO mission.
35. *Ibid.*

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War in Algeria: The French Experience

Colonel Gilles Martin, French Army

DISCUSSING THE Algerian War with the objectivity of a historian is difficult. A number of generations of French and Algerian politicians and soldiers have been intimately involved in these events. In both countries, to speak of the Algerian War meant, and still means, to venture into the political realm. In this article, I describe the distinct phases of the war to draw useful conclusions for contemporary counterinsurgency operations.¹

The Algerian War began on 1 November 1954 and ended 8 years later, in 1962, following the independence of Algeria. The conflict was a colonial war between France and the Algerian people, but it was also a civil war between loyalist Algerian Muslims who still believed in a French Algeria and their independence-minded Algerian counterparts. During its final months, the conflict evolved into a civil war between pro-French hardliners in Algeria and supporters of General Charles de Gaulle. The French Army had to wage a war against guerrillas, insurrection, and terrorism, a “revolutionary” war in which the conquest of the population was at stake, exactly as it was in another war that had just ended in Indochina with the defeat at Dien Bien Phu. At the time, the French Army thought it had won in Algeria. On the other hand, France’s political leaders wanted nothing more to do with the former colony.

The war created a deep wound in French society and a deeper one within the Army. The scars healed slowly, and the slightest event can still reopen the wound. Even selecting a date to commemorate the end of the war divides the generation that experienced the war’s effects. In short, the consequences of this war have made relations between France and Algeria and, even now, between the French people and Algerian immigrants, particularly complex. Spite, nostalgia, regret, remorse, guilt, wastefulness, and squandered opportunities abound between the two peoples, as in a love story that ends in a difficult divorce—a story that could have had a happier outcome.

A Plot Out of Clancy or Ludlum?

Making comparisons is always dangerous, but we can imagine the following scenario: A part of the population of one U.S. state declares its independence and begins an armed insurrection that mixes guerrilla activities with urban terrorism. An army of 2 million U.S. soldiers is deployed for 8 years in secessionist territory. Despite a long tradition of obedience to civil authority, the U.S. Armed Forces rebel against the President and Congress, and with support from an important part of the population, demand and obtain the President’s removal, the creation of a new constitution, and the election of a President who acquiesces to military desires regarding the management of the war.

Later, after the new President decides to stop the war by allowing the state to secede, he is almost toppled in a coup d’état orchestrated by prestigious generals with the support of the 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions, the Army Rangers, and regiments of the U.S. Marine Corps. An antigovernment terrorist movement made up of military renegades tries to assassinate the President. The National Guard fires on flag-waving loyalists singing the national anthem and proclaiming their desire to continue being American. After secession is complete, four million traumatized loyalists flee the newly independent territory, tearfully leaving in droves from the piers of the former American state. Unthinkable? This is exactly what the French would have thought on 1 November 1954, had they been asked the question.

Algeria (1954)

“Algeria is France.” At least that is what the French thought, what they taught their schoolchildren, and what a million French citizens living in Algeria thought in 1954.² Eighteen percent of these French Algerians—an exceptionally high number—had been mobilized from 1942 onward to help the Allies liberate France. “Algeria is France,” the political sector unanimously proclaimed, even

after the initial uprising on 1 November 1954 by nationalists against French rule.

Algeria had been conquered in 1830 and transformed into a French colony administered as if it were metropolitan France. There was, however, a great disparity between Algeria and France. In Algeria, 10 million indigenous Muslims were deprived of all political rights, and 99 percent of the economy was in the hands of French or French Algerian citizens. Although obligated to deal with the grave consequences of World War II (rationing, reconstruction, violent labor strikes, the Cold War, and the War in Indochina), the French government never had the courage to upgrade the native Algerians' status despite a widespread decolonization movement and the role Algerian soldiers had played in the world wars and Indochina.

For several reasons, nationalist sentiment was, at least initially, less virulent in Algeria than it was in Morocco or in Tunisia, which had just obtained their independence. In 1830, the Algerian population had changed from a feudal society to a colonial one, French rule replacing that of the Bey of Algiers and various tribal chiefs. While it did not increase or diminish the Algerians' civil rights or improve their living conditions dramatically, French rule did provide security, economic development, disease eradication, and literacy initiatives. Then too, with one million French colonists and the symbols of French sovereignty part of the landscape, so to speak, Algerians looked at the situation with a sense of fatalism and concluded, as Muslims often do, "Inch' Allah"—(it [French rule] is the will of God).

French domination also derived support from notorious Muslim tribal chiefs and elitist judges, clerics, and civil servants whose interests were served by the French presence. These people had sided with France at the time of conquest and continued to offer their loyal support over the years. Veterans, too, predominantly favored the French. More than 150,000 Algerians had fought alongside the French in Tunisia, Italy, France, and Indochina. Elite troops, they had covered themselves in glory, notably in Italy for breaching the Gustav Line, and had suffered staggering losses. As recompense, France had merely given them medals, war pensions, and government jobs. Many who had hoped to obtain French citizenship or at least equal rights with French Algerians were dismayed by this ingratitude. However, they could not forget the bonds they had forged with their French brothers on the field of battle. In 1954, Algerians who considered taking up arms against their former comrades were rare.

Culture and tradition also worked to assuage native Algerians. Literacy efforts among children, especially in cities and towns, spread the French language and culture, and the Muslim elite assimilated this second culture without forsaking their own. Long-established friendships between Muslim and French Algerian neighbors contributed to maintaining the status quo. Although unwilling to grant their Muslim countrymen equal rights, French Algerians were paternalistic and friendly in everyday life. On the farms and in small businesses, certain families had known each other for generations; they got along. Above all else, awareness of French power and the memory of blood spilled in earlier revolts deterred political unrest.

However, in 1945, nationalist demonstrations degenerated into riots. The ensuing unrest resulted in ethnic French families being massacred. The following government crackdown caused thousands of deaths and civil unrest temporarily paused. Fear of government violence was not the only check: Many moderate nationalists believed that a democratic, peaceful transition was possible. They demanded only equal rights, not independence. For these reasons, the nationalist opposition had difficulty recruiting and organizing militants.

An 8-Year War

The Algerian War of Independence, 8 years in duration, had 3 distinct phases: the birth of the Revolutionary Committee of Unity and Action (soon to be known as the National Liberation Front [NLF]) and its rise to power; a period of NLF military defeat but political victory; and a final period of political tumult and a bloody independence.

The NLF's birth and rise to power (1954-1957). Six exceptional men, isolated and penniless, chose the path of armed struggle to gain independence. Mustafa Ben Boulaid, Larbi Ben M'hidi, Didouche Mourad, Rabah Bitah, Krim Belkacem, and Mohamed Boudiaf created the Revolutionary Committee of Unity and Action. To these individuals, Algeria owes its independence.

During the first few months of its existence, the militant NLF created resistance groups and urban cells, recruited new members, and fought to survive. However, the general population maintained a wait-and-see attitude and often refused to pay "revolutionary taxes."

Realizing they had failed to convince the Muslim population to join them, NLF leaders decided to raise the level of violence, so as to stimulate hatred, bloodshed, and fear between the French and Muslim communities. On 20 August 1955, they stoked fanaticism in a few villages whose

residents rose up to massacre and mutilate French civilians. The Army intervened by distributing weapons to the French civilians, and the resulting repression led to hundreds of Muslim deaths, a dire development that would help the rebels achieve their goal.

Provoked by the NLF, fanatical violence spread widely, causing the Army to clamp down on the Muslim population through inspections, arrests, interrogations, detentions, and repression, which caused even more Muslims to side with the NLF. By 1956, the NLF had imposed its authority on Algeria's Muslims, and although the French Army swelled to 500,000 soldiers, it still had to remain in a defensive posture.

The NLF understood victory would be political, not military, and wanted to discuss the war in the international news media and at the UN. In 1957 the rebels began a campaign of urban terrorism by detonating bombs on the streets of Algiers and killing scores of civilians. The world did, in fact, begin to pay attention.

NLF military defeat, political victory (1957-1960). In a decision of grave import, the French government granted absolute power to the Army and ordered it to reestablish order using all means at its disposal. Individual liberties were suspended in Algeria; the 10th Parachute Division occupied Algiers; and in a matter of weeks, the NLF's cells had been dismantled and its principal leaders arrested, killed, or driven into hiding or exile. Seizing the initiative, the Army began to control the terrain, the borders, and the population. NLF losses mounted.

The government then timidly sought to negotiate an end to hostilities, a move that provoked the ire of French Algerians and the disbelief of the Army. On 13 May 1958, French Algerians rebelled against the peace process and formed a "Committee for Public Safety" that rejected the government's authority. What ensued were some truly revolutionary events.

The government ordered the Army, which retained full civil and military powers, to oppose this new insurgency. Instead, and despite its tradition of absolute submission to civilian authority, the Army joined the Committee for Public Safety. Army leaders demanded the abdication of the government, a new constitution, adoption of a pro-French Algerian policy, and the designation of De Gaulle as head of state. They went so far as to prepare an airborne operation against Paris. Unpopular, lacking in authority, and incapable of proposing an alternate solution, the government and Chamber of Deputies gave in. To quickly return to at least the appearance of legality, De Gaulle demanded and

received investiture by the National Assembly. He immediately organized elections, which he won resoundingly.

Concurrently, the Army took advantage of its position of power within the Committee for Public Safety to impose the very changes the French had refused since 1945: social reforms and equality of civil rights for Muslims. Because it tightly controlled Arab districts after the Battle of Algiers (1957), a year-long offensive in the capital by the 10th Parachute Division, the Army convinced the Muslim population to obey the Committee of Public Safety, demonstrate in European neighborhoods, defend their rights, support Army reforms, and call for De Gaulle's rise to power. The generals took a big risk in doing this because of the recent terrorist attacks and the rift of hatred and blood that separated the French and Muslim communities.

The demonstrations that followed had an enormous effect: Under the influence of crowd psychology and revolutionary rhetoric, the two communities came together. Suddenly, it appeared that nothing was beyond their reach, including peace, reconciliation, and a new French Algeria of brotherly love, biculturalism, and harmony. The Army tried to persuade NLF leaders, and even those terrorists who had planted explosive devices, to join the reconciliation movement. A victory tour by De Gaulle succeeded in persuading the Army and the population that victory and peace were near.

In the following months, the NLF's leaders in Tunisia failed to remotivate members of the resistance, and the organization lost much of its will to fight. More people began to side with the French Army and De Gaulle. At the same time, a new commander in chief, General Maurice Challe, implemented a plan to systematically destroy the NLF. Three years later, the rebels had no more than 5,000 members, no means to conduct offensive operations, and no objective beyond survival. Some 300,000 Muslims (a large percentage of men old enough to fight) had registered for service with the Army. A French military victory did indeed seem imminent.

French Algeria's agony (1961-1962). This near victory was, however, fruitless. Unlike his military chiefs, De Gaulle had a global geopolitical vision; he understood that the international community firmly supported the decolonization movement. In late 1960, having decided that France's place was in Europe, not North Africa, De Gaulle openly committed to "an Algerian Algeria" and made peace overtures to the NLF's leaders in Tunisia.

The generals felt they were about to be robbed of their victory and, worse, their honor. Wanting to fulfill the promises they had made to French Algerians and their Muslim sympathizers that

Algeria would remain French, some of them hatched a plot.

In April 1961, four well-known generals, including two former commanders in chief in Algeria, rallied a dozen regiments and took control of Algiers. They demanded that De Gaulle re-adopt the policy of “French Algeria” and break off all negotiations with the NLF. Unlike in May 1958, however, the rest of the Army remained loyal to the government. A nation weary of war supported De Gaulle, and he crushed the putsch.

On 16 March 1962, in Evian, France, the government and the NLF signed peace accords mandating a cease-fire, setting up a 1 July referendum on Algerian self-determination, and addressing such topics as security for all Algerians, including the French in Algeria and the harkis (Muslim soldiers) in the French Army.

The end of the war in Algeria was tragic. Radical hardliners in the military and among the French living in Algeria founded a terrorist organization—the Secret Army Organization (SAO)—that intended to assassinate De Gaulle; unleash a civil war against the government, the police, and the French Army; and ignite an ethnic war against the Muslims. The SAO assassinated hundreds of Muslims, and many Algiers neighborhoods revolted and attacked police and military units. The Air Force responded by bombing the SAO-controlled neighborhoods. When French Algerians carrying French flags and singing the *Marseillaise* mounted a protest, the Army opened fire on them. After 19 March 1962, in accordance with the peace accords, the French Army enforced the ceasefire with the NLF, although combat continued to flare between the NLF and the SAO. Hundreds of French Algerians were kidnapped and assassinated. French Algerians then understood they no longer had a place in Algeria.

In a matter of weeks, a million forlorn refugees (2 percent of the French population in 1962) arrived in southern France. Among them were thousands of pro-French Muslims, though most of the latter group (mayors, tribal chiefs, harkis), believing they were protected by the peace treaty, chose to stay in Algeria. The NLF immediately massacred perhaps 150,000 of these.

The war’s overall death toll was immense. According to the French Ministry of Defense, 22,755 French soldiers were killed, 7,917 died in accidents, and 56,962 were wounded. Thirty-five hundred Muslims were killed in combat while serving in the French Army. An additional 66,000 Muslim civilians (along with the 150,000 massacred post-cease-fire) and 2,788 French civilians were killed by the NLF, while another 875 French went missing. On

the NLF side, over 141,000 rebels died in combat, thousands more disappeared during the Battle of Algiers, and about 12,000 members of the NLF fell victim to internal purges. Sixteen thousand Algerian civilians died as a result of combat or during revolts or ethnic confrontations. Overall, the head of the NLF estimated that 300,000 Muslims were killed. With great pain, France and Algeria had turned the page to decolonization.

Lessons Learned from the War

Without spelling them out, there are some obvious and perhaps enlightening similarities between the French experience in Algeria and the Coalition Force experience in Iraq.

NLF tactics. From the humble origin of a handful of unknown and unarmed militants, the NLF became a well-armed, well-organized guerrilla force that challenged 500,000 French soldiers for more than 5 years. It proved itself adept at using publicity to recruit new soldiers, organizing those recruits, inciting ethnic conflict, conducting urban terrorism, and controlling the population.

The NLF explained its actions and recruited its soldiers in outlying towns and in Muslim neighborhoods in larger cities, and it created representative entities outside Algeria, principally in Tunisia and Egypt, to spread word of NLF actions to an international audience. Its beginnings, however, were fraught with difficulty. Notoriously violent pro-French elements deterred many Algerians from joining the NLF, while other Algerians demurred out of loyalty to France, adopted a wait-and-see attitude, or resigned themselves to fatalism.

The initially noncommittal attitude of the population incited certain NLF leaders to instigate ethnic conflict. Assaults, assassinations, and massacres were carried out against the French in Algeria. Later, the NLF called for jihad, but the Muslim population, especially the religiously moderate Berbers, was less than receptive to the call.³ Nevertheless, fissures between the French and Muslim communities widened and more provocations, followed by more repression, inexorably pushed the population toward the guerrillas.

Vast, mountainous, woody, and lightly populated, Algeria offered terrain favorable to guerrilla warfare. Capable resistance groups operating from densely forested areas harassed French Army posts, patrols, and convoys in a war of ambushes in which the attackers always had the advantage of terrain and surprise. When the French Army conducted cordon and search operations, the resistance (operating in 150-man units called *katibas*) avoided contact and blended into the surrounding forest. Occasionally, several *katibas* joined to conduct

common operations of short duration. For command and control, the NLF divided Algeria into six regions, or wilayas, each administered by a colonel assisted by a political advisor. Each colonel also headed an elite commando unit, one of which, the Ali Khoja Commando, held some of the best French regiments in check. As in most conflicts of this type, the local leaders could be charismatic commanders or authentic heroes, bloody tyrants or common thieves.

From Tunisia, a guerrilla army of tens of thousands of troops harassed French units arrayed along the border. The guerrillas would foray into Algeria, then flee back into Tunisia. This army infiltrated Algeria, escorting numerous mule trains packed with arms for the resistance.

The NLF understood from the outset that while a military victory was beyond its reach, the movement only had to survive the war, not win its battles, to obtain a political victory. Aided by international publicity, this strategy worked perfectly. The NLF increased the level of violence, and the war was duly debated in the UN, the Arab League, and other international bodies. Astute NLF leaders stressed that an ambush conducted in an isolated valley had only a slight psychological effect and attracted limited media coverage, whereas a bomb detonated in an Algiers theater or stadium quickly caught the eye of the French and international news services. Urban terrorism thus became the NLF's choice course of action in the war for independence.

NLF leaders might not have read Mao Tse-tung, but they instinctively rediscovered one of his principal tenets: Guerrillas must be immersed in the population like fish in water. The population constituted the principal stake of the war because rural and even urban NLF cells could not survive without daily support from a large part of the population.

To enlist the population's sympathy, two simultaneous actions were required: destroy the French administration (and the power of French culture over the population) and control the population through an efficient parallel administration. The NLF systematically assassinated Muslim and French functionaries, mayors, and professors; attacked French schools and prohibited Muslim children from attending them; forced respect for Islam by prohibiting the use of alcohol and tobacco; and applied a code of merciless sanctions—after the first warning, cutting off noses, then slitting throats if these warnings were not heeded.

Voluntarily or by force, the population was required to obey the NLF and provide intelligence, money, food, and new recruits. A bona fide, highly

structured political administrative organization (PAO), which included tax collectors, informants, liaison and propaganda agents, judges, and mayors (the embryo of Algeria's future administration) closely observed and monitored the population.

French Army tactics. After 2 years, the French found they had lost control of entire regions, primarily because they had isolated themselves in camps and posts. The Army then turned to a full-spectrum strategy that would neutralize the guerrilla movement. Officers with experience in counter guerrilla operations in Indochina and those from colonial units with extensive knowledge of Algerian culture and the administration of populations devised a two-part doctrine of pacification: Get the support of the population because the population was the primary stake of the war, and control the borders. To accomplish the first it was necessary to provide considerable material and humanitarian support, which the NLF evidently could not provide; to protect those who sided with the Army; and to send a political message at least as strong and full of hope as that of the NLF—to the magic word “independence” (expected to bring with it happiness in addition to liberty), the French Army decided to oppose the word “integration,” which meant total equality with French Algerians and French citizens. To control the borders, the Army had to stop the guerrillas and cut off all their external sources of support, thus completing the asphyxiation begun by the loss of popular internal support.

This doctrine would be applied progressively, and successfully, as evidenced by the massive commitment of the harkis and the decision of thousands of rebels and villages in 1959 and 1960 to support the French Army against the NLF.

Once embarked on the path to pacification, the French Army crossed a line to an area off-limits to armies in democratic countries: It made a deliberate political commitment. Because the entire political class of the day unanimously accepted a “French” Algeria, the Army saw nothing wrong in assuming the government's prerogative. It quickly swung into action once the government legally conferred civilian power on it.

Pacification's ultimate goals were to destroy the NLF's PAO, restore French administration, and reestablish a secure environment for reunification without exposing the people to excessive risk. Intelligence gathered by human agents (HUMINT) was vital to attaining the first goal. Classic police and counterinsurgency work, facilitated by the highly structured and standardized NLF network, helped crush the rebels' PAO.⁴ To achieve the second and third goals, the Army replaced a civilian

administration unable to act in unsecured areas. It took over the management of schools, clinics, road maintenance, the water supply, and so on. To help administer these functions, the Army divided Algeria into a “grid” of regions, sectors, and sub-sectors. At the lowest level, an infantry company controlled a few villages and a couple thousand inhabitants. The same soldiers who used shovels, first-aid kits, and schoolbooks reinforced security, administered the population, and fought the kabitas and local PAOs. Sustained contact created a strong personal bond between the people and “their” company. Once trust had been established, the company formed village self-defense units, called harkas, which worked with the French to seek out and destroy rebels.

Experience and knowledge contributed to success. On average, conscripted units stayed in Algeria for 28 months after their initial training; thus, the men became seasoned soldiers who understood rebel tactics. Each battalion also benefited from a hunter unit, often composed of harkis and former rebels, which tracked the local katibas and practiced guerrilla tactics against them.

The grid method was also applied to urban areas. Algiers, for example, was divided into sectors, with a neighborhood chief keeping watch on all buildings and city blocks in his sector. He was expected to identify all inhabitants and know why any were absent. If he did not, he was promptly accused of complicity with the NLF.

Simultaneously, the Army moved to stop the flow of external support to the rebels. It constructed a barrier that extended along the borders with Tunisia and Morocco, from the sea to the desert. With its electrified barbed-wire, minefields, radars, patrol routes for armored elements, and interdiction units stationed in posts offset from the border by a few kilometers, the barrier was intended not to sweep the area of insurgents, but to locate them quickly. The barrier acted like a fishnet that interdiction units could use for several hours at a time to intercept katiba arms convoys. It was so efficient that infiltration became suicidal, causing NLF guerrillas in Tunisia to deliberately abandon their comrades in Algeria.

Having denied the rebels safety and support, the Army, under Challe, further refined its infantry tactics. Intervention units were assigned to each region to conduct search and cordon operations with units that inhabited the grid. Except for some parachute units made up almost entirely of conscripts, these intervention units were generally professional regiments (Foreign Legion, Parachute, or Marines). In 1959, Challe grouped these regiments into a strategic reserve, which he

successively committed in mass operations across Algeria, beginning in the relatively quiet Oranie region and ending in the rebel strongholds of Kabylie and the Aures Mountains.

Intervention operations always began as routine cordon and search missions, but they were coordinated regionally and went on for weeks, even months at a time, thus preventing NLF guerrillas from waiting out the Army by hiding in caves or other safe places. Those who did hide fell prey to ambushes when they emerged to look for food and water. Within 2 years of the Challe Plan’s implementation, the guerrillas had lost all offensive capabilities and were effectively routed.

The Army also attacked from the inside. Special forces and secret services action units infiltrated guerrilla networks to misinform and mislead NLF leaders. In the most damaging of these operations, the Army fabricated a terrorist network that asked the NLF for support (weapons, ammunition, explosives, and money) from neighboring networks. The bogus group’s inactivity eventually aroused the suspicions of local chiefs, but when it did the imaginary group put out the word that it had been infiltrated by the French; it also claimed to have proof that the guerrillas in surrounding areas had been likewise infiltrated. The NLF chiefs in these surrounding areas promptly picked up some of their own people who, under torture, named accomplices. Rumors of a plot reached even the ears of Colonel Amirouche, the feared commander of the Kabylie Wilaya, who quickly found evidence of a yet deeper plot. He convinced other Wilaya commanders to proceed with bloody purges in their regions. Over the next several months, the NLF executed thousands of its own members. Recently recruited high school and university students bore the brunt of the violence; as urban intellectuals, they were already suspected by the NLF’s mostly rural, peasant base. The killings, of course, discouraged many sympathizers from joining the insurgency.

Legal Problems. In the first months of the war, the French applied peacetime law. In fact, there being no foreign aggression, the word “war” was never used. Any person arrested for any aggressive act or singled out as an insurgent was subject to a police investigation and potential judgment by a nonmilitary tribunal. This system failed. When the suspects were freed for lack of evidence and triumphantly returned to their towns, they immediately executed their accusers. Civil authorities were so incapable of performing their missions that they turned over their powers to the Army.

The military, however, also had problems administering the law. In 1957, a controversy erupted

in France over the Army's torture and summary execution of suspects, particularly during the Battle of Algiers. One general and several officers resigned to protest methods they considered contrary to military ethics, disgraceful to the Army's image, and, worst of all, counterproductive because they drove Muslims to the NLF. Recently, two generals who participated in the Battle of Algiers admitted to having resorted to these practices—the only method available they said—to combat the daily scourge of urban terrorism. Many other soldiers emphatically maintained they had fought within legal boundaries and with military honor. To this day, the controversy continues.

Consequences of the Algerian War

On disembarking in France, French Algerian émigrés realized they loved their country of birth and its Arab citizens more than the mother country, which few of them knew. Nonetheless, this valiant, proactive people had great success integrating into French society while still preserving group cohesion.

In Algeria, after 130 years of French colonial domination and 8 years of war, independence did not provide the happiness the people had yearned for. Leaders who had enjoyed the support of the NLF army in Tunisia stripped surviving insurgent chiefs and resistance forces of power. During the ensuing struggle for political control, the Algerian people endured a socialist dictatorship, a military dictatorship, border wars with Morocco, chronic rebellions by the Kabylie Berbers, economic crises, political assassinations, terrorism, and another civil war. According to UN data, in 1954, Algeria ranked 14th in the world in gross domestic product; in 2001, despite the oil boom in the Sahara, Algeria ranked 74th. Relations between France and its former colony have also been slow to normalize.

For the French Army, the end of the Algerian War was a terrible ordeal. After the 1961 coup in Algiers failed, a dozen prestigious regiments were disbanded and numerous highly decorated officers—many of them heroes of World War II and Indochina—were tried and sentenced to prison; others were forced to flee their homeland or to retire from active service. A number of military SAO members, including one colonel, were executed by firing squad. When chosen to preside over a court martial, one general loyal to De Gaulle took his own life to avoid standing in judgment of his peers.

For some time, the Army remained bitterly divided between the old French Algeria hardliners and those in the De Gaulle camp. Trust between the military and its civilian leaders was another casualty. The military has long harbored mistrust of the political class for changing its policies in the midst of war and for going back on its word and abandoning those Algerians who had united with the Army. Conversely, until recently a significant part of the public believed the Army capable of intervening in the democratic workings of political institutions, or even of organizing another military coup.

The Algerian War did have at least one benefit: Young officers now read the stories of their predecessors, and most daydream of being, at least once in their careers, commanding officers of hunter units or of isolated outposts, fighting with total initiative in *their* zone, against *their* enemy while competing for the hearts and minds of *their* people. This mindset enables them to adapt rapidly and effectively to stability or peacekeeping operations. Even so, the darker lessons learned from the Algerian War have been etched into their collective memory: Do not promise anything you yourself cannot provide; do not interfere in politics; and be prepared to withdraw with a clear conscience. **MR**

NOTES

1. The historical data in this article are drawn from the books of Yves Courrière. This article uses the term French Algerian to refer to French citizens who were born, raised, and lived in Algeria.

2. Among these were strong minorities of Italian, Spanish, Armenian, Jewish, and Greek immigrants. Nicknamed the "Pieds Noirs" (Black Feet), the French Algerians retained the pioneer spirit of the first colonists. Several thousand native-born Muslims, essentially Army veterans, also had French nationality. They made up a small number of the Algerian Muslim soldiers who had enlisted in the French Army during World War II and the War in Indochina.

3. The Berbers, the indigenous inhabitants of Maghreb, were present before the Arab conquest of the region. They make up the second largest ethnic group

in North Africa, have their own language and culture, and have always demanded administrative autonomy and respect for their rights.

4. Due to the centralized, pyramidal, symmetrical organization of the political administrative organization, it was not difficult to crack a local network. Each family knew the tax collector who came to request money every month, the tax collector had a contact in the logistic cell who knew his own chief, and this chief had a contact with a combat bombing cell and propaganda cell. If you broke one link, you could break the whole chain. The key factor was speed: Identify the network from the first piece of intelligence (often using physical pressure or torture) and then roll up the members before they could find out they had been betrayed.

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Why Small Brigade Combat Teams Undermine Modularity

Lieutenant Colonel Stephen L. Melton, U.S. Army, Retired

THE MODULAR transformation of the Army will not achieve its goal of flattening and rationalizing command echelons and providing more usable combat power for operational deployments as long as the Army maintains the small brigade combat team (BCT) as currently designed. Underuse of the BCT and subordinate battalion headquarters is driving unwanted, unnecessary growth of BCT and unit of employment (UEx) headquarters, and the BCT's small size and combat maneuver focus are causing special-purpose support units of action (SUAs) to proliferate. The Army has not eliminated redundancies and inefficiencies in BCT, UEx, and SUA designs. The Army cannot afford unneeded headquarters. Ultimately, soldiers in the field will be the ones who pay the bills for the profligate overhead the Army is now creating.

The problem begins with the small, maneuver-focused BCT, which is a flawed foundation for modularity. One of modularity's original goals was to reduce Army echelons from four to three. Figure 1 depicts the BCT as being significantly more capable than the current brigade, which enables

the UEx to function in the span from division to corps.¹

The Army hoped that enhancing the brigade would allow fewer levels of command and fewer two- and three-star headquarters as division to corps functions and capabilities migrated to the BCT. But that is not the way things worked out. Instead, the Army—

- Elected to go from 33 existing brigades to 43 BCTs to increase the number of brigade-equivalent units available for operations overseas.
- Established four BCTs per division by taking the assets of the legacy three-brigade division and its associated corps slices and dividing them among four ground maneuver BCTs (which led to no significant increase in overall division combat power).
- Left the number of infantry and armor companies about the same, increasing it by five in the heavy division, but decreasing it by seven in the infantry divisions (IDs) (figure 2).²

The BCT design is weaker than its Force XXI or limited conversion brigade predecessor because—

- Small BCTs trade armor and infantry companies for reconnaissance troops in the hope that improved situational awareness will reduce the need for combat power.
- The heavy brigade loses one of its infantry (IN)/armor (AR) teams and two howitzers, although adding 29 Bradleys to the armed reconnaissance squadron (ARS) and scout platoons replaces much of the lost firepower.
- On average, heavy BCTs have about 10 percent fewer tanks, but more Bradleys.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the position of the Department of the Army; the Department of Defense or any other government office or agency.—Editor




Figure 1. Command echelons transformed.

- The infantry brigade loses one-third of its companies, two howitzers, its share of line-of-sight antitank battalion support, and is only partially compensated by two scout platoons.

Some would argue that fielding improved weapons systems and equipment will enhance the actual combat power of the new BCTs. They are correct, but the same could be said if predecessor brigades had fielded the new equipment.

The Army has not elevated the BCT to assume divisional and corps roles, as promised. The BCT, like the divisional brigade, is built around its maneuver battalions and direct support by sappers and artillery. True, the BCT can achieve greater situational awareness because of enhanced scouting and intelligence, but it has no greater a menu of capabilities to forcefully change a situation than the old brigades. The small, ground-maneuver-focused BCT still needs links to a division for additional combat, combat support (CS), and combat service support (CSS) functions. UEx-level SUAs are an attempt to make up for the deficiencies of the small BCT design.

A More Expensive Division-Based Army

To date, modularized divisions share the same pattern.

- They are building to four BCTs.
- Their division headquarters is growing in size and capability into a UEx.
- They have an aviation brigade (two in the 101st Airborne Division [ABD]).
- They are organizing the old division base into one or more SUAs.

So far, each has a sustainment SUA, and heavy divisions have fires SUAs. The sustainment SUA contains the old division support command (DISCOM) and the corps support units not divided among the BCT's brigade support battalions (BSBs). The fires SUA is a combination of division artillery (DIVARTY) and reinforcing corps artillery brigades. The maneuver enhancement (ME) SUA gets the remaining engineers, military police (MP), and air defense artillery (ADA). The battlefield surveillance (BFS) SUA houses a military intelligence (MI) battalion and, until recently, the division cavalry squadron. These SUAs are little more than a re-creation of elements of the old division base. With the BCTs specialized for ground maneuver, other

key battlefield responsibilities bubble up to the UEx by default. Small BCTs require creating and resourcing UEx-subordinate SUAs.

The SUAs' cost is driving the Army to admit it cannot allocate the full complement of SUA headquarters to each division UEx in the Army Campaign Plan.³ The SUA base designs (all of which are colonel commands requiring a brigade headquarters, signal company, and various service support units) require several hundred soldiers each before a single functional battalion is even assigned. For example, a sustainment SUA has 365 soldiers in its headquarters and signal company, even if no battalions are assigned. A fires SUA has 278 soldiers in its headquarters and headquarters battalion, signal company, and BSB headquarters and headquarters company (HHC), but only one organic multiple-launch rocket system (MLRS) battalion. These 278 soldiers are not needed to command and control (C2) or sustain the MLRS battalion. The ME and BFS brigade bases are similarly designed and represent significant overhead cost.

The UEx Digital Warfighter 05 Omnifusion Block II Experiment, conducted from 22 March to 8 April 2005 at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, demonstrated how expensive the new SUA designs are. In the experimental scenario, a modular heavy division with a UEx headquarters, three heavy BCTs, one Stryker BCT, a heavy aviation brigade, and a full complement of SUAs conducted offensive operations against a defending near-peer competitor. The three heavy BCTs had 174 Abrams and 267 Bradleys (441 combined). However, with the addition of the SUAs, the modularized division grew to

Heavy Division

IN/AR Cos: 27 to 32 (9 bns of 3 to 8 bns of 4)
 Scout Plts: 28 to 32 (includes tanks from old Div Cav)
 155 Btrys: 9 to 8 (guns increase from 54 to 64)

Heavy Brigade

IN/AR Cos: 9 to 8
 Scout Plts: 5 to 8
 155 Btrys: 3 to 2 (guns decrease from 18 to 16)


Infantry Division

IN Cos: 39 to 32 (9 bns of 4 to 8 bns of 4, loss of LOSAT bn)
 Scout Plts: 19 to 28
 105 Btrys: 9 to 8 (guns increase from 54 to 64)

Infantry Brigade

IN Cos: 12 to 8 (includes AT and Weapons Cos)
 Scout Plts: 5 to 7
 105 Btrys: 3 to 2 (guns decrease from 18 to 16)

Figure 2. Transformation of IN/AR/FA structure.



Divisions go from three ground maneuver brigades to four smaller maneuver-focused BCTs, forcing retention of all division and several corps HQs, and causing proliferation of UEx-level support UAs.

Figure 3. Effect of small BCTs.

over 35,000 soldiers and 9,500 vehicles.⁴ By comparison, the 3d Infantry Division (ID) (Reinforced) went into Iraq with 247 Abrams and 264 Bradleys (511 combined) and about 21,000 soldiers, while all of V Corps had about 10,000 vehicles.⁵ SUAs are creating a situation in which the Army needs a corps' worth of tail to support a division's worth of tooth. And, because all SUAs require protection on the contemporary, noncontiguous battlefield (protection the small BCTs, with only eight combat companies, cannot afford to provide), protection of SUAs became the main focus of the Stryker BCT during the exercise.

The small BCTs are causing proliferation of CS and CSS SUAs and retention of unnecessary personnel in division and corps headquarters. The Army hoped the UEx would reduce the number of divisional headquarters, but span-of-control factors are forcing the Army to create a UEx headquarters for all 10 transforming divisions. Four small BCTs, an aviation brigade, and a few SUAs pretty much exhaust the UEx headquarters' span of control. Tying the division UEx to the C2 and support of its subordinate BCTs and SUAs limits its as-

sumption of corps responsibilities. Small brigades force the Army to retain nearly all its division and corps structure. If 3d ID, 101st Airborne (ABN) Division, 82d ABN Division, and other units in theater had been modularized along current designs during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), V Corps would still have been needed as an intermediate headquarters between the divisions and the joint force land component command (JFLCC). As a consequence of the small, maneuver-focused BCT, the modular Army will maintain its four original echelons, not be reduced to three (figure 3).

Rethinking the Modular Brigade Base

The Army should revisit BCT design to make the BCT capable of operating independently without relying on UEx SUAs for combat, CS, and CSS, except aviation support. Only when the BCT assumes nearly all divisional functions can the UEx assume corps-level functions. Brigade and battalion headquarters must command an appropriate, that is, a larger, number of subordinate maneuver units.⁶ The unaffordable proliferation of headquarters in the modular force is largely caused by failure to fully use BCT C2 capabilities.⁷ Diseconomies at the bottom become more costly as their consequences move up the hierarchical chain.

One solution is a large combined arms BCT. (See figure 4.) Other large brigade designs are possible, but I prefer to construct the large BCT, with some minor changes, from approved company and battalion modular designs because these units are serviceable and widely accepted. The large BCT is not an alternative to modularity; it is a less costly way to better achieve its goals by arranging and combining its substructures.

With a brigadier general commanding the large




Figure 4. Comparison of BCTs.


BCT and two assistant commanders responsible for intelligence, maneuver, fires and sustainment, infrastructure, and civil-military operations, respectively, the headquarters would grow to nearly 185 people.⁸ The new BCT would command 4 maneuver battalions, not just 2 as in the current design, and provide 16 IN/AR companies, compared

with 8 in the small BCT and 9 in a Force XXI or limited conversion brigade.⁹ With the addition of another Paladin battery and an MLRS battery, the fires battalion would command 4 batteries, not 2, with about half of the Force XXI DIVARTY's 155 howitzers, plus organic MLRS for counterbattery and long-range fires.

The unneeded and problematic BTB headquarters would be eliminated. Instead, a 68-soldier engineer battalion headquarters would have administrative control (for manning and training) of the sapper companies assigned to maneuver battalions. More important, the engineer battalion would exercise C2 of attached or OPCON bridging, horizontal construction, vertical construction, and specialty engineering companies and construction contractors employed in the area of operations (AO). An MP company, not a platoon, would support and protect the expanded BCT AO. Additional forward support companies would supplement the BSB to support the increased maneuver and fires structure.

The large combined arms BCT would have—

- Twice the maneuver strength as the small BCT.
- More than twice the artillery and engineering support.
- Three times as many MPs as the small BCT.
- Roughly the same capability as two small BCTs, but with 1,400 (19 percent) fewer soldiers.
- Roughly half a division's worth of ground combat power. In essence, each division would be divided into two large BCTs and one aviation brigade.



Large combined-arms BCTs commanded by brigadier generals reduce requirements for UEx Headquarters and Support UAs. Army structure flattens, with savings reinvested in combat troops.

Figure 5. Transformation based on large BCTs.

The large BCT would no longer replace the current brigade, but would replace the current division. Because the large BCT would have expanded combat and CS capability and organic CSS, it would not depend on division SUAs. With the joint force air component commander providing close air support and Army aviation support (attack, reconnaissance, lift, and command aviation support) from its normally associated aviation brigade, the large BCT would be a dominating presence within its AO and provide a more robust platform for the varied task organizations required in stability operations and support operations.

Second-Order Benefits of Larger BCTs

Elevating and enlarging the BCT to assume all divisional functions (less aviation) results in the force structure shown in figure 5, which looks a lot like the modularity concept in figure 1. Doing so would pay big dividends in that there would be fewer requirements and bills for UEx, SUA, and BCT headquarters.

Using large BCTs, the UEx could control two legacy divisions' worth of ground and aviation brigades and a smaller menu of SUAs oriented toward UEx-level missions, not brigade support, which in essence would make the UEx a headquarters for a small corps. In smaller scale contingencies, as in OIF, the UEx would be directly subordinate to the JFLCC. If OIF had been fought with large BCTs, the combined JFLCC would have commanded the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force, a UEx made up of 3d ID and 101st ABN Division assets, and another UEx from 82d ABN Division assets and units that had completed reception, staging, onward movement, and integration. V Corps would not have been needed as an intermediate headquarters.¹⁰ The UEx headquarters could alternatively serve as the joint task force headquarters. UEx headquarters would command other UExs only during a major theater war requiring nearly the entire force structure—active and reserve. In that extreme and unlikely case, the superior UExs would be equivalent to World War II armies, each commanding multiple corps-size units.

The Army could re-mission, streamline, or eliminate UEx SUAs no longer required for BCTs' direct support. Force designers should consider the following suggestions.

Combine sustainment and ME brigades. Because both SUAs operate in the same geographical area with the same units mutually supporting or being supported, the sustainment and ME brigades

should be combined. The new support brigade, with a brigadier general commanding, would sustain the UEx and protect and maintain lines of communication to the theater base; in essence, spanning the geographical and capabilities gap between the theater base, and BCT BSBs. The support brigade should be combined-arms-capable and allow attachment of maneuver battalions when the need arises. The Army should allocate one support brigade headquarters per UEx and determine the number of subordinate battalions by operational need.

Eliminate the fires brigade headquarters. The Army should eliminate the fires brigade headquarters, establish a more robust targeting element at the UEx level, and attach artillery battalions directly to the BCTs, even if they fire in general support of the UEx. The noncontiguous battlefield requires artillery battalions to collocate with BCTs to stay within range of the enemy and to receive better protection and sustainment.¹¹

Eliminate the BSF brigade headquarters. The BFS brigade headquarters is an unnecessary level of supervision. The single MI battalion should be directly subordinate to the UEx headquarters.

Establish “force provider” headquarters no lower than theater level. A force provider headquarters should only be established at the theater level, not within the UEx. The Army can gain efficiencies by task organizing scarce units directly to the brigades that will employ them.

Total Army Analysis must determine the numbers of large BCTs, UExs, SUAs, and UEys the Army requires and can resource. The numbers in figure 5 are only reasoned estimates. Elevating the BCT in capability would allow the higher headquarters the reductions Army leaders initially desired.

Force Structure Savings Quantified

Creating large BCTs from the legacy divisions will be less costly and traumatic than creating small BCTs because large BCTs would reduce the number of brigade and battalion headquarters; small BCTs increases them. Eliminating unneeded headquarters is the best source of manning for the significantly larger BCT and UEx headquarters. Conversion based on large BCTs nets a savings of eight headquarters per legacy division. Only one new headquarters (for an ARS) is needed. On average, nine old headquarters are not needed (one forward support battalion [FSB], one engineer battalion, two field artillery battalions, the signal and

ADA battalions, and three brigade-level HHCs: one maneuver, the DIVARTY, and the division engineers [DIVENG]). The MI battalion and DISCOM headquarters often will be needed to source the UEx MI battalion and support brigade SUA. By contrast, modularity conversion based on the small BCT design adds headquarters, requiring 10 new headquarters (1 BCT, 4 brigade troops battalions [BTBs], 3 ARCs, 1 FSB, and 1 special troops battalion), with only 7 sourcing headquarters (DIVENG and the signal, engineer, and ADA battalions). The MI, DIVARTY, and DISCOM headquarters generally become UEx SUA HHCs. The Army has to field three new brigade or battalion headquarters, as well as an expanded divisional (UEx) headquarters per division converted to small BCTs. No wonder the Army has difficulty manning and equipping the headquarters for this small-BCT force.

The savings in disestablishing (or never establishing) unneeded headquarters is significant. Each UEx headquarters requires about 1,000 soldiers, and its SUA headquarters about 500 soldiers. The savings is probably 1,500 soldiers per UEx not created, if not more. UEx and SUA savings resulting from large BCTs would be at least 6,000 soldiers. (See figures 2 and 5.) Also, fully utilized BCT headquarters means fewer headquarters for each supported maneuver battalion and artillery battery. The current heavy BCT BTB has 453 soldiers; the BSB HHC has 91; each ARS headquarters and headquarters troop has 62; and each underused fires battalion headquarters costs 87 soldiers—nearly 700 headquarters soldiers in the underemployed small-BCT base.

Sorting the current division assets into two large BCTs each, rather than four small ones each, would save over 14,000 brigade and battalion headquarters spaces in the 20 brigade bases not built. Combined with the savings from fewer UExs and SUAs, the total savings would be about 20,000 headquarters spaces—all overhead—without eliminating a single infantry, armor, engineer, support, or maintenance company.

More Combat Power

The Army should invest the savings in building large BCTs, to total 24 when conversion is complete.¹² (I assume the Army will also keep five Stryker brigades.) The 24 large BCTs would contain 384 IN/AR companies, 80 more (26 percent) than the 304 in the 38 small BCT force now in the Army Campaign Plan, and 20 more (5.5 percent) than the 43 small BCT force that requires a 30,000-

soldier end-strength increase.

Reinvesting the savings that large BCTs would generate into creating additional large BCTs, whether infantry or armor will provide much-needed relief for those doing most of the fighting and dying in Iraq and Afghanistan, or in any war for that matter. Creating more combat units is the most direct, effective way to reduce deployments overseas for the Army's combat brigades and the soldiers assigned to them. A 26 percent growth in the IN/AR force structure, even if organized in 24 large brigades, would allow for a sounder overseas rotation scheme than would 38 small brigades with little or no growth in combat arms strength.¹³

The large BCT force would be more efficient. Fewer soldiers would have to be deployed to generate the same combat power in theater, and more combat units would be available for deployment. To deploy a division's worth of ground combat power into theater, the Army would have to send four BCTs of the 43 small BCT force (9.3 percent), as was the case with the 3d ID in OIF3.¹⁴ Only two BCTs of the 29 large BCT force (6.9 percent) would be required. Put in other terms, if the standard for combat deployment for active component BCTs is 1 year in 3, the 43 small BCT force would yield 3.6 current division equivalents on station in theater, while the 29 large BCT force would support 4.8 current division equivalents, with 33 percent more available ground combat

force. In terms of soldiers required per combat battalion deployed or in terms of combat units available for deployment, the large BCT force would be significantly more efficient than the small BCT force. More units for deployment and fewer soldiers per deployment means the Army could reduce the soldier rotational tempo by one-third; that is, 1 year in 4, and still generate the same combat power overseas.

Streamlining the C2 Structure

The Army's intent in modularity was not to create a more lavish C2 structure, but to streamline it. The Army wanted more combat units for overseas rotations, not fewer. However, the current modularity conversion seems to be unwittingly sacrificing foxhole strength in combat arms to build under-used, redundant headquarters structures, which is exactly the opposite of what the Army intended when it began the modular transformation.

We now know enough about how modularity works to make the necessary beneficial corrections, which, in the grander view of Army Transformation, are not that great. We can significantly reduce the stress on the average soldier by creating more companies and battalions, not unneeded BCT, UEx, and SUA headquarters. The Army would have more combat power to support combatant commanders overseas and to ease strains on the All-Volunteer Army. MR

NOTES

1. U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), "Primer on Army Modularity," briefing to the U.S. Joint Forces Command, 1 December 2004. The briefing slide appears in many modularity briefings and documents, often with different text.

2. *The Army Comprehensive Guide to Modularity Version 1.0* (Fort Monroe, VA: Headquarters TRADOC, 8 October 2004), chaps. 8 and 9, app. B, D, and E, and the U.S. Army Force Management and Support Agency (USAFMSA) Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) and Modified TOE databases, on-line at <www.usafmsardd.army.mil>, accessed 10 June 2005. Also available at <https://webtaads.belvoir.mil>. Current force data is from the USAFMSA website.

3. GEN Dick Cody, briefing on the Army Campaign Plan, Senior Army Commanders Conference, 21 October 2004, Washington, D.C.

4. TRADOC determined the support unit of action's (SUA's) task organization.

5. Gregory Fontenot, E.J. Degen, and David Tohn, *On Point* (Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), 80, 88.

6. "Modular Brigade Combat Teams: Task Force Modularity White Paper Part III" (draft), 15 July 2004, 32-33. (No other publishing information given.) The authors argue that the brigade combat team (BCT) should have a third maneuver battalion; that combat effectiveness increases in proportion to ground maneuver platoons; and cite endurance and flexibility as additional advantages of additional battalions.

7. U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 5-0, *Army Planning and Orders Production* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], January 2005), F-2, provides guidance on span of control as being two to five subordinate units. Modular designs are generally based on a span of four or five. Combined arms battalions command four maneuver companies, plus engineer, scout, mortar, and various other supporting units. UExs command on average four or five BCTs, plus other brigade and support elements. Only the BCT has the minimum

span of control.

8. Compared to 265 people in the headquarters and headquarters company (HHC) of the limited conversion heavy division and 89 people in the HHC of the current heavy brigade, the large BCT headquarters contains three times the personnel of an existing brigade headquarters or 70 percent of the old division staff.

9. The Army of Excellence balanced brigade of the 1980s and 1990s had 16 ground maneuver companies.

10. "Task Force Modularity UE [unit of excellence] Overview," briefing to the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army and the Army Staff, slide 6, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., 9 August 2004, shows that a combined joint force land component commander and staff could directly command two UExs, a U.S. Marine Expeditionary Force, and a multinational force without an intervening corps.

11. *Modular Brigade Combat Teams*, 30-31. Note that even multiple-launch rocket system batteries must be deployed in the BCT footprint and rely on the BCT for security and protection. The closest source of general support artillery sustainment would be a BCT brigade support battalion.

12. The Army Campaign Plan establishes a 2010 goal of 20 heavy BCTs (3,735 soldiers each); 18 infantry BCTs (3,369 soldiers each); and 4 unneeded UEx headquarters/SUA structures (6,000 soldiers each), totaling 141,342 soldiers. The same number of soldiers could be used to build 12 large heavy interim BCTs (6,071 each) and 12 large infantry brigade combat teams (IBCTs) (5,491 each). Large IBCTs would follow the same design principles as the large heavy BCTs.

13. If only one small BCT's-worth of combat power were needed, half of a large BCT could be sent overseas, and a deputy commander would be available to command the stay-behind force, which would become part of the rotational pool. Large BCTs do not preclude the inevitable small operations.

14. OIF3 indicates a unit's third rotation in-theater.

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Growing the Iraqi Security Forces

Major Steven M. Miska, U.S. Army

The political record suggests that even the most valid counter-guerilla tactics provided transitory victory that gained meaning only when exploited politically. . . .

—Robert B. Asprey in *War in the Shadows: The Guerilla in History*¹

POLITICAL LEADERS in America and military leaders in Iraq have repeatedly emphasized the importance of building up Iraqi security forces (ISF) as a foundation for the rule of law, economic progress, and political stability. Underlying the strategy is the ancient proverb “Give a man a fish, and you feed him for a day; teach a man to fish, and you feed him for a lifetime.”

Arming a democratic Iraq with the internal and external security to defend itself will be a political victory that will allow the United States to withdraw from operations. Military units across the Iraqi theater have spent a tremendous amount of energy and resources to help produce an Iraqi National Guard (ING), civic and border police, and special operations and regular army units. Much remains to be done, but the U.S. Army has laid a solid foundation for democracy despite the persistent barbs of a stubborn insurgency.

Recent operations in Samarra, a city of 300,000 in Iraq’s Sunni Triangle, illustrate why the ISF holds the key to Iraq’s future. Coalition forces easily regained control of Samarra overnight after a brigade combat team assault combined with elements of three ING battalions, the 7th Iraqi Army (IA) Battalion, and the 2d Ministry of the Interior Commando Battalion. After only a day of combat,

the insurgents fled, died fighting, or went to ground in Samarra.

That the insurgents stood their ground at all against mechanized forces came as a surprise. As former CBS reporter and author Robert Taber explains, “[G]uerrillas restrict their] operations to nibbling around the edges of the opposing army and fighting in the enemy’s rear areas. Materially unable to face a military decision, they must of necessity await a political decision.”²

Operations in Samarra rapidly shifted to locating any remaining insurgents and weapons caches and returning the city to normalcy. Iraqi forces quickly exceeded coalition force (CF) capabilities in gathering intelligence because they could communicate with Samarra’s inhabitants in their native tongue without relying on interpreters. The ISF rapidly developed credibility, but the lack of effective law enforcement led the city’s inhabitants to doubt the CF could maintain a lasting peace in Samarra. The CF quickly began training and resourcing a police force that could assume control and maintain order within the city. Without a police force, the tactical victory in Samarra was the equivalent of giving the citizens a fish; providing a police force would teach them how to fish. But training policemen to stand up to an insurgency is not easy. The insurgents harassed and intimidated ISF leaders and their families, creating a climate of uncertainty that the CF and ISF still contend with.

Protecting the Populace

To defeat an insurgency you must win over the populace, not simply win the tactical battle. Defeating insurgents on the field of conflict requires sufficient combat power, but winning over the population by helping them achieve a better future requires economic opportunity, security, and stability. Iraqis are pragmatic. If the government

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or any other government office or agency.—Editor

can provide jobs for the heads of households and security for families while ensuring that insurgents will not destroy that hope, the people can be won over. Most Iraqis do not believe the United States will remain in Iraq for the long term, given repeated U.S. policy statements about not wanting to be an occupying power. However, if U.S. forces leave, the Iraqis must have a credible force in place to continue the rule of law. An effective police force best provides stability and security at the level where individual families make decisions. Given the prospect for a better tomorrow, most Iraqis will tolerate occupation efforts as long as the coalition takes no actions to aggravate existing anti-Western sentiment, which is why the United States emphasizes developing ISF capacities and capabilities.

How does a task force (TF) build an ISF that can offer enduring peace? Committed leadership dedicated to a commander's vision is one fundamental ingredient. At the battalion TF level, this translates into taking the command's strategic lines of operation and committing the manpower and resources necessary to accomplish specific, measurable goals.

The first step in creating a force capable of protecting the Iraqi people is to focus energy on designing a strategic vision based on the theater campaign plan, lines of operation, and any measures of effectiveness (MOEs) developed in operations orders and targeting processes. Economic, political, security, and information operations (IO) measures should be defined in that strategy. Although these might be broad-based, applying them creatively requires refining them into comprehensible goals at the soldier level.

In Samarra, Task Force 1-18 developed a model to apply a strategy that rested on platoon discipline and training. (See figure 1.) The basic premise was that no one platoon could win the campaign, but any platoon could lose it, or at least severely set relations back, as Abu Ghraib attests. The strategy incorporated the pillars of economy, governance, and security all built on a foundation of disciplined platoons and focused IO.

Information emanates from everything a unit does—the way soldiers wear their kit, the way messages are announced to local leaders, the way soldiers conduct operations and treat people. All of these things send signals to the populace and to the enemy—signals that reveal a unit's reputation, level of training, and inten-

tions. For example, by purposely wearing elbow and knee pads for protection in urban environments, TF 1-18 created a storm-trooper image. The enemy immediately recognized a different type of soldier, although the previous unit in Tikrit had been just as aggressive. Still, TF 1-18's soldiers did not alienate the public while striking fear in the enemy. Tactics such as carrying weapons at the low ready, waving to children, and paying for damages during raids and other operations helped create an impression of evenhandedness.

Driving a Wedge Between the Populace and Insurgents

Building security forces, creating economic opportunity, and developing fledgling government programs helped drive a wedge between the population and the insurgents. The key to stymieing an insurgency is winning over the population, for "if the insurgents can gain control over the population through fear, popular appeal, or . . . a mixture of both, they stand a good chance of winning."³

Insurgents must fight asymmetrically. To plan and resource attacks, they require safe havens—areas isolated from counterinsurgent power through geography or areas a population provides through passive acceptance or active support of the insurgency. In urban environments, the populace often provides the necessary safe haven. Although most people might simply be fence-sitters with respect to supporting the insurgent cause, a unit that does not follow a strategy of creating future opportunities for the majority of the population can quickly create safe havens and additional enemies. Strategy must simultaneously focus on providing economic progress, local self-governance, credible security forces, and favorable publicity about counterinsurgent achievements.




Figure 1. Command strategy.

The current theater campaign plan in Iraq focuses on building a credible ISF that will eventually turn Iraq into a sovereign nation and allow the United States and other coalition nations to scale back their commitments. At the TF level, building a credible ISF means—

- Recruiting and training an ING battalion.
- Creating a fully functional joint coordination center (JCC).
- Training and resourcing local police and police stations.
- Training and resourcing local emergency responders.
- Integrating all of the above forces into an overall security plan to protect the common citizen.

Building Credible Security Forces

Figure 2 depicts a commander’s assessment of four lines of operation with an emphasis on developing credible security forces. A capable ISF provides security, which enables local control and rule of law, economic progress, and job creation. Once this positive cycle begins, economic growth leads to higher employment, which promotes more stability.

Task forces must define ISF roles and responsibilities, which might differ from traditional police and National Guard duties. (For example, the ING

plays a major role in combating a domestic insurgency, a challenge the U.S. Army National Guard does not face.) In Iraq, security forces play many roles in a city. No Iraqi Army or border security units were present in Tikrit, but other cities and regions in Iraq required border security (or Special Forces units or IA battalions). Iraq’s security requires—

- Iraqi National Police (INP). Civic police interface most closely with the people and provide the ISF and CF with information. Police must be able to defend themselves, as well as defend citizens. This requires training to build confidence and effective systems at police stations.
- Iraqi National Guard. The ING can defeat insurgents, generate public trust and self confidence, and conduct raids and military operations inside Iraq.
- Emergency Services Units (ESUs). ESUs are special police SWAT units that conduct raids and searches in coordination with the INP, ING, and CF and when applicable, train INP personnel.
- Joint Coordination Center (JCC). The JCC coordinates and synchronizes the activities of security and emergency response forces within a city or region and provides the command and control infrastructure for security. The JCC is part of city government. Because the Iraqi kada (county) system stovepipes funding from Baghdad to provincial

Security	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)/Joint Coordination Center (JCC). Tikrit area on track to achieve local control by 1 December. ISF operations controlled through JCC. • Iraqi National Guard (ING) platoon collective task validation, 1 December. Iraqi National Police (INP) demonstrate marked improvement in local control but still suffer from tribal favoritism. Continue to promote ISF credibility. • Coalition force-overall secure. Complex entry points, contingency plans (CONPLANS), and rehearsals complete. • Government facilities and fixed sites-overall secure. All municipal-level facilities secure. Continue to upgrade satellite stations and facilities. ISF provides security. • Population-overall secure. Reasonable security exists with majority of incidents coming from civil crimes.
Governance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • City council prioritizes economic development projects • Progressing. All municipal government functions execute programs for growth in city government. Coaching continues to sustain momentum. • Newly formed national and provincial institutions will initially slow growth. • Task Force New Dawn governmental training tasks are working. • Favoritism and tribal affiliation still dominate. Vanguard area of operation (AO).
Economy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Focus is on Job Corps, key job-producing project to gain influence with former Iraqi Army. • Pushing small-business center project. 1st Infantry Division “Minister of Commerce” has developed a proposal in conjunction with U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). • In conjunction with USAID, U.S. is submitting short-term employment projects to bridge the gap between now and when larger projects begin. • Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) is on track in accordance with project list.
Information Operations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Build Iraqi confidence through aggressive campaign to highlight successes. • Promote ING as a credible force trusted by public and feared by insurgents. • Engagement programs tied to quick dollars continue to improve attitude of overall population. • Information dominance continues through marginalizing kinetic operations and selling New Dawn talking points to leaders and population.

Figure 2. Example of commander’s assessment—Tikrit.

ministries, city governments have little control over purse strings. Lacking fiscal authority, city mayors must petition county ministries to provide resources for city security and economic progress. The JCC gives city mayors a voice in security matters and is a mechanism that enables police chiefs and other security officials to respond to city mayor directives.

Units should focus on building ISF confidence, promoting public trust, and gaining enemy respect. The strategy rests on a unit's commitment to training, resources, and integrating the ISF into operations. Task Force 1-18 committed 15 leaders and soldiers to live permanently with the 201st ING Battalion. A captain led the team of two lieutenants and several senior noncommissioned officers, squad leaders, and soldiers. The roster in figure 3 provides a useful template, but individual soldier personalities are far more important than rank. Iraqi National Guard cadre members must be carefully selected for patience and individual initiative. Working with the 201st ING Battalion, several TF 1-18 specialists developed systems to account for weapons and ammunition in the battalion's arms rooms, conduct battle tracking in the S3 shop, and implement a maintenance

program in the ING battalion. U.S. soldiers who live with the ING are administrators, role models, and individual trainers. CF companies carry out collective training, partner with specific ING units, and conduct joint operations against insurgents. Company commanders provide collective training while the cadre focuses on systems and mentorship.

Partnering U.S. units with Iraqi units deserves more elaboration. Task Force 1-18 companies partnered with Iraqi companies and trained platoons within the companies. Iraqi and U.S. squad leaders developed close working relationships and soldiered together during weapons qualification, collective training, joint operations, and partnership events. The battalions held quarterly partnership days that brought teams of Iraqi and U.S. soldiers to the field to compete against other combined teams. Activities did not foster competition between American and Iraqi teams but, rather, between Iraqis and Americans who habitually trained with each other. The partnering extended to awards ceremonies and combined operations. Leaders fostered bonds that promoted cohesion within Iraqi and American units.

Task Force 1-18 based its training strategy on

CPT		ING Cadre Commander Mentor BN CMD GRP/BN Staff Informant Liaison PAO Representative	
SFC	ING Cadre First Sergeant Mentor BN CSM/Scouts FOB Dragon Life Support Personnel Accountability	SFC	ING Cadre Assistant 1SG Mentor HHC/Support FOB Dragon Details Equipment Accountability
1LT	ING Cadre Executive Officer Mentor B Co/BN S-3/BN S-2 Assistant Informant Liaison Pay Agent	2LT	ING Cadre Assistant XO Mentor A Co/BN S-1/BN S-4 Assistant Pay Agent
SSG MOS (SPC)	Mentor 1&2 Plt/B Co Mentor B Co Supply Room/1SG ING Patrol Leader	SSG 2x MOS (SPC)	Mentor 1,2&3 Plt/A Co Mentor B Co Arms Room/1SG ING Patrol Leader
SSG MOS (SPC)	Mentor 3&4 Plt/B Co Mentor B Co Arms Room/1SG ING Patrol Leader	SSG 2x MOS (SPC)	Mentor 1&2 Plt/A Co Mentor A Co Supply Room/1SG Mentor A Co Arms Room ING Patrol Leader

Figure 3. Cadre duties and responsibilities.

U.S. training management doctrine and focused on squad and platoon training tasks derived from a division quarterly training guidance mission-essential task list crosswalk. (See figure 4.) ING platoons became capable of independent operations within sector, and such operations were building blocks to achieving local control in Tikrit.⁴

While ING individual, squad, and platoon training helped generate confidence for combat operations, other techniques promoted public trust in the ING. Joint training and visible operations promoted CF and ISF unity, but independent operations allowed the ING to present an image of itself as a capable force. The ING conducted independent improvised explosive device sweeps, escorted their own supply convoys, and manned traffic control points (TCPs).

As the tempo of ING operations increased, insurgents increased attacks on ING members and their families. Had they not been well-trained and confident, many ING members might have quit when threatened, like the police in Samarra. However, the ING S2 targeted those who threatened ISF and CF and their interpreters, contractors, workers, and supporters in Tikrit. As a result, ING intelligence

was more valuable than most U.S. intelligence. Iraqi agents gathered information, and ING leaders imparted a sense of urgency to the effort. Intelligence had to be effective or the soldiers would pay a heavy price. Confident in themselves and armed with reliable intelligence, the 201st ING Battalion conducted raids and sweeps to deny safe haven to insurgents in Tikrit. President Bush once claimed: “Some Iraqis units have performed better than others. Some Iraqis have been intimidated enough by the insurgents to leave the service of their country. But a great many are standing firm.”⁵

Engaging the Public

Task Force 1-18’s civil affairs and company teams developed another technique that helped foster public trust in the ISF: they included the ING, INP, and other ISF in outreach programs. Public outreach is a vital aspect of information operations. The ISF conducted dozens of clothing giveaways, visited schools, and held charity drives and other events that generated public exposure and goodwill. The ING S5 was instrumental in these civil-military interactions.

The JCC, ISF, and CF registered every taxicab




Figure 4. ING mission-essential task list (METL) crosswalk.

in the city, conducted aerial reconnaissance of the security sector, exercised crisis response systems, distributed police equipment, and spot-checked training. Joint operations combined IO targeted at the population, the enemy, or both. For example, Operation Orange Crush was the task force's initiative to register all of the taxis in Tikrit. Intelligence indicated that insurgents were using taxis to transit the city and that many taxi drivers were involved in threats against contractors and interpreters. Task Force 1-18 companies and Iraqi police established TCPs and, over a 7-day period, funneled all taxis in Tikrit into inspection areas, questioned drivers, took photos of drivers and license plates, and placed registration stickers on each taxi.

The taxi drivers had no idea what CF and ISF would do with the information, but they could reliably believe that CF and ISF could identify them if they abetted insurgent attacks. The insurgents also had no idea what CF and ISF would do with the cab registrations, but they believed that CF and ISF were somehow tracking taxis within the city, a belief that made the enemy less likely to use cabs as transportation.

Coalition forces and ISF conducted early morning cordons and searches of neighborhoods, going from house to house looking for weapons and other contraband. A secondary objective, however, was to identify potential ex-military personnel who wanted a job. Soldiers selectively handed out job certificates that former Iraqi soldiers could cash in for employment in the Tikrit Job Corps. While such operations netted little in the way of contraband or detainees, insurgent attacks immediately declined. The rebels did not know what information CF and ISF had gleaned from the populace during the searches and reduced their attacks in the area.

These operations were simultaneously kinetic and informational. The ISF developed a core competency, and the operation's effects on the populace deprived the insurgents of safe havens.

Lessons Learned

Task Force 1-18 learned several lessons to nurture independent ISF:

- Leaders must be committed to a strategy that simultaneously promotes ISF development while combating insurgency.

- The strategy must contain specific MOEs that soldiers can understand.

- The environment demands creativity in assessing the threat, the population, and other socioeconomic variables. As T.E. Lawrence aptly said, "Irregular war is far more intellectual than a bayonet charge."⁶

- Leaders must help soldiers adapt to conditions that might require armored kinetic operations one week and dismounted civil-military operations the next.

- Units should train junior leaders to handle routine interactions with the populace so senior leaders can focus on problem areas and think through future strategies.

- There is no substitute for hard work and persistence. The entire task force must accomplish results, not only "pinning the rose," but integrating efforts across functional areas.

- Squad-leader partnering with the ISF helps commit the entire force to the strategy.

If units arrive in theater intent on making a difference, conditions in Iraq will continue to improve, and Iraqis will slowly take charge of their own security and governance. An obstinate insurgency will attempt to slow progress, but agility and persistence set the conditions for peace and stability. **MR**

NOTES

1. Robert B. Asprey, *War in the Shadows: The Guerilla in History* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1975), xii.

2. Robert Taber, *War of the Flea* (New York: L. Stuart, 1965), 64.

3. Andrew Krepinevich, "The War in Iraq: The Nature of Insurgency Warfare," Center for Strategic and Budgetary Studies, 2 June 2004, on-line at <www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/Archive/B.20040602.NatofInsurge/B.20040602.NatofInsurge.pdf>, accessed 10 May 2005.

4. Local control is defined as JCC coordination of all Iraqi Security Forces

activities in the area of operations, with an Iraqi National Guard capable of independent platoon-level operations and an Iraqi National Police force to facilitate basic law and order.

5. David E. Sanger, "Bush Gives Praise and Caution at Marine Base," *New York Times*, 8 December 2004.

6. T.E. Lawrence, "The Evolution of a Revolt," in *The Army Quarterly Journal*, vol. 1, no. 1 (October 1920).

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Marketing: An Overlooked Aspect of Information Operations

Captain Stoney Trent, U.S. Army, and Captain James L. Doty III, U.S. Army

DEFEATING ENEMY formations on the field of battle is merely the first, and often the easiest, phase of a military operation. Ultimate success (accomplishing the political goals of the National Command Authority) hinges on a successful post-high-intensity conflict occupation in which the population comes to accept the new state of affairs. In all phases, understanding and influencing the people is critical to reducing the cost of victory in terms of lives, dollars, and time.

The U.S. Army has had varying degrees of success over the past 100 years in influencing the people of opposing nations. In Cuba, the Philippines, the Dominican Republic, Italy, Germany, Japan, Korea, Vietnam, Haiti, Grenada, Panama, Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo, we have run the gamut from success to failure. Recognizing the need to win over populations, the Army has begun to emphasize information operations (IO) in every deployment. Such operations are one part of the Army's campaign to achieve information superiority during a conflict. Information superiority is "the operational advantage derived from the ability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary's ability to do the same."¹ According to U.S. Army Field Manual 3-0, *Operations*, information operations are "actions taken to affect the adversary's and influence others' decisionmaking processes, information and information systems while protecting one's own information and information systems."²

The concept of influencing an enemy force's or local population's decisionmaking process is not new. American psychological operations (PSYOP) personnel have attempted to disseminate messages and influence enemy forces or local populations since World War II.³ Propaganda, the attempt to

influence threat forces and populations through directed messages, has been used by warring countries for centuries. Americans view propaganda negatively because past enemies such as Nazi Germany, North Vietnam, Imperial Japan, and the Soviet Union used it. Yet, propaganda, PSYOP, and information operations seek to accomplish the same goal: to influence the target audience to make a decision beneficial to the user. What is new in information operations is the integration of the plan to influence threat forces and local populations into a larger effort to achieve an operational advantage by controlling the flow of information.

Recent challenges in Iraq highlight the difficulty of developing and sustaining an effective IO campaign. The U.S. military's failure to adequately integrate and successfully execute IO campaigns is ironic; after all, Americans live in a society dominated by marketing communications. From political lobbying to commercial advertising, organizations sway Americans' decisions. Information operations have the same goal as marketing communications: to influence a target audience to respond positively to a message. Because IO and marketing both attempt to elicit physical as well as psychological responses, both ought to utilize similar methods. The U.S. military should tap the abundance of creative marketing talent in America and implement a more complete approach to IO planning and execution.

In units such as the 1st Armored, 1st Infantry, and 3d Infantry Divisions, field artillery staff officers under the supervision of the S3/G3 are responsible for information operations.⁴ This is because staffs approach IO planning from a targeting perspective. The decide, detect, deliver, and assess targeting cycle is, in fact, similar to the process many advertising agencies use: discover, define,

design, and deliver. However, the Army provides no training for officers who must plan, coordinate, and execute its version of a successful marketing campaign. Even IO career field (FA 30) selectees are not required to possess marketing training, although FA 30 Reserve Component officers “with civilian experience in information technology and management, communications, marketing, organizational behavior or other IO-related fields are a valuable army resource.”⁵ While U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Pamphlet 525-69, *Concept for Information Operations*, recommends all officers receive “awareness training in IO” in officer training schools, it does not address the additional resources needed for IO training and emphasizes technology and computer skills rather than the complex skills of expert marketers—message development and tailored delivery.⁶

At the strategic level, the Army has established the 1st Information Operations Command (IOC) (Land [L]) to support combatant commands in an array of IO specialties, including operations security, PSYOP, electronic warfare, military deception, civil affairs, and public affairs.⁷ While casting its net over the entire span of information superiority, the 1st IOC (L) has neglected to integrate key specialties that would result in successful “mission-tailored, thoroughly developed, IO plans.”⁸ Officers wishing to specialize in information operations are afforded opportunities for advanced schooling, but only in information systems and computer science. These areas provide technical skills necessary to link IO to the broader information superiority effort, but they are not particularly helpful in developing effective IO campaigns aimed at diverse populations. No mention of marketing skills or education can be found in the material describing the value of IO or its officers.⁹

Information operations are marketing communications. A review of marketing textbooks reveals the four key aspects of marketing are product, price, promotion, and place.¹⁰ As conceived by the Army, IO starts and stops with a shallow promotion plan (talking points for soldiers and leaders, and public relations and advertising venues) directed at a particular place (the neighborhood or civil leader). The plan fails to consider what “product” is being “sold,” and at what “price to the consumer.” Others have also noted the importance of considering the relative cost of supporting U.S. operations.¹¹ A good way to clarify the nature of the Army’s “product” is to think of the U.S. mission as a “brand” that will bring certain benefits to the target audience if the audience chooses to buy it.

The U.S. Mission as a Brand with a Cost

In marketing terminology, a brand is the summary of all perceptions about products, employees, the organization, and so on that marketing creates. According to Professor Terry Paul, “A strong brand is more the result of good marketing, rather than the cause of good marketing.”¹² A brand makes a promise to consumers, and companies must be obsessive about fulfilling such promises. The United States already has a strong brand name among people all over the world (who have strong perceptions about it, good and bad). The U.S. military must understand those perceptions and work to capitalize on its brand’s strengths while marginalizing its weaknesses. In civilian marketing circles, this is viewed as “leveraging a brand.”¹³

Leveraging the U.S. brand in a military operation can take many forms. We could extend the brand in the form of U.S.-sponsored organizations such as security forces or civil engineering firms that have their own identity but are consistently supportive of the promises of the U.S. mission. When doing this, though, we must keep in mind that just as corporate reputations can be damaged by their associates’ actions, so too can the U.S. mission be jeopardized by affiliates that act in ways inconsistent with American promises.

When possible, U.S. forces should partner with civilian or government organizations that have already established their own credibility within the region, including nonlocal governments that have a better reputation than the United States does. And finally, the United States could license its brand to other organizations that support U.S. operations or ideals; for example, a storeowner who allows minorities to shop in his store could be a licensee and receive a Coalition Forces (CF) storefront ad and a government supply contract for his cooperation.

In marketing, product price is an important consideration. The price associated with a particular brand indicates how the brand compares with competing brands in quality and status.¹⁴ A skilled marketer is aware of the competing products a consumer might choose to support. While the U.S. brand might offer many benefits, its cost might be too high. In Iraq, for example, the cost of supporting the U.S. brand through its extensions, partners, and licensees is potentially death. Information operations, like marketing, must find a way to sell a product with such a high cost. An effective plan might include messages that point out the costs versus the benefits of supporting each product, that compare the relative cost of the U.S. brand

to other brands (for instance, the terrorist brand), and that appeal to the consumers' desire for a prestigious product. In order to succeed in marketing the high-cost U.S. brand, one must understand the customer's perceptions and goals.

Understanding the "Customer"

An information operation can be viewed as selling a mission (such as the U.S. presence in Iraq) to the local population. Just as a sound marketing strategy must first comprehend the target market, or customers, successful IO must begin with understanding the people it is attempting to affect. For the military, civilians and business leaders are analogous to household consumers and business buyers. The household consumer is typically concerned with only his household and is significantly more emotional in his decisionmaking. The business buyer or civil leader represents an organization and consults with experts and associates. Both buyers balance the benefits of cooperating with multiple entities. In pursuing their goals, leaders and locales might consort with both the United States and its enemies. However, they will do business with neither if it is not advantageous to them.

A significant shortfall in military operations continues to be insufficient knowledge about the local populace and how to influence it. Combat units and intelligence sections in the 1st Armored Division and 3d Infantry Division deployed to Iraq with country studies printed before 1991, for Operation Desert Storm.¹⁵ These studies included only general population information. Well-developed information about tribes, such as their motivation, leaders, interrelationships or even general locations, simply did not exist.

Successful marketing campaigns begin with thorough research to identify consumer trends. Just as military intelligence spends much of its time assessing the many facets of threat organizations, we must make a greater effort to collect usable market data about the IO target population. At a minimum, this includes identifying market segments and their leaders, their goals, motivations, expectations, and daily rituals. While it would be time- and manpower-intensive, conducting surveys and cooperating with successful marketers in the region could make the difference between advertising successes and colossal backfires. Assessment of the consumer must also continue over time to track changes in the market.

Successful marketing campaigns draw on emotions, and strong brands have good stories.

Psychological studies have shown people to have much better recall of details when they receive information in a story format.¹⁶ The story provides a framework for learning and is easily transferable. Even in Western societies people rely more on their own personal networks of family and friends than on traditional media for acquiring information about ideals and purchases. In the United States, the average person shares a bad experience with at least 25 other people. This phenomenon is amplified in Muslim societies, which rely even more on story-telling traditions.¹⁷ Unfortunately, stories and emotional appeals that apply to consumers in the United States are often obscure, confusing, or have the reverse effect in other cultures. Finding the right story and the right people to deliver it to is critical.

Touch Points and Consistency

Everything an organization does conveys a message, and to varying degrees, the message content depends on the source and the recipient. Thus, salesmen must prioritize their efforts so they communicate the right message to the right person. Key points where an organization interacts with its customers are known as touch points.¹⁸ By analyzing the needs of the local population, we can identify intrinsic touch points (interaction with patrols) and civilian-initiated touch points (public service complaints). While IO should maximize the effectiveness of planned, military-created touch points (ads, news releases, public announcements), only consistent communication and proper soldier behavior will positively influence spontaneous touch points. The latter are particularly important, because in the eye of the public, they often define deployments.

Just as sound strategic thinking applied consistently from design to communications to sales is essential for strong branding, so consistency, sensitivity, and creativity are the keys to gaining and maintaining credibility in military operations. Consistency generates positive relationships; a unified outward image reflects an organization's internal stability. Consistency must be maintained at both tactical and strategic levels. At the tactical level, messages directed at the same target audience should have the same style and tone. For example, in two communications, one targeting potential insurgent recruits and one active guerrillas, both should discourage resistance. The potential recruits might be shown a message of hope and prosperity, while the active guerrillas receive a message about the futility of resistance, but both messages should

still have a similar personality, positioning, and identification. They would be tactically tailored but strategically alike.

Information operations are not trivial undertakings for an army operating across a large area populated by a diverse people. Even when higher echelons have personnel who can draft a strategically consistent plan, the separation between them and the marketplace where subordinate units work often results in ineffective or out-of-synch messages. For example, a battalion in Kosovo was unexpectedly flooded with local nationals demanding construction aid that had been promised on television, but the battalion had not been funded or equipped to conduct the construction. Moreover, it first heard of the plan from the locals.¹⁹ The higher echelon's failure to coordinate with the unit on the ground decreased the effectiveness of the IO campaign and reduced the legitimacy of the coalition effort.

The challenge of achieving consistency makes some decentralized IO planning and execution necessary and requires higher skills at lower echelons. Adjacent units developing separate messages and operating procedures can confuse local citizens, who view all soldiers as the same "U.S. brand." IO planners must consider the effects of their messages on many different consumers and ensure a message at one level or in one area conflicts as little as possible with messages at other levels in other areas. Sending contradictory messages or making promises that cannot be kept undermines credibility.²⁰ Such was the case when the international media promised Iraqis security and stability that local forces were not able to provide. Iraqis' bad experience with looting, shootings, and kidnappings was reinforced by anti-U.S. marketing messages emphasizing the illegitimacy of the CF campaign. The result was a lack of trust in Coalition messages. The Abu Ghraib prison scandal has also been skillfully exploited by opponents of the United States in many ways. One example was dressing hostages in orange jumpsuits to mimic U.S. treatment of detainees.

Media Planning and Execution

The Army has long employed mass media (radio, print, and limited television) in support of operations, but like commercial marketers, the Army should begin to move away from mass media to niche media. With technology, messages can be tailored and made interactive, which should

reduce the risk of delivering conflicting messages to consumers. Information operations should use new forms of communication. A prevailing misperception is that Third World societies are ignorant of or have no access to multiple media sources. In fact, they have come to distrust mass media outlets because of their control by the state. Interactive internet sites and free CDs or DVDs can carry messages to identifiable targets and allow two-way communication between the organization and the target.

An IO campaign must begin with understanding the target market. Most parts of the world perceive the United States as headstrong, pro-big business, dangerous to local cultures, and pro-Israel.²¹ This reputation is not an insurmountable hurdle, but it must be taken into account. Recent history provides many examples of successful companies that had poor public images but still grew and succeeded (for example, Halliburton, R.J. Reynolds, and Wal-Mart).

Many believe the West can solve all problems with ease and efficiency. Such an expectation can undermine U.S. legitimacy. Trust rapidly deteriorates when the public does not see action and results. Iraqis see the failure to quickly solve local problems as proof America does not intend to solve them rather than evidence of their difficulty. What this reality demands is a quality IO or marketing communication plan that is integrated, introspective, interactive, and imaginative—a plan more expansive and complex than current military staffs can generate or supervise.

Insurgents Capitalize on IMC

To illustrate how successful integrated marketing communications (IMC) can be developed with much more thought than resources, consider the recent IO campaign waged by insurgents in Iraq. In July 2004, National Public Radio (NPR) reported on the use of DVDs and CDs by insurgent groups to increase public support, recruiting, and funding: "Intended to appeal directly to average Iraqis, insurgents are bypassing the mainstream media and using compelling forms of direct marketing. Videos depicting insurgents on the attack, wounded Iraqis (apparently collateral damage from U.S. aggression), and hooded Abu Ghraib prisoners is overlaid with patriotic and religiously motivating music and chants. Earlier versions of these products were very crude, but in recent months, the production quality has increased to that of a professional, broadcast

level. Integrating combat cameramen into their operations, they demonstrate experienced use of cameras and listening devices. While a more experienced military observer would notice crude tactics and skill demonstrated (firing wildly, poor weapons maintenance, and small unit tactics) on the part of the armed insurgents, these are not readily apparent to the target market, which has been termed the 'Jihad Market.' Money and recruits from within Iraq and abroad follow performance and success, and here it is apparent that success in the information campaign is much more important than real tactical combat success.²²

Since the beginning of the occupation in Iraq, the United States has attempted to run its own IO campaign using traditional media (flyers and U.S.-funded television and radio networks). Unfortunately, the NPR report also illustrated the breadth of mistrust Iraqis have for traditional media outlets: "Because the truth has been denied to Iraqis for so long, they are now searching the internet for truth. A taxi driver stated that he stays away from ["news"] websites that are sponsored by foreign governments, the news media, or insurgent groups. He states that it is simply 'hard to find [a] reliable

source of news.'²³

With such skepticism running rampant in the Middle East, a large window of opportunity is open for a powerful marketing campaign using alternative media. It could have a tremendous effect.

Understanding marketing is critical to understanding the strengths and limitations of U.S. Army information operations. More important, the art and success of IO as a marketing application comes from skilled, impassioned practitioners. The Army should acquire skilled marketing professionals by contracting with U.S. companies, by co-opting the best local national counterparts, or by providing marketing training for military IO practitioners.

While information operations have parallels to the business-world practices of marketing, promotion, and sales, the military has much more at stake than quarterly earnings. The IO mission is so crucial and complex it deserves the most skilled marketers the United States has to offer. Selling the United States in current and future deployments is of paramount importance. Without proper planning and resourcing of the IO mission, much effort, and many lives, will be wasted on diminished successes, or even failures. **MR**

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Ultramicro, Nonlethal, and Reversible: Looking Ahead to Military Biotechnology

Guo Ji-wei and Xue-sen Yang

AFTER TWO world wars, the invention of nuclear weapons, and the Cold War, our world is undergoing a military revolution characterized by electronics, computers, communications, and microinformation technology. In recent wars, this progress has produced fewer casualties (both civilian and military), and the desire to cause fewer casualties has become an important factor restricting military operations.¹

Biotechnology is developing quite rapidly and has had an enormous effect on the progress of science and technology, as well as on the global economy. In the field of military affairs, modern biotechnology maintains a rapid pace of development and plays an important role in medical protection. However, it is gradually revealing a character of aggression as well. Therefore, it is of increasing military value.

Mainstream science and technology extend from the land to the seas, air, and space. In an age that emphasizes the command of information, we have begun to explore a new technological space. Today, the modern biotechnology that focuses on the microcosmos of the life structure can directly explore the main entity of war—human beings themselves—thus taking precise control of the battle effectiveness of enemies. As Prussian strategist Carl von Clausewitz said, “War . . . is an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfill our will.”² Clausewitz scholar Wu Qiong adds,

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“Conceptually, to deprive the enemy of the power of resistance is the real aim of war.”³

Compared with wars in the past, war through the command of biotechnology will guarantee the free application and security of our own biotechnology and, ultimately, lead to success through ultramicro, nonlethal, and reversible effects. Biotechnology is likely to bring about profound changes in the military domain and will contribute the utmost to the protection of civilization.

Possible Military Uses of Biotechnology

Modern biotechnology is now in full blossom. Since the 1990s, half of the “Breakthroughs of the Year” selected by *Science* magazine have been in the biotechnology and life sciences fields. Such innovations (outlined below) are of great medical value and can be of great value in military affairs as well.⁴

The Human Genome Project (HGP). The HGP explores the new world of biotechnology, defines the microcosmos of life science, and lifts medical research and practice to new levels, such as individualized and ethnical medicine. It also provides possibilities for military use. Revealing genetic structure, the structure-function relationship, and the structure-health relationship can deepen the understanding of how to control and change a human being’s battle effectiveness.

Bioinformatics. The study of gene and protein molecules is rapidly expanding to other domains. Those who master more bioinformation faster will take the lead in military biotechnology

development and application.

Proteomics. From the perspective of military medicine, proteomics, which examines the structure-function relationship at the molecular level, is a bridge between military goals and practical technologies. With the development of proteomics, we can discover and interpret the key proteins in any single human physiological function and the multiple physiological functions any single protein possesses. All of this will provide accurate models for military attack and make it possible to develop small-scale or ultramicro-scale destructive weapons.

Transgenic technology. The new transgenic technology currently has limited uses, but its idea of gene control and reconstitution has possibilities for military use. The results from studies in this domain will help the military set goals in command and control.

Besides the innovations listed above, many other newly developed biotechnologies lend themselves to military purposes; for example, DNA recombination, gene modification, gene cloning, exogenous gene expression synergy, gene targeting, stem cell technology, tissue engineering, and so on. These biotechnologies will vastly enrich the military's ability to defend and attack.

Aggressive Biotechnology

Modern biotechnology has played an important role in treatment of war injuries, prevention and diagnosis of diseases, and protection against biochemical toxic agents; it will show its advantages in strengthening the power to fight, resist fatigue, sense and monitor the battlefield, and develop military biomaterials.⁵ We can use many modern biotechnologies directly as a means of defense and attack, and with further development, they probably will become new weapons systems. Such biotechnologies have the features discussed in the following paragraphs:

Direct effects. Direct-effect weapons can be used on human bodies to alter their biological features. Modern biotechnology looks at life in a new way—at the molecular level. Many unknown or unidentified substances of physiological activity have been discovered, and the structure-function relationship of biomacromolecules has been clarified. As a result, we might soon be able to design, control, reconstruct, and simulate molecules in living beings. Methods to change and rebuild biological features and biomolecule functions will soon

appear in great number. Genome and proteome technologies can accurately modify living tissues according to precise procedures and conditions. Through the interaction of proteins, we can modify cell functions as needed. In the final analysis, war is simply human behavior that forces enemies to lose the power of resistance. Biotechnological weapons can cause destruction that is both more powerful and more civilized than that caused by conventional killing methods like gunpowder or nuclear weapons.

Reversible wounds. Modern biotechnology reveals pathologies of products that can do great harm to people. It can also provide effective ways to explore human health hazards. We can also use this knowledge during war to damage and injure individuals in a more accurate, effective fashion. We can choose military biotechnologies with different pathogenic factors to achieve various military goals. A military attack, therefore, might wound an enemy's genes, proteins, cells, tissues, and organs, causing more damage than conventional weapons could. However, such devastating, nonlethal effects will require us to pacify the enemy through postwar reconstruction efforts and hatred control.⁶

Multiple vulnerability. Modern biotechnology makes it possible to combine two or more pathogenic genes and place them inside a susceptible living body to create a multiple-vulnerating effect. In addition, delaying the time required for a causative agent to take effect is possible by using a living body with a relatively longer incubation period or a pathogenic living body that produces no symptoms when inserted into the human body. When some other factor activates the causative agents, a timed causation of disease or pathogenesis is possible. What is more, it is now possible to make bioproducts that can target and destroy an enemy's armaments and food and water sources. For example, rubber-invading compounds can attack rubber goods exclusively.⁷

Directional-effect Biotechnologies

We can now hypothesize highly directional biotechnologies as described in the following paragraph:

Organismic vector transfer. As the application of viral vectors in gene therapy shows, the stable expression of the exogenous virulence gene transfected to targeted people via retrovirus, adenovirus, or an adenoassociated virus can cause disease or

injury.⁸ As transfection technology develops, more viral vectors or other organismic vectors will be found, which will enable vector transfer to be more suitable for war.

Directed-energy-induced mutation. High-intensity ultraviolet rays and electromagnetic waves can induce genetic-locus cell mutation.⁹ If we determine the relationship between the specific frequency, wavelength, or power of the ray or wave and the specific gene or locus, we can cause injury by remote, radiation-induced, genetic function changes.

Direct integration. University of Wisconsin scientists have made exogenous, naked DNA and injected it into veins for easy access into muscle cells for gene therapy. By combining this knowledge and particle-gun technology, we could create a microbullet out of a 1- μ m tungsten or gold ion, on whose surface plasmid DNA or naked DNA could be precipitated, and deliver the bullet via a gunpowder explosion, electron transmission, or high-pressured gas to penetrate the body surface.¹⁰ We could then release DNA molecules to integrate with the host's cells through blood circulation and cause disease or injury by controlling genes.

The Superiority of Biotechnological Weapons

Biological tag-tracing, electromagnetic targeting, and nanometer biological technologies can help build highly military-oriented biotechniques. While it is perhaps too early to decide what form modern biotechnological weapons might take, one thing is sure: all such weapons require a military that focuses on information more than on mechanization. In an environment where information is processed rapidly, the battlefield is more transparent, positioning is more accurate, and with the help of material science and nanometer technology, we can finally make revolutionary breakthroughs.

How to turn modern biotechnology to make actual weapons today is still not known, but with their capability of attacking targets accurately and producing ultramicro, nonlethal, and reversible damage, such weapons might finally change the methods of "physical annihilation" or "destruction within the killing range" which have characterized war since the invention of gunpowder. Humanness in the conduct of war has become the focus of attention recently, and weapons of mass destruction are banned to reduce casualties. The times call for new kinds of weapons, and modern biotechnology

can contribute such weapons, which might have the following vulnerating characteristics:

Specificity of wounding. Precision injury is an embodiment of specificity. HGP and proteomics have greatly enriched bioinformation. If we acquire a target's genome and proteome information, including those of ethnic groups or individuals, we could design a vulnerating agent that attacks only key enemies without doing any harm to ordinary people. We could also confine the attack to a more precise level. Injuries might be limited to a specific gene sequence or a specific protein structure. Through gene manipulation, we can attack or injure one or more key human physiological functions (the ability to learn, memorize, keep one's balance, or perform fine motor activities and even act aggressively) without a threat to life.

Ultramicro damage. When attacking an enemy with biotechnological military weapons, we could choose targets from a nucleotide sequence or protein structure. We could cause physiological dysfunction by producing an ultramicro damaging effect to a gene's or a protein's structure and functioning. Precision injury and ultramicro damage are two vulnerating methods based on genomics and proteomics. Because they target the primary structure of the gene or protein, they are completely different from traditional weapons of war that directly damage tissues and organs.

Crypticity. Although applications of military biotechnology are complicated, the finished products are convenient to carry, easy to use, and do not require large support systems. Detecting and predicting their use is difficult. Only after obvious wounding occurs will enemies realize they are under attack. In this sense, using military biotechnology weapons is a good tactic.

Controllability and recoverability. Unlike weapons that use ammunition whose damaging effects can only be ascertained after shooting, we can test in a laboratory the degree of damage biotechnological weapons produce. We can control the degree of injuries and damage produced and even provide an antidote or a cure (a vaccine, a countervulnerating agent, or a piece of bioinformation). Providing such an anodyne to our enemies would represent real "mercy."

Difficulty in taking precautions. Because of the sheer number of living bodies military biotechnology can use, the reformed (managed) gene order or protein structure is like a specially made lock: Only the developer has the key, and it is difficult

for enemies to unlock. Because so many human genes and proteins are vulnerable to attack in so many ways, definite diagnosis and prompt treatment of injury is difficult. So, how and when can we take precautions against attacks?

Biotechnological vs. Biological Weapons

Modern military biotechnology, which is biotechnology applied in the military domain to produce weapons-like effects, is fundamentally different from traditional biological weapons. The confusion of the two concepts is not scientific and is not helpful to the proper development of military biotechnology or the final elimination of traditional biological weapons.

Traditional biological weapons aim to produce mass destruction. They reduce the enemy's fighting power by damaging a large number of human beings, livestock, crops, and even the ecological system. Biological weapons of mass destruction originated from the idea that the more they kill and the fiercer the disasters they produce, the better they are. Technologically, traditional biological weapons depend on microbiology, especially bacteriology, which uses destructive bacteria, viruses, and toxic living bodies obtained directly from the natural world. These weapons are subject to nature, are difficult to control, and have irreversible effects. The use of such weapons is opposed by most countries in the world.

In the 1970s, DNA recombination technology symbolized the birth of modern biotechnology. As seen in the examples mentioned, current military biotechnology possesses a quality of "mercy," and

its action, purpose of study, and specifications are totally different from traditional biological weapons. Modern biotechnology will help rid the world of primitive forms of microorganisms, biological agents and toxins; offer an alternative to biological warfare; and, ultimately, help eliminate traditional biological weapons. However, modern biotechnology has a long way to go, so it is still necessary to regulate it in order to develop it in the correct direction. The Chemical Weapons Convention or similar international conventions must ensure military biotechnology is never abused or misused.

Not Yet an Instrument of Military Power

Military biotechnology has not yet become an instrument of military power. The laws, rules, and essential qualities of modern biotechnology have not yet been clarified. We cannot use and control it at our will. Progress is still needed in supporting areas such as military information technologies and material science. Even so, the increased pace of development of modern biotechnology tells us that the day on which we will begin to make full military use of its advantages is not too far off.

We believe that command of military biotechnology is a reasonable scientific presumption, not a scientific illusion. In the near future, when military biotechnology is highly developed, modern biotechnology will have a revolutionary influence on the organization of military power with its more direct effects on the main entity of war—human beings. Modern biotechnology offers an enormous potential military advantage. **MR**

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Defining Success at Guantanamo: By What Measure?

Jeffrey H. Norwitz

Brown eyes stare back at me from beneath black eyebrows above a ruddy face framed by thick black hair which melts into a long, well-groomed beard. An orange jumpsuit contrasts with otherwise colorless surroundings. Staccato-like rattling of an ankle chain interrupts the harmonic humming of an air conditioner. The detainee and I face each other. Our knees almost touch. We can smell each other.

CAMP DELTA is a confinement facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, where, beginning in 2002, America transferred more than 1,000 men who had been captured during Operation Enduring Freedom, an operation launched to topple the Taliban and to pursue terrorists and dismantle their sanctuaries.¹ As a federal investigator with the U.S. Department of Defense Criminal Investigative Task Force (CITF), I interviewed this orange-clad man deemed an “enemy combatant” in the Global War on Terrorism.² My job was to determine the truth. Success would determine whether the detainee would be prosecuted or released.³

I asked myself: What is America trying to achieve? What does success look like on a strategic level? Defining success must begin with a pragmatic, candid, and thoughtful appraisal of America’s goals. Is there a course of action to achieve them? And most important, is America’s strategy working? These questions frame a necessary dialogue to assess progress against terrorists, who clearly demonstrate their own strategy.⁴

Three distinct missions with different objectives and varied degrees of accomplishment are ongoing at Camp Delta. The first mission is intelligence collection and analysis. The second is detention operations, characterized by humanitarian and welfare issues relating to overall treatment. The third, criminal investigation and prosecution, determines the details of a detainee’s actions.⁵

Intelligence Measures

According to the mission statement of Joint Task Force Guantanamo, the primary pursuit at Camp Delta is gleaning intelligence from the detainees, who are considered unlawful combatants under Article IV of the Geneva Conventions.⁶ Some argue that success cannot be measured if the public does

not know what is being learned or what methods are being used. In fact, skilled questioning and analysis has uncovered lifesaving information. Even 2 years after capture, actionable intelligence about terrorist networks and those who are undermining stability in Afghanistan is still forthcoming at Guantanamo.⁷

The eternal paradox of intelligence, however, is that the exceptional success is also exceptionally secret. Achievements will be obscure if intelligence gathering is the principal metric for measuring success. To measure success, the world must evaluate tangibles and observables. Yet, because of the inexcusable activity at Abu Ghraib prison, the American public demands accountability.⁸ So how can the public form an opinion as to whether America is succeeding?

Humanitarian Measures

Human rights and humane treatment are criteria used to assess how a government behaves and, by extension, the rectitude of that nation’s conduct. History will be critical of what America does at Guantanamo and will ask: How well were the detainees cared for while in America’s custody? Were detainees protected from each other? Was there evidence of torture, and if so, what actions were taken to correct the situation? Did detainees receive proper medical treatment? Were food, exercise, recreation, and promotion of mental well-being adequate? Were religious practices respected?

Like any federal prison, Camp Delta’s concern is with the safety and security of the detainees and guards. The detention mission is the responsibility of the Military Police (MP) Corps. The MP contingent at Guantanamo is a mix of active duty and Reserve Component soldiers designated as the Joint Detainee Operations Group. During the time I was there, detainees were housed in safe, secure, comfortable facilities that were constantly being improved. Respect for religious practice was unmistakable. Every detention cell contained a small black arrow pointing east so detainees knew where to face while praying. Meals, deferential to religious and dietary needs, were well prepared. On occasion, culturally distinctive foods such as dates, baklava, and tea were served. Linens and clothing

were changed often.

Library and reading education programs were also part of the regimen. Recreation space was plentiful, and the sound of men kicking soccer balls was common. Undeniably, these men ate better than at any other time in their lives. They received world-class medical and dental treatment (unheard of in their home countries), and they had never-envisioned educational opportunities. If, as many suggest, part of the terrorism solution is to demonstrate American benevolence to combatants who allegedly took part in unlawful acts of aggression against the United States, then history will note the exemplary yet demanding detention work by the MPs at Guantanamo.

Criminal Investigation and Prosecutorial Measures

Criminal investigation and prosecutorial measures will continue to grow in strategic significance, but ubiquitous problems still haunt collaborative law-enforcement and intelligence projects. Cultural and legal barriers prohibit information-sharing between criminalists and intelligence practitioners. Classified, need-to-know requirements restrict the dissemination of intelligence. Legal obstacles, such as dealing with grand jury material, is equally restrictive.⁹

Tension stems from contradictory objectives. Testimony and evidence are intended for criminal court presentation and judicial scrutiny, while classified intelligence is purposely limited to protect sources and methods from compromise. Such cultural biases frequently arise in national security cases such as espionage or treason where trials must deal with classified information. The fact is, there are judicial procedures that balance a defendant's right to challenge the prosecution's case against the need to protect sensitive information.¹⁰ Military commissions will be similarly structured to safeguard intelligence yet uphold transparency of the trial process.¹¹

More irreconcilable, however, is the method by which each community questions persons for information—not whether the information is sensitive. Criminalists expect to be held accountable for how they obtain information. For example, while on the witness stand, investigators expect the defense counsel to challenge how they obtained a confession. Was the accused threatened, coerced, or mistreated? How much time was there between breaks? Interview methods by law-enforcement officials must never shock the conscience of the court or the American public, which will not accept outrageous conduct to gain confessions, even from alleged terrorists.

Interrogations for intelligence purposes have a completely different set of criteria, none of which is ever seen in a courtroom. What intelligence interrogators learn and how it is used is usually incompatible with criminal jurisprudence.¹² As a consequence, criminal interviewers and intelligence interrogators have different techniques and distinctly different measures of success. Reconciling these inconsistencies is one of the key challenges at Guantanamo.¹³ Part of the solution is to maintain a consistent long-term relationship between interviewer and interviewee. Greater success is achieved when interviewers collaborate with behavioral-science professionals to individualize an approach rather than treat all detainees as if they are indistinguishable. Personalized questions about family or village, role-playing, and even empathy are necessary to begin building a relationship. Threats and intimidation are poor substitutes for skilled elicitation techniques.

Voluntary, handwritten confessions, obtained without coercion and that are admissible in court, are forthcoming at Camp Delta. Using time-proven techniques of criminal-interview methodology, the CITF seeks to establish the truth about each detainee's conduct. Candor and determination are the best tools to elicit information, particularly considering the certainty of judicial scrutiny.¹⁴ According to MP Colonel Brittan P. Mallow, CITF Commander, the task force has successfully overcome traditional barriers to information-sharing.

As the criminal and intelligence disciplines find common ground in the Global War on Terrorism, customary impediments such as law, regulations, policy, culture, perspective, and mechanics are redefined to protect the sensitivity of information while allowing for its use in court. Mark Fallon, Naval Criminal Investigative Service, Special Agent in Charge and Deputy CITF Commander, speculates that an enduring legacy of the criminal investigation mission will be the innovative methods by which U.S. Armed Forces, teamed with skilled criminalists and prosecutors, bring the world's most violent men to justice.

Criminal pursuit and prosecution of terrorists on a global scale is a consequence of President George W. Bush's proclamation: "Whether we bring our enemies to justice, or bring justice to our enemies, justice will be done."¹⁵ Success will inevitably equate to a transparent, credible, full-and-fair trial process, with measurable results.

In the "Quiet" Room

Camp Delta houses persons from 41 countries who speak 10 languages and multiple dialects. Therefore, skilled translators are critical for effective commu-

nication. Linguists are most often native speakers who have lived in the United States for many years. Besides language expertise, the native linguists have knowledge of a country's culture and nuances, which is necessary for meaningful dialogue.

At Camp Delta, each day is the same, interrupted only by the occasional "reservation" that brings detainees into the quiet rooms where they are interviewed. On this day, I am meeting with US9AF-4282DP, believed to be Afghani. His number tells me he was detained by U.S. forces operating in the region of Southwest Asia. The number is important because common Arab names are often spelled in various ways; family, tribal, and honorary titles often are used as names; and identification can be quite confusing. In camp, the detainee is known as 4282, but I use his preferred name, Kakai. Kakai's file suggests he built a bomb and blew up a small Afghan video store because it violated strict Taliban edicts against music. He is also accused of launching rockets to attack a U.S. base near Kandahar. Unfortunately, there is no forensic evidence, such as fingerprints or explosive residue from his clothing, to connect him with the crimes. My challenge is to determine whether Kakai is responsible for the acts, not, as many presuppose, to prove him guilty.

Criminal investigators deal with hundreds of cases like Kakai's that are in various stages of prosecutorial preparation. Kakai looks well. His hair is wet from a shower. He tells me his breakfast of eggs and rice is his favorite meal. Because he is wearing standard rubber flipflops, I can see his big toe is still swollen from being stepped on during a detainee volleyball game. He says he has seen a doctor. Since his arrival at Camp Delta in early 2002, Kakai has earned increasingly greater privileges. He has been honest and cooperative with interviewers, and group recreation is one reward for his honesty. Another reward is enrollment in the camp's voluntary Pashtu reading program. Having arrived at Camp Delta illiterate, Kakai is well on his way to mastering his native Afghan language.

Several weeks have passed since Kakai and I last spoke. At that time, he had complained of pain in his jaw. Leaning over, Kakai hooked his index finger in his mouth to show me a new dental filling. The Pashtu linguist explained that Kakai had lived with dental pain for many years before coming to Camp Delta. He is now pain-free.

To a casual observer, the conversation might have seemed haphazard and capricious: it was anything but. Criminal investigators have a strategy for each interview and a practiced methodology to elicit information. The strategy is not based on trickery and does not depend on deceit. Rather, to improve trust on both sides, a good interviewer displays

integrity over a period of many meetings. Kakai knows I have the means to corroborate an honest story or to unravel a fictitious tale. He realizes that cooperation with me is his quickest way home.

For many detainees, anger and frustration at losing their freedom gives way to an unspoken, yet tangible, appreciation for their overall situation. For most, imprisonment at home would equate to unspeakable living conditions, physical torture, and false confessions extorted by threats. A large number of detainees have asked to remain in Cuba rather than face their own country's justice system. History will note that America treated these men humanely and worked tirelessly to negotiate civilized handling for those detainees who did return home.¹⁶ But what about the law?

The Court of World Opinion

In November 2001, shortly after Operation Enduring Freedom began, Bush issued a military order titled "Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism."¹⁷ That order codified a policy to treat as criminals certain captured persons defined as unlawful combatants instead of prisoners of war (POWs). The concept originated from a World War II case in which Nazi saboteurs, wearing civilian clothes and carrying plans to create chaos, were captured in New York 6 months after the Pearl Harbor attack. The court held they were not entitled to POW protections under the Rules of Land Warfare of 1940.¹⁸ Particularly striking, however, is that the military order specifically set forth a strategy leading to trials and judicial process.

Guantanamo Bay was chosen as a detention facility and site for trials because of its unique legal standing. The 45-square-mile U.S. naval base was liberated by U.S. Marines during the Spanish-American War in 1898. The indefinite 1903 lease for Guantanamo Bay grants the U.S. power to exercise complete jurisdiction and control over the base while leaving ultimate sovereignty with Cuba. These distinct parameters were the basis for the U.S. Government's early assertion that detainees had no access to U.S. courts and, therefore, could not challenge their detention using habeas corpus.¹⁹ In June 2004, the U.S. Supreme Court decided that federal courts do have jurisdiction to consider the legality of detaining foreign nationals at Guantanamo.²⁰ A question remains, however: what criminal offenses would detainees be charged with?

Some of the crimes are familiar, such as murder, destruction of property, hostage-taking, and conspiracy. Other crimes, however, focus on the status of the victim or the offender, as defined by the Law of Armed Conflict. Some unique crimes include attacking civilians or protected property, using

protected persons as shields, aiding the enemy, or improperly using protected emblems.

The first military commission trials began on 24 August 2004 with four defendants being charged with conspiracy to commit war crimes, attempted murder by an unprivileged belligerent, and aiding the enemy.²¹ On 8 November 2004, Judge James Robertson of the U.S. District Court in Washington, D.C., effectively halted the military commission's pretrial proceedings until a competent tribunal could determine whether detainees were entitled to protections afforded POWs under Article 4 of the Geneva Conventions.²² In January 2005, while deciding separate cases, two U.S. District judges offered opposite conclusions regarding the rights of Guantanamo detainees to pursue legal challenges. Joyce Hens Green and Richard Leon wrote lengthy and decidedly different opinions, that observers say are certain to force the issue to the U.S. Supreme Court.²³

The U.S. Congress and White House recently outlined long-range plans for dealing with detainees who, for lack of evidence, will not face trials, yet are clearly determined to restart armed hostilities if released. According to news reports, a proposed \$25 million will fund a 200-bed prison for detainees unlikely to face military tribunals, but who retain the leadership capability and motivation to kill Americans if set free.²⁴ The dilemma can be summarized simply: either release militant detainees who pledge to kill Americans and whom we cannot convict, or confine them for life without trial. America's ability to find alternatives will shape the future.

The Nature of the War

What will a future combatant look like? Under what circumstances will warfare lawfully be conducted in a world where armed hostilities might not be between sovereign powers but, rather, involve nonstate actors? As perceptions of war change, how will the law deal with combat 2 decades from now? Devising new criminal-investigative approaches whereby nations can defeat terrorism in the courtroom while protecting human dignity and respect for the law will be an enduring measure of success in the Guantanamo experience.

Legal commentary challenges the notion that organized armed persons engaged in deadly conflict, such as bands of local fighters, must be considered unlawful combatants. Critics argue that the supremacy of modern U.S. diplomatic, economic, and military power forces adversaries to adopt unconventional, asymmetric, and unlawful approaches to warfare—as defined by those who met in Geneva more than 50 years ago. If acquittals at Guantanamo become common, what sort of

changes to our legal approach will be necessary?

In a riveting essay, U.S. Air Force Colonel Charles Dunlap suggests that the law, and by extension, the judicial system, is becoming weapon-like in its effect on the nature of war. He offers that “lawfare” will reform notions of modern warfare. Dunlap says: “Lawfare describes a method of warfare where law is used as a means of realizing a military objective. There are many dimensions to lawfare, but the one ever more frequently embraced by U.S. opponents is a cynical manipulation of the rule of law and the humanitarian values it represents. Rather than seeking battlefield victories, per se, challengers try to destroy the will to fight by undermining the public support that is indispensable when democracies like the U.S. conduct military interventions.”²⁵

Changes in defining who is a lawful combatant are needed. If America hopes to demonstrate the efficacy of military commissions, then that process must have integrity so that global recognition follows. If we are to win in the court of world opinion, we must be persuasive in our definitions of war, which some say do not fit the reality of 21st-century conflict.²⁶

Options for Success

Success in the struggle against terrorism will be measured in generations. When future strategists look back on the early years of this decade, they will not judge Camp Delta on the relative value of intelligence reports but on humanitarian issues, how detainees were treated, the legitimacy of the trial process, whether laws reflected evolving definitions of “combatants,” and how detainees were ultimately dealt with when America dismantled terrorist groups. As we discover what the law will not allow, serious action to define what is permissible will follow. Justice—evidenced by whether criminal defendants were successfully defended or prosecuted, acquitted or convicted, fairly sentenced and safely incarcerated or repatriated—will be the enduring legacy of America's actions at Guantanamo.

It has been less than 3 years since the first detainee walked off the back of a military aircraft onto a runway baking under the hot Cuban sun. Is America achieving its strategic goals by its choice of means? Only by considering how the future measures success can America properly define its strategy at Guantanamo today. Will operations at Camp Delta help achieve strategic objectives against terrorism? If so, will this trajectory take us where we want to be? How will we know when we have arrived?

Kakai's expression changed to one of despair as I told him my assignment to Guantanamo was

ending. I reminded him that all of our conversations are fully documented and other investigators would continue to work his case. I pointed out to him that when he first arrived in Cuba, he was 20 pounds lighter and had many medical and dental problems. His health is now greatly improved, and he is learning to read and write. As my words were being translated, I leaned back and closed my eyes. I knew Kakai would never see the inside of a courtroom. Guilt "beyond a reasonable doubt" is still a daunting challenge, whether in a federal courthouse stateside or before a military commission at Guantanamo. Kakai's case could never meet that threshold.

Kakai will ultimately return home a healthier, more educated Afghan citizen. He will be prepared to participate in political change, engage in rebuilding his country, or return to herding livestock. The choice will be his, but it will be a choice based on options he would not have had if not for his time at Guantanamo. One of the legacies of America's Guantanamo experience is justice for terrorist killers, humane treatment for those awaiting determination, and the creation of new options for those returning home who will, after all, raise the next generation. How this materializes is the next measure of success against terrorism. **MR**

NOTES

1. For current information on Camp Delta and Joint Task Force (JTF) Guantanamo, see on-line at <www.nsgtmo.navy.mil/jtftgmo/>, accessed 10 July 2004. For photos of Camp Delta, see on-line at <www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/guantanamo-bay_delta-pics.htm>, accessed 25 December 2004. FindLaw Legal News and Commentary maintains a superb webpage concerning civil and criminal terror cases, on-line at <http://news.findlaw.com/legalnews/us/terrorism/index.html>, accessed 15 October 2004. GlobalSecurity.org offers a comprehensive webpage of references on Guantanamo on-line at <www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/guantanamo-bay_camp_refs.htm>, accessed 29 December 2004.
2. An enemy combatant is defined as an individual who is part of or who supports Taliban or al-Qaeda or associated forces engaged in hostilities against the U.S. or its coalition partners and includes any person who has committed a belligerent act or has directly supported hostilities in aid of enemy armed forces. Department of Defense (DOD) factsheet, "Guantanamo Detainee Processes," on-line at <www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2005/d20050131process.pdf>, accessed 20 January 2005. See also DOD factsheet, "Guantanamo Detainees," at <www.defenselink.mil/news/Apr2004/d20040406gua.pdf>, accessed 24 December 2004. See note 5 for a discussion of who is an unlawful versus a lawful combatant.
3. A January 2002 memorandum from Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld assigned overall responsibility for investigating suspected war crimes and acts of terrorism during Operation Enduring Freedom to the Army, which quickly partnered the Naval Criminal Investigative Service and Air Force Office of Special Investigations with its own Criminal Investigation Division, to form a joint investigative unit called the Criminal Investigative Task Force (CITF).
4. See Osama bin-Muhammad bin-Ladin, "Fatwah Urging Jihad Against Americans," on-line at <www.ict.org.il/articles/fatwah.htm>, 1998, accessed 20 November 2004. Bin-Laden states: "The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies—civilian and military—is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it, in order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque and the holy mosque from their grip, and in order for their armies to move out of all the lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim."
5. Yale Law School has one of the finest on-line collections dealing with the Laws of War. See on-line at <www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/lawofwar/lawwar.htm>, accessed 10 November 2004. The criteria for being considered a lawful combatant are—
 - Being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates.
 - Having a fixed, distinctive sign recognizable at a distance.
 - Carrying arms openly.
 - Conducting operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.
 Failing to meet all four criteria, defines one as an unlawful combatant and negates prisoner of war status as defined by Article 4 of Geneva Convention (III).
6. JTF Guantanamo "conducts detention and interrogation operations to collect and exploit intelligence in support of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), coordinates and implements [detainee screening operations, and supports law enforcement and war crimes investigations," on-line at <www.jtftgmo.southcom.mil/>, accessed 2 March 2005.
7. According to news reports, information obtained through the interrogation of a Guantanamo Bay detainee led to a spectacular series of counterterrorism raids in Germany on 21 January 2005 in which more than 700 police officers swept through mosques, homes, and businesses in 6 cities and arrested 22 people suspected of being militants. See on-line at <www.iht.com/articles/2005/01/24/news/cuba.html>. See also <www.boston.com/news/world/europe/articles/2005/01/24/guantanamo_tip_tied_to_arrests_of_22_in_germany/>, accessed 31 January 2005.
8. Details of the Abu Ghraib investigation are in the "Final Report of the Independent Panel to Review DOD Detention Operations," August 2004. On-line at <www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2004/d20040824finalreport.pdf>. For DOD updates, see on-line at <www.defenselink.mil/news/detainee_investigations.html>, accessed 26 August 2004.
9. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure greatly restrict dissemination of information stemming from grand jury hearings. However, there are exceptions for intelligence purposes. See on-line at <www.usdoj.gov/olc/gjctfnop1.htm>, accessed 20 December 2004.
10. For information about the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) and the FISA court, see on-line at <www.eff.org/Censorship/Terrorism_millitias/fisa_faqs.html>, accessed 20 October 2004, and <www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/50/ch36/sch1.html> accessed 20 October 2004.
11. For information about military commission procedures and related materials,

- see on-line at <www.defenselink.mil/news/commissions.html>, and also at <www.defenselink.mil/news/detainees.html>, accessed 10 December 2004.
12. For an illuminating study into interrogation methodology, see Mark Bowden, "The Dark Art of Interrogation," *Atlantic Monthly* (October 2003): 51-76.
13. For an academic study concerning military and police options in the GWOT, see Jeffrey H. Norwitz, "Combating Terrorism: With a Helmet or a Badge?" in *Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment*, ed. Russell Howard (Connecticut: McGraw-Hill, 2004), 470-81. See also on-line at <www.homelandsecurity.org/journal/Articles/displayarticle.asp?article=72>, accessed 15 December 2004.
14. The interview techniques pioneered by the DOD CITF demonstrate the success of a relationship/rapport-based approach with Middle Eastern Arab subjects that has resulted in more truthful and reliable information than a more aggressive approach.
15. President George W. Bush, speech to a joint session of Congress, 20 September 2001, Washington, D.C., on-line at <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html>, accessed 15 December 2004.
16. As of late January 2005, 208 detainees had departed Guantanamo: 146 were released, and 62 were transferred to the control of other governments (29 to Pakistan, 5 to Morocco, 4 to France, 7 to Russia, 4 to Saudi Arabia, 1 to Spain, 1 to Sweden, 9 to the United Kingdom, 1 to Kuwait, and 1 to Australia). See on-line at <www.defenselink.mil/news/detainees.html>, accessed 10 February 2005.
17. The White House, Military Order, "Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism," *Federal Register* 66, no. 222 (16 November 2001): 57833. On-line at <www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/mco/prezorder.pdf>, accessed 30 November 2004. The United States has always acknowledged the applicability of the United Nations, "Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment." On-line at <www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/h_comp36.htm>, accessed 25 November 2004.
18. Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson wrote for the majority in the case of *Johnson v. Eisentrager*, 339 U.S. 763, 5 June 1950. For more information, see on-line at <caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/cgi-bin/getcase.pl?navby=cas&court=US&vol=339&invol=763>, accessed 15 October 2004.
19. The term habeas corpus—Latin for "you have the body"—is often used in discussing detainee status. A writ of habeas corpus is a judicial mandate ordering an inmate to be brought to the court so the court can determine whether the person is imprisoned lawfully or to be released from custody. See on-line at <www.lectlaw.com/def/h001.htm>, accessed 15 December 2004.
20. Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens wrote for the majority in the case of *Rasul et al. v. Bush*, no. 03-334, 28 June 2004, on-line at <caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=000&invol=03-334>, 15 December 2004.
21. The first four defendants of the military commission trials in Guantanamo, Cuba, were Salim Ahmed Hamdan, Yemen; David Hicks, Australia; Ali Hamza Ahmed Sulayman al-Bahlul, Yemen; and Ibrahim Ahmed Mahmoud al-Qosi, Sudan. For more information, see on-line at <www.cbsnews.com/elements/2004/08/24/in_depth_us/whoswho638066.shtml>, accessed 28 December 2004, and <www.defenselink.mil/news/Combatant_Tribunals.html>, accessed 28 December 2004.
22. For more information about the federal judges appeal ruling, see on-line at <www.defenselink.mil/news/Nov2004/n11092004_2004110903.html>, accessed 11 December 2004.
23. For more information about the Guantanamo detainee opinions of Federal Judges Joyce Hens Green and Richard Leon, see on-line at <news.findlaw.com/ap_stories/a/w/1151/2-9-2005/20050209153010_17.html>, 10 February 2005.
24. Certain militant Islamist detainees told me candidly and without hesitation that, if released, they would rearm themselves and begin killing U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan.
25. Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., "Law and Military Interventions: Preserving Humanitarian Values in 21st Century Conflicts." (Presented at the Humanitarian Challenges in Military Intervention Conference, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Washington, D.C., 29 November 2001), on-line at <www.duke.edu/~pfeaver/dunlap.pdf>, accessed 2 August 2004.
26. The information in this paragraph came from thoughts developed during my interview with David Alan Rosenberg, Ph.D., Director, Task Force History, and Special Assistant to the Vice Chief of Naval Operations and noted historian Deborah L. Haines, on 15 February 2004, Washington, D.C.

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Generational Differences in Waging Jihad

Chief Warrant Officer 3 Sharon Curcio, U.S. Army Reserve

FROM NOVEMBER 2003 to July 2004, I read over 600 narratives from prisoners detained at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. While the information I present is anecdotal, I have drawn conclusions about the experiences of the young men (almost all between the ages of 18 to 25) from various countries who had been recruited to fight for Islam and support the Taliban in Afghanistan.

Many of the young detainees at the U.S. military prison at Guantanamo Bay relate vivid “they-never-told-me-about-this” narratives describing what happened to them after they left their homes to train at terrorist and jihadist military camps in Afghanistan. Many expected to participate in jihad in Chechnya; few expected jihad would come to them in Afghanistan. For many of the young men shipped to training camps in Afghanistan, the unexpected became routine. They were left to help people they did not know well—the Afghani Taliban—and rub shoulders with brother Muslims with whom they felt uncomfortable. Instead of becoming martyrs, the young men were captured and imprisoned. No one had prepared them for such an unthinkable turn of events. Indeed, the Koran has precious little to say about imprisonment in service to Allah. As I pored over the stories of the young men who had left their homes to go to a training camp in Afghanistan, and who were unexpectedly plunged into jihad there, I noticed much dissonance between what they expected to accomplish by getting a taste of military training and what actually happened to them.

While the anecdotes cited do not reflect the comments or opinions of at least one group of young men at Guantanamo—Osama bin-Laden’s ideologically extremist bodyguards—they do suggest that a lot of recruits were unpleasantly surprised by events. Many recruits had left comfortable lives in the Gulf States, Saudi Arabia, or Western Europe. Their travels, training, and combat experiences led them to encounter the improbable. Later, only a few would admit how painful this had been.

Why Go on Jihad?

Many of the young men were motivated to leave home for Afghanistan, Chechnya, or Palestine because of the words and influence of imams and recruiters in their local mosques. The call to jihad is seductive to young men because it functions as a rite of passage into manhood and demonstrates one’s devotion to Islam, the religion of one’s ancestors. Whatever one needed, the imams were quick to position jihad as the panacea for lost, searching, disenfranchised youth—the way to whatever one needed. The recruiters used visual displays of persecuted Muslims, and routinely exposed recruits to films that featured suffering women and children in refugee camps in Chechnya or Palestine. Multiple means of persuasion, from lectures to radio advertisements, motivated the young to go to Afghanistan.

To complete the requirements of jihad, they were told they could—

- Perform zekat (provide charitable donations to help widows, orphans and refugees).
- Teach the Koran or Arabic.
- Visit a country that was a model of sharia (strict Islamic rule).
- Perform one’s duty as a Muslim male and learn to use weapons to protect one’s family.
- Help Muslim brothers fight off Western oppressors to put an end to the corruption that threatens Islam everywhere.

Then, of course, there were the real reasons why these young men left home:

- Unemployment.
- A failed business.
- Failure in higher education.
- Substance abuse problems.
- A criminal record with impending jail time.
- Disagreements with family members.

Many Gulf States detainees, particularly young unskilled and semi-skilled laborers, took the training camp plunge because they were unemployed. They saw going on jihad as “alternative employ-

ment.” Nongovernmental organizations frequently hired young men for warehouse and distribution work to provide relief materials such as foodstuffs or blankets to a local population, so the call to jihad appeared to be more of the same.

In contrast, young, educated Saudis who departed for jihad were motivated by a desire for self-discovery and a challenge. To go to Afghanistan to observe the model of a pure Islamic state was a worthy endeavor for a devout young man. For the idealistic, jihad was a chance to get one’s spiritual and physical life together; for others it was a chance to prove oneself a man; for still others, it offered temporary relief from poverty or the ravages of substance abuse. Off they went, showing multiple faces of motivation: the rich and the poor, the religious and the political, those seeking identity, those seeking work, and those trying to save themselves from themselves.

Pre-9/11 Recruitment

The millennial year 2000 was a warmup compared to 2001, a banner year for recruiting youth for jihad. Recruitment intensity ran strong, with imams and recruiters busily sending boys on jihad. The call to train reached some young men via radio. (Unfortunately, what the radio messages were, how frequently the messages were played, or what stations carried these recruitment appeals remains unexplored.) Young men were also recruited by visiting speakers at local mosques. Several detainees mentioned the experience of being recruited while on hajj, a pilgrimage to Mecca that includes religious activities lasting a week. They were introduced to the idea of volunteering for jihad in the context of a religious pilgrimage. The Hajj was used by more than one clever recruiter to send a young man on his next pilgrimage—the so-called holy war in Afghanistan.

Several interrogators asked detainees if they had ever left home before going on jihad. Some more affluent Saudis had taken leisure trips out of the country. One young Saudi said he had been permitted to go shopping (once) in Bahrain. While it would be inaccurate to say all the young men had such limited travel experience, for the most part, Gulf States and Saudi detainees were not widely traveled. Few Yemenis could afford to do so.

The Facilitators. Getting the Gulf States or Saudi youth on the road to attend training proved difficult. Enter the “facilitators”—a network of Muslims practiced in furthering the jihad mission. Although European and North African recruits could get around alone, Gulf States and Saudi men needed the facilitators’ help.

Facilitators ensured the right persons met the young in the right places and got them to their training destinations. Of interest is that many young men report that facilitators intercepted them at airports and hotels. Some facilitators actually drove the recruits to specific locations; others simply met the recruits and traveled with them for one leg of the journey. Because no detainee had reported missing a connection with his facilitator or local contact in the course of traveling to a training camp, one assumes the facilitation network routing recruits to Afghanistan was well-funded and well-organized.

Loss of Identity. Recruitment for jihad often necessitated the use of an alias, or kunya. Although the detainees did not take a kunya at the beginning of their travels, many had selected a name by the time they reached the last safehouse before arriving at the camp. Supposedly, the new name gave the recruit a measure of safety and protected his and his family’s identities. The Taliban arrested any person considered to be a spy, and Al-Qaeda was vigilant in rooting out spies, so recruits willingly chose a temporary name during travel, training, or assignment.

After the recruits adopted a new identity, they were asked to surrender any passports or national identification cards that linked them to their former lives. They gave these to designated recipients at one of the last safehouses used before arrival at the training camp. The recruits seemed to have no problem with this, believing it was better to give up the documents than lose them. They also took for granted they would get the documents back after the jihad. The facilitators set up trust accounts for passports and other forms of identification, and the recruits never doubted that the passports and identification cards would remain where they were deposited.

The Downside of the Camps. Training facilities in Afghanistan were language-specific. Because a shared language speeded up learning, training camps were largely organized by language groups. Al-Qaeda trained Arabs; Libyans trained North Africans; Uzbeks trained other Uzbeks and Tajiks.

None of the training camps had medical facilities. Those detainees who had left Western Europe’s or Saudi Arabia’s health-care systems behind became ill within the first month at camp. Sometimes, an illness might last for months; however, detainee narratives do not mention “group illnesses,” although malaria and dysentery affected many of them. Gulf States and Saudi recruits described extended, debilitating illnesses that prevented them from finishing training and rendered them useless for combat. A few said they left the

training camp and headed to the border alone to reach Pakistan for medical treatment because they believed Pakistan, unlike Afghanistan, offered real doctors and medical facilities. Some tried to return home for treatment. Others said that when they became seriously ill at camp, they were removed to safehouses or hospitals. The camps could bandage a wound but had no other medical supplies. The detainees quickly realized that those practicing medicine in the camps were not real doctors, and sick detainees showed an unusual amount of initiative when it came to leaving a camp to seek medical attention.

Before U.S. troops deploy overseas, they receive a variety of vaccinations. I find it odd that the jihad recruiters allowed young men to leave for a remote destination without receiving vaccinations for common illnesses (such as malaria, yellow fever, and tetanus). Older detainees who had experience with an established military (Syrian or Egyptian, for example) received medical care through their respective militaries. Why would a sophisticated group like Al-Qaeda send unvaccinated recruits to a country like Afghanistan, where the drinking water was unsafe and there was little sanitation?

Al-Qaeda likes Western technology enough to use plastic explosives but seems to eschew the medical aspect of preparing for war. Al-Qaeda also knew what recruits would be exposed to in Afghanistan, yet refused to inform them of the possible health risks. The organization would spend money for plane tickets, hotel reservations, ground travel, and communications systems to get recruits to safehouses and training camps, but risked—and lost—an enormous amount of manpower and man-hours when recruits became ill.

Perhaps Al-Qaeda did not use the medical technology available to protect recruits because winning jihad means massing and using manpower. Doctrinally in Islam, those who die for the cause of jihad become martyrs and, thus, receive eternal rewards. So in a sense, Al-Qaeda had a religious license to throw bodies into the fray—the more, the better. The will of Allah would determine who withstood illness and who succumbed.

The Consequences of Illness. As much as 25 percent of those in training camps reported becoming ill and suffering with illness for months. Because Al-Qaeda overlooked the medical requirements of a military operation, it had much less actual manpower than the number of its recruits suggested. Sickness dramatically reduced Al-Qaeda's ability to help the Taliban stop the Northern Alliance.

A number of young detainees had frightening memories of the sicknesses they endured. Many re-

ported feeling depleted and vulnerable: camp food was mainly gruel, a subsistence diet not calculated to improve health, but the men were still expected to participate in rough physical conditioning. Physical output and poor nutrition undoubtedly weakened their immunity so they more readily succumbed to illness. From 10 to 15 detainees recalled being arrested at a hospital in either Pakistan or Afghanistan. Many were unsure how they had gotten there. Some recalled that a local had taken them. Many did not know how long they had been there. Later, when these men were identified at the hospital as Arabs or as foreign fighters, Northern Alliance or Pakistani authorities promptly arrested them and turned them over to U.S. forces.

The U.S. Will Do “Nothing”

While recruits assembled in Afghanistan to support the Taliban against the Northern Alliance, 9/11 occurred. Some recruits were still in training camps; others were on the fronts but had seen little action. Yet, all seemed to feel a part of something larger than themselves. When news of 9/11 reached the young men, they routinely asked their older, more experienced trainers or mujahideen what would happen next. The universal answer was “nothing.” So the young recruits shrugged off any worries of a post-9/11 calamity, although many were aware that the Taliban had been hosting Bin-Laden and knew he moved freely among the training camps. The universal consensus was that if Islamic brothers had destroyed a U.S. skyscraper, it was a good day for Muslims everywhere. Islamic brothers had brought down a symbol of the West; Bin-Laden had won a great victory; and nothing would happen to a foreign fighter in Afghanistan.

But why did the older men not expect retaliation after the 9/11 attack? Because there had been no significant retaliation after the terrorist attacks on the Khobar Towers housing complex in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, and the USS *Cole* in Port Aden, Yemen. It was reasonable to assume the United States would, once again, do little. Al-Qaeda also did not want to alert the young recruits that a larger, more dangerous game might have just begun.

Whether they believed the United States would do nothing or because Al-Qaeda was effective at keeping its young recruits calm, “nothing” was the answer many youths accepted as they, along with the former Soviet mujahideen, the Bosnians, and the Chechens, waited patiently on mountain slopes in Afghanistan to fire on the Northern Alliance. They expected nothing to interfere with their waiting and what they intended to do.

Encounters with the Unexpected

Six weeks after 9/11, the United States began dropping bombs on alleged Al-Qaeda sites and other Islamic fighter training camps in Afghanistan. By mid-October 2001, recruits from Europe, Africa, Central Asia, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf States were running for their lives. One detainee said that when he looked up and saw U.S. planes, he did not want to fight the Americans. Many knew they had signed up to fight the Northern Alliance, but they had not bargained on the United States entering the fray.

The older men who had said nothing would happen were now desperate to leave Afghanistan. Arab recruits were told to exit Afghanistan as soon as possible because a price was on their heads. Many recruits sought cover in the Tora Bora Mountains but were caught in the bombing and suffered shrapnel wounds or lost limbs after stepping on landmines. Many were not dressed for the cold weather of the Tora Boras and were not sure with whom they were living or where their supplies were. Quite a few hired Afghan guides to get them out of the mountains and spent many days on foot trying to get to the border. They formed small groups and ditched their weapons as they tried to cross the border from Afghanistan to Pakistan. Others, who had been wounded near the border, recalled that a local Afghani transported them somewhere for medical help. Some recalled being rounded up and betrayed by Pakistanis who sold them to the Northern Alliance. Some reported they could have purchased their freedom from the Northern Alliance if they had had enough money to pay the price demanded. A number admitted that if they had known what they had to face in jihad, they would not have participated unless in direct defense of their homeland.

Stranded

Advertising one thing and delivering another amounts to betrayal. In the training camps of Afghanistan, the caves of Tora Bora, and the prisons of Pakistan, many young men discovered they had undertaken a journey no one could realistically explain. The risks had been purposely omitted to avoid discouragement, and the supposed rewards were nonexistent.

Some detained Arabs said that after the fall of Kabul, locals warned them to leave Afghanistan because foreign fighters were being rounded up and arrested. Many detainees said that not having passports, identification, or other travel documents heightened their fears of being isolated, trapped, and stranded in a hostile place. One young detainee commented that when it came to getting Arabs

out of Afghanistan into Pakistan safely, "Al-Qaeda took care of their own." He noted that some escapes appeared to be planned and went more smoothly than others.

A handful of young men in detention described surviving the Mazar-E-Sharif (MES) uprising. One was shot twice but crawled to the basement of the MES compound to hide. He survived a week of explosions and flooding underground, and emerged alive.

When U.S. bombing forced the Arab and foreign fighters to scatter, the issue of national identification cards and passports surfaced again. As the jihadists tried to escape by crossing into other countries, many regretted not having official papers with them. Most knew where they had left their passports or identification cards, but had no hope of going back to retrieve them. Initially, they thought having a false name and no identification would make it more difficult for arresting authorities to prove that they were Arab. Others thought having a passport would win them help from their respective embassies. Curiously, forged IDs or passports were rare. Foot soldiers rarely possessed forged documents: Al-Qaeda usually procured these (for a fee) for higher level operatives. For those who had kept their official papers, even a passport or identification card was no guarantee they would be taken to their embassies if arrested. Moreover, many embassies in Pakistan did not even attempt to locate their nationals.

Official U.S. records do not indicate that the Saudi Arabian Government made any special requests to the United States, Afghanistan, or Pakistan to gain access to detainment centers or prisons to identify their nationals or to secure their release. One Saudi representative was observed outside a prison near Kandahar, Afghanistan, but it is not known whether he was passing through the area on some other business or whether he had been sent specifically to examine the prison. What is known is that he did not talk to any of the Saudi detainees.

The more sophisticated recruits seem to understand why their governments did not look for them, but the naïve recruits insisted they deserved support from their governments for fighting for Islam and were quite disappointed when they did not receive it. Of course, the Saudi Arabian Government had little interest in working to release troublesome Al-Qaeda members or jihadists from detention: extremist groups oppose the current Saudi monarchy.

Capture and Detention

Perhaps the greatest shock the young men faced was capture, then detention by various authorities

before being transferred into U.S. custody. The imprisoned young men in Afghanistan or Pakistan recall “rough handling” during interrogations and daily treatment. A few men said prisoners sometimes disappeared from their midst. Whether these men were released, died, or were murdered remains unknown.

The International Red Crescent has reminded the United Nations that prolonged detention is damaging to human well-being, but the wheels of government grind slowly when sorting out identities and nationalities. While appearing high tech and fast, the real intelligence process inches along in nanometers.

Lengthy detention in a foreign land was the one outcome of jihad no jihadist appears to have anticipated. Recruiters, trainers, and imams in their fatwas talked about martyrdom, but no one mentioned imprisonment. The older generation had omitted any discussion of imprisonment in preparing the young recruits for jihad. Those recruited were supposed to achieve (and win) jihad through martyrdom. Even if jihad were lost, one could still be a martyr for the cause. In fact, one key Al-Qaeda operative (confined elsewhere) talked longingly about the martyrdom he missed. But a prisoner? This was unthinkable. The orators who drummed up bodies for the purpose of “defending” Islam never warned of the hardships of incarceration.

Reframing Jihad

Experience marks us, whether the marks are the physical scars of battlefield wounds or the emotional scars of separation, loss, and death. The scars of experiencing what no one told them might happen run deep in the young men imprisoned at Guantanamo Bay, but does captivity and imprisonment change the young soldier more than the older? Is the young jihadist more likely to take action against the United States, once released, or are the older men more likely to do so?

What is striking is that a number of the young detainees have already psychologically reframed their jihad experience. They now have new parameters for engaging in jihad. Some said they would go on jihad again, but only to protect their homeland. Several declared they would never participate in jihad again. Others said they had now fulfilled their obligation to Islam and need not go on jihad again. Perhaps one in four of the young detainees

would go on jihad again. Among the older men, a greater number seemed less affected or intimidated by imprisonment and stated they would likely engage in jihad again.

Future jihads

Who will U.S. forces fight next in the Global War on Terrorism? Close scrutiny of those detained at Guantanamo provides insight into the minds we will undoubtedly face in the future. The older men tend to be more hardcore Islamic extremists simply because they are more deeply set in their religious beliefs and behaviors. More often than the young, they have difficulty in dealing with any kind of change. Saturated with radical Islamic religious beliefs, the older men are less amenable to rehabilitation, that is, to adopt the practice of a more moderate Islam. We can expect them back, at an even more advanced age, in the global fray.

On the other hand, the younger men show less rigidity in belief and behavior. They are much more reasonable in their thinking and are clearly more open to change. Carefully planned psychological operations (PSYOP) can show them the dark, unexpected side of jihad and expose them to the realities their recruiters ignored. While such a campaign might not keep all young men out of terror networks, reducing the rate of reenlistment would reduce the overall terrorist headcount—and the fewer terrorists in the world, the better.

While the younger detainees have successfully reframed jihad and discovered reasons not to fight again, they also say they believe in defending their homeland if attacked, which might explain why the United States has encountered so much resistance in Iraq. Once a Western entity engages militarily on Muslim soil, jihad mutates, becoming not only the defense of Islam on one’s street in everyday life, but the defense of Islam from a larger enemy—Western corruption.

When jihad involves armed resistance against Western civilization, the Islamic male has no choice but to fight because nothing in the Koran or any other part of his intellectual and emotional structure will allow him to decline to fight. Until all Iraqis take a page from the Guantanamo detainees and develop a way of thinking that permits fidelity to the Koran and preserves the tenets of Islam, Iraq’s civil war will undoubtedly continue. **MR**

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Clausewitz: “On Afghanistan”

Major Frank Sobchak, U.S. Army

The following article, written in the voice of Carl von Clausewitz and addressing the United States and its military leaders, explores the influence of politics on the early phases of Operation Enduring Freedom. Despite official denials that politics did not influence military decisions during the conflict, this article concludes that the military campaign in Afghanistan vindicates Clausewitz's thesis that war is dominated by politics.

When the guards at Valhalla's gate allow me to venture back to the world of the living, I find it humorous to listen to new generations of war theorists who are convinced that warfare has changed so completely that all previous notions of it are invalid. They are so confident they are witnessing a military revolution they say my unfinished work, *On War*, is an anachronism and no longer salient.¹

Critics should look no further than Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan to understand that my book is still relevant. Despite protestations and official denials, politics still influences war. When I wrote, “War is a mere continuation of policy by other means,” I was referring to the fact that politics and war are completely intertwined, intermeshed, and can never be separated.² Ends and means are still interactively linked, and the conduct of wars is influenced by the political means available. Furthermore, I still believe “war is no act of blind passion, but is dominated by the political object.”³ And, I believe wars are still fought to achieve political goals and are an element of political intercourse. Politics, meaning political objectives, therefore, still influences the conduct of wars.

This same political influence was evident in the early phases of the

war America fought in Afghanistan. Like all wars before it and all wars that follow it, Operation Enduring Freedom has been affected by politics in two significant areas: how allies affected the way war was fought and how postwar objectives influenced the conduct of the war.

Having fought against French Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte, I understand alliances. I wrote: “[E]ven if two states really go to war with a third, they do not always both look in like measure upon this common enemy as one they must destroy or be destroyed by him. The affair is often settled like a commercial transaction; each according to the risk he incurs or the advantage to be expected.”⁴ This political effect of allies was seen in Operation Enduring Freedom in two subsets: first through the geographic effects of Afghanistan's location; and, second, through the effect of allies' desires and interests.

Allied Territory Limitations

Because Afghanistan is landlocked, you, America, had to conduct ground and air operations through a bordering country. This complicated how the war was conducted because many of your allies gave only limited cooperation. Politics and allies caused Afghanistan's bordering states to prohibit cross-border ground invasions or basing large amounts of conventional ground troops within their borders. Because of the political situation, your allies vetoed any possibility of conducting a large-scale, conventional ground offensive.

Only Pakistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan allowed you to base commandos and conventional forces within their territories. The danger of nuclear-armed Pakistan imploding caused you to limit the amount to which you used Paki-

stan. For example, the parachute raid your Rangers conducted on an airfield near Kandahar began in Oman—a country not ideally located to your target. Your allies' reluctance to base large numbers of soldiers on their shores contributed to commandos and aviation assets being stationed on the aircraft carrier *Kitty Hawk*, which shows you understood the political ramifications of putting large numbers of forces in such a relatively unstable country as Pakistan.

The influence of politics and geography on war can best be learned by observing how you fought the air campaign. By the war's fifth week, when Taliban opposition had crumbled significantly in the north and south, none of the bordering countries allowed you to base combat aircraft on their soil.

Your allies' limited support influenced the way you fought the war. For example, because you could not base your aircraft in a border country, you operated from either Oman, Diego Garcia, your own aircraft carriers, or even from America. This resulted in extremely long sorties (most in excess of 6 hours). Some planes had to conduct in-flight refueling two or three times to complete just one mission, which affected the conduct of war because you could not launch the number of sorties you wanted.

In previous conflicts, American pilots flew two or three sorties a day. In Afghanistan, pilots were often able to carry out only one. This statistic reflects the effects of political issues. At the end of the fourth week, the average number of daily combat sorties was 63, with a continued decrease after that. In the Kosovo war, daily sorties averaged 500; in Operation Desert Storm it was roughly 1,500.⁵ The number of viable targets available no doubt affected this statistic, but more

important, it reflected your allies' decisions not to allow you to base combat aircraft on their soil.

Your allies' concerns, desires, and interests also affected the way you conducted the war. Anyone who doubts this need only look at the operation's original name—Infinite Justice. You did not use that name because it might have alienated Muslim allies who believe only Allah can mete out infinite justice.

Pakistan is the most important ally whose wishes you considered—with good reason. General Pervez Musharraf came to power through a coup d'état that limited his legitimacy and caused him to face significant internal opposition to siding with America. He identified three major concerns: ending the campaign quickly, halting bombing during Ramadan, and not having the Northern Alliance come to power as the sole leader in a postwar Afghanistan.

Musharraf's first two concerns reflected his belief that the longer the campaign lasted, the more enflamed the passions of his Muslim constituents would become. The third concern stemmed from the fact that a significant Pashtun minority in Pakistan would object to Uzbek, Tajik, and Hazaras factions in the Northern alliance dominating their kin in Afghanistan.

Although you completely supported only Musharraf's last request, you worked hard to attain the first and respectfully denied the other. Furthermore, the collapse of the Taliban made moot his requests that addressed the conduct of the war. Your policy was wise considering the political tightrope Musharraf walked.

You have several allies and considerable interests in the Middle East, and therefore you chose to take allies' concerns into account. They asked you to do everything possible to limit civilian casualties, end the campaign quickly, and halt bombing during Ramadan. While the concerns did not have a major effect on the way you fought the war, they did influence the way you selected targets. Much to the chagrin of air power enthusiasts, you erred on the side of caution and tried not to cause public opinion to turn against you or to destabilize

important Muslim allies (or anger friends in Europe). The air force officer who during the conflict, said, "It is shocking the degree to which collateral damage hamstrung the campaign," should read my book.⁶ To preserve the coalition against terrorism—where allies freeze financial assets of terrorists and share intelligence—an army must not lose the public opinion on war.

Uzbekistan and Tajikistan had different concerns. They feared a repeat of Somalia and Operation Desert Storm because they believed you did not live up to your promises and lacked staying power. They were concerned that if they provided too much support they would face a resurgence of fundamentalist Islam, which would have been buoyed by the conflict had you not achieved victory. They were also concerned that any cooperation with the United States would upset Russia and damage their bipolar relations with this powerful neighbor. While these concerns were not completely fair, this was certainly their perception. I do not envy the work your foreign ministers and military leaders performed to keep the political balance among allies.

The concerns allies voiced significantly affected the way you fought the war in Afghanistan. The unique geographic situation and allies' concerns limited options, showing without a doubt how Operation Enduring Freedom was influenced by politics. However, this political influence did not come only from alliances, it also came from the effect postwar aims had on the conduct of the campaign. I wrote: "No war is begun, or at least no war should be begun, if people acted wisely, without first finding an answer to the question: What is to be attained by and in war? By this dominant idea the whole course of the war is prescribed, the extent of the means and the measure of energy are determined; its influence manifests itself down to the smallest detail of action."⁷

Achieving Goals

Setting the goals of a conflict is the most important thing a warring nation can do. The goals should be paramount. Every tactic, every battlefield step, every action, and every engagement should be

planned to guide the war in the direction to achieve these goals. In an age of technological development and media omnipresence, tactical decisions can have strategic effects. Imagine how different the situation would be today if the errant bomb that killed three Special Forces soldiers had instead landed a mere 100 yards away and killed Afghan Interim Prime Minister Hamid Karzai.

You acted wisely and then determined your postwar objectives. You then tied the objectives to the ways you conducted war and your two major postwar objectives: replace the Taliban and al-Qaeda with a broad-based, multiethnic government and set the conditions to prevent a power vacuum from reoccurring in Afghanistan.

The first goal, although noble and important, is quite difficult. The best lesson from the Soviet Union's debacle in Afghanistan is that they failed because they put an autocratic puppet government (with no legitimacy) in power in Kabul. In essence, the Soviets lost the hearts and minds of the Afghan people, which led to mass uprisings throughout the country and a protracted guerrilla war. One of your key postwar objectives was to avoid the Soviet Union's fate. You worked to prevent a repeat of the Soviet mistake by openly supporting a post-Taliban government that included all major ethnic groups and a fair representation of minorities. The postwar goal was to install a new Afghan government that would have the legitimacy of its people, to avoid the morass of a protracted guerrilla war. In essence, this was accomplished. Karzai won the first Afghan national election through a fair and open campaign. Many pitfalls still await, however, and only time will tell if the achievements will last.

You meticulously chose ways to attain your objectives—by not allying yourself completely with the Northern Alliance, for example, you recognized, correctly, that this group did not represent all Afghans and you equivocated on complete support for them. When Central Command Commander General Tommy Franks was asked if the Northern Alliance could be trusted, he responded, "Well, we're

not sure.”⁸ This lukewarm support also came from President George W. Bush, who in an unsuccessful attempt to keep the alliance from occupying the capital during the final death throes of the Taliban, said, “We will encourage our friends to head south, but not into the city of Kabul itself.”⁹

The support given southern Afghan Pashtun groups showed the desire for a broad-based, post-Taliban government. Early in the war there were rumors of American support in the form of CIA personnel and air support for Afghan leader Abdul Haq during his disastrous return to Afghanistan. There were even confirmations that American aircraft provided cover for a helicopter evacuation of Karzai when the Taliban closed in on his position during an initial infiltration attempt. And, even before a majority of the Pashtun tribes defected from the Taliban, you provided other Pashtun tribes with Special Forces advisers and supplies. Your support for exiled King Mohammed Zahir Shah, the last man to rule a multiethnic Afghanistan, showed concern for this postwar objective.

Balancing Demands

You backed a broad-based coalition government in word and deed. However, these postwar political goals, coupled with allies’ desires, put you in the difficult situation of having to balance competing demands. You did not want the Northern Alliance to win too quickly because this would have threatened postwar objectives. Also, the southern Pashtun groups had not organized or taken significant tracts of land. But you also did not want the war to be won too slowly for fear repercussions would come in Pakistan and other Muslim countries.

In Afghanistan you used the same “Goldilocks” strategy as in Kosovo to prevent the Kosovo Liberation Army from making too much progress against the Serbs, a situation that would have led to a postwar power imbalance.¹⁰ You showed this in the several attempts to reign in Northern Alliance conquests in the face of a collapsing Taliban and in attempts to speed up the nascent southern Pashtun resistance.

Winning the war too quickly could have led to a power vacuum that would have led to different ethnic groups not wanting to cooperate with each other, forcing you to abandon Afghanistan to its own devices. Your political representatives did not want to repeat an experience that happened 9 years ago when “internecine fighting among opposition groups smashed hopes for a peaceful transition of power in Kabul after the fall of the Soviet-backed government.”¹¹ This would have been a dangerous situation; a void could have developed and been filled by a radical element, much in the same way the Taliban came to power.

The goal of having a stable postwar Afghanistan, one devoid of power vacuums, can be seen in your work with the UN Special Representative for Afghanistan, Lakhdar Brahimi, to establish a peacekeeping force that would keep different anti-Taliban factions from fighting each other. You obtained pledges from peacekeepers from France, Germany, Australia, Jordan, England, Turkey, and others, and you pressured the UN to establish an interim government. This peacekeeping force eventually transitioned to NATO control and to this day is helping to achieve this objective.

Your concern with Afghanistan’s postwar situation is evident from the mission’s humanitarian element. Risking aircrew and airframes, you dropped over a million humanitarian daily rations and sent engineers to rebuild roads, bridges, and tunnels to allow vast amounts of aid (most of which came from America) into the country. This shows a commitment to stabilize postwar Afghanistan and is echoed in the words of Secretary of Defense Colin Powell: “We will help them rebuild; we will not abandon them.”¹² Having a substantial humanitarian component within the campaign demonstrated to the Afghan people that you were committed to their long-term well-being.

It is evident you applied my maxim on the importance of linking ways—or the methods you use—to ends—or the postwar political situation you desire. The policy of not supporting one Afghan resistance

group more than another and the long-term political commitment to avoid a power vacuum shows the successful linking of these two concepts.

My book is not irrelevant. Quite the contrary, my thesis of the importance of politics in war is still valid. The thesis shows how politics significantly affected the conduct of Operation Enduring Freedom. Political limitations in the way you fought in Afghanistan were caused by the formation of alliances necessary to wage the war and gain political postwar objectives. But, there is nothing wrong with this. Political intrusion in campaign strategy is a natural state of warfare. However, I am troubled when I see your minister of war saying the war was not fought under political constraints. He should have said: Of course there are political constraints on this war. We are smart enough to understand Clausewitz and apply military means to achieve a political end so we will not have to fight this war again in the future. **MR**

NOTES

1. Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans., O.J. Matthijs Jolles (New York: Random House, 1943).
2. *Ibid.*, 16.
3. *Ibid.*, 21.
4. *Ibid.*, 594.
5. Molly Moore and Kamran Khan, “Big Ground Force Seen as Necessary to Defeat Taliban,” *The Washington Post*, 2 November 2001.
6. Thomas E. Ricks, “Target Approval Delays Cost Air Force Key Hits,” *The Washington Post*, 18 November 2001.
7. Clausewitz, 569.
8. Moore and Khan.
9. President George W. Bush, quoted in William Branigan, “Jubilant Afghan Fighters Set Their Sights on Kabul,” *The Washington Post*, 11 November 2001.
10. Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O’Hanlon, *Winning Ugly: NATO’s War to Save Kosovo* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), 104. The Goldilocks Theory is taken from Daalder and O’Hanlon’s book. U.S. war planners might have applied it during Operation Enduring Freedom.
11. Alan Sipress and Colum Lynch, “Shifting Focus to Interim Government,” *The Washington Post*, 13 November 2001.
12. Colin Powell, quoted in Elizabeth Becker, “U.S. Orders New Aid to Help Avert Famine in Afghanistan,” *The New York Times*, 3 November 2001.

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Fox Conner and Dwight Eisenhower: Mentoring and Application

Jerome H. Parker IV

Four years after giving his go-order for the Allied invasion of the Normandy coast, General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower addressed the Army War College. He said his thinking about coalition warfare had been molded by the ablest man he had ever known, Major General Fox Conner. In a polite understatement, he gave Conner credit for offering “a preparation that was unusual in the Army at that time.”¹ Indeed, the 33 months Eisenhower spent in Panama with Conner had jump-started his personal and professional life and set him on course to international prominence.

Conner received his commission in the artillery, although he preferred the cavalry. Within 10 years he was on the staff and faculty of the Army War College. Following America’s entry into World War I, Conner was recommended for detail to the European Front. On 19 April 1917 he was ordered to host and consult with the Viviani-Joffre Mission, a French delegation sent to discuss with U.S. President Woodrow Wilson how the United States could best help France. Conner worked closely with officers from the French general staff discussing details of organization, artillery requirements, internal affairs, and the immediate needs of the French and British.

Conner was the youngest officer on the senior staff when Chief of Staff of the Army General John J. Pershing chose him to become General Andre W. Brewster’s assistant. Within 6 months Conner was named the chief of operations of the American Expeditionary Force (AEF). By 1921, Conner was a 47-year-old brigadier general preparing for his first command of an infantry brigade.

Conner Chooses an Executive Officer

The story of the Conner-Eisenhower adventure began in the fall of 1919, when Conner became immersed in the congressional budget

hearings that were to determine the Army’s post-World War I reorganization. He was about to command an infantry brigade and was looking for a top executive officer. Because he had been tied to high-level staff work for the past several years, he felt out of touch with the Army’s young officers. He turned to General George S. Patton, Jr., with whom he had enjoyed a close personal and professional relationship, for help with the matter and to talk to Patton about the armored tank’s place in the Army’s battle formations. Conner planned a fact-finding mission to Camp Meade, Maryland, for November 1919, where Patton commanded the light tanks of the 304th Brigade. Patton had arrived at Camp Meade in the spring of 1919, about the same time as Eisenhower, and Patton promised to introduce the two men.

During the war, Eisenhower had trained men for overseas duty. For 9 grueling weeks, he accompanied an experimental motorized convoy of more than 60 motor vehicles from Washington, D.C., to San Francisco. Few men in the Army knew more about motorized weapons and transport than Eisenhower.

Eisenhower stressed that the tank would be a profitable adjunct to the infantry.² In November 1920, Eisenhower published his ideas about tanks in the *Infantry Journal*.³ However, the Chief of Infantry, Major General Charles S. Farnsworth, was not pleased with Eisenhower’s article and informed Eisenhower that his facts were incorrect and dangerous to the service. Farnsworth told Eisenhower to keep his opinions to himself or face a court martial.⁴

Eisenhower was caught between the wartime Army and the changing peacetime Army. To complicate matters, there was a simmering conflict between AEF commanders and the officers who had remained stateside. This split affected Eisenhower’s promotion possibilities, and he believed that his wartime

service was being demeaned.

At Camp Colt, Eisenhower’s commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Ira C. Wellborn, recommended Eisenhower for the Distinguished Service Medal.⁵ AEF Tank Corps Chief Brigadier General Samuel D. Rockenbach rated Eisenhower’s performance as average, however, and the War Department rejected the recommendation.⁶ The rejection, reduction from his wartime rank of colonel, and the recent death of his first son had been cruel blows to Eisenhower, and he seriously considered leaving the Army.

Conner pulled Eisenhower back. Conner wrote Eisenhower to ask if he would be his executive officer in Panama, and Eisenhower eagerly sent an affirmative response.⁷ However, Rockenbach denied the transfer. Fortunately, Pershing intervened when Conner sent a letter to Pershing’s aide, Colonel George C. Marshall, asking him to steer the matter through the War Department. Eisenhower arrived in Panama in January 1922.⁸

The Conner-Eisenhower Team

The Conner-Eisenhower team meshed well from the start. Conner was a masterful leader who believed leadership could be taught by delegating authority, providing instruction and example, setting high standards, and holding everyone to those standards without fear or favor. A hallmark of his leadership style was the almost leisurely way he offered words of praise for a job well done and simple words of caution for things done poorly.⁹

Even as he delegated authority, Conner never abandoned his position as a teacher and mentor.¹⁰ He convened all of his officers for lecture sessions that encompassed various relevant topics, such as jungle warfare and the importance of good intelligence gathering. He believed attention to detail made the difference between success and failure.

Eisenhower held independent command of Camp Colt, yet was puzzled by Conner's running the camp as a field command. Conner required Eisenhower to write daily field orders for the operation of the post instead of issuing the normal general orders concerned with matters of policy or administration. Conner explained the goals for the day and made the appropriate troop assignments to carry out an action plan. Eisenhower became so well acquainted with the techniques and routine of preparing plans and orders for operations and logistics that they became second nature to him.¹¹

Later, while attending the U.S. Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, Eisenhower wrote to Conner expressing his uncertainty about his ability to handle work and the competition. Conner assured Eisenhower that because of his 3 years in Panama he was far better trained and ready for Leavenworth than anybody he knew.¹²

Conner was loyal to his junior officers, never hesitating to give credit when it was earned, but also expecting loyalty in return.¹³ Do not, he insisted, have a personal enemy on your staff who could sabotage you or your command.¹⁴ He spoke loudest when he selected Eisenhower as his executive officer. This great staff leader chose a man who would be prized by his superiors as one of the Army's most capable staff officers.

Field Knowledge. As an officer of the mounted field artillery, Conner had an overriding concern that the Army effectively use whatever tools it had to allow the infantry to meet and destroy the enemy.¹⁵ A progressive military thinker, he proposed in 1919 that a division organization of three regiments (16,000 men) replace the cumbersome AEF division of 27,000 men and 4 regiments.¹⁶ He favored efficiency, quality, and less expense over quantity and ill-prepared soldiers. He insisted, for example, that any technological advance intended to replace the horse be proven capable of doing more and better than the horse. What did speed matter if the machines attached to the infantry could not keep pace? What did the

load-carrying capacity of motorized transport matter if roads were impassable for motor transport, or if there was a fuel shortage, or if the machinery broke down owing to terrain or weather?

Conner encouraged the Army to do everything possible to develop its motor transport and weapons. In fact, he recanted his decision to abolish the tank corps, and recommended that tanks be separated from the infantry and allowed to operate independently as envisioned by Eisenhower and George S. Patton, Jr. But, in deference to a budget-conscious America, he insisted that change not come at the expense of existing arms.¹⁷

Eisenhower was obsessed with new 20th-century machinery and did whatever he could to see how it worked. He tested machineguns; worked to improve tanks and armor tactics; hitched a ride on a submarine to experience a dive and underwater operations; owned and maintained his own automobile; and, at the age of 46, learned to pilot Army training aircraft, accruing 350 hours of flight time.¹⁸

Book Knowledge. While they were in Panama, Conner asked Eisenhower what books he read. Eisenhower replied that he read mostly for pleasure and had little interest in military history because West Point treated military history as an "out-and-out memory" course.¹⁹ Conner received this without comment but later invited Eisenhower to visit his library—"a sort of graduate school in military affairs and the humanities."²⁰ The range of Conner's thinking showed in the titles of his diverse library. Conner often quoted Shakespeare and related his plays to the wars he and Eisenhower were discussing. Conner also introduced Eisenhower to the works of Plato, Tacitus, and Nietzsche, all of whom examined the human condition.

Conner recommended that Eisenhower read Matthew Forney Steele's *American Campaigns*.²¹ Steele was a lecturer at the staff school where Conner's growth as a professional soldier was deeply rooted. Steele's lectures, a comprehensive analysis of military operations from the American Revolution through the Civil War, included discussions of

tactics and the behavior and motivations of commanders. There was no denying that modern military science was the American Civil War's legacy. While the war could not—probably should not—have been avoided or the outcome altered, adequate preparation could have mitigated the terrible consequences of battle.

Conner repeated Major General Emory Upton's assertion: "Had the Union possessed 50,000 battle-ready troops, the country would have been spared the loss of thousands of her youth, billions of treasure, and untold suffering."²² Through his explanations of Upton's theories about military history and reforms of the American military system, Conner warned that even if the Nation remained lax about military preparedness, the soldier could not afford to be unprepared for the inevitable job of defending the Nation.

Using a copy of *American Campaigns*, Conner introduced Eisenhower to the curriculum at Fort Leavenworth and to the "applicatory method," which referred to case studies of historical battles and campaigns. At the school, students advanced from military history lectures and original research to applying the lessons to battle situations in indoor wargaming exercises.²³ The students studied military scenarios and learned how to derive their own "estimate of the situation," incorporating a systematic means of issuing orders in five paragraphs into their solutions.²⁴ Such exercises were followed by tactical rides and field maneuvers with troops and ended with staff rides to study actual battlefields.²⁵

During Panama's dry season, Conner and Eisenhower rode on horseback to clear trails and map routes for the rapid movement of troops and pack animals. In the evenings they discussed Civil War battles.²⁶ Conner demonstrated the benefits and dangers of indiscriminately applying the general principles of war. Eisenhower once casually referred to World War I as the "Great War." Conner replied, "As far as we're concerned, that was only large-scale maneuvers."²⁷

Conner asked Eisenhower to read Carl von Clausewitz's *On War* three

times, each time reminding him that Clausewitz wrote primarily about operations and ignored logistics.²⁸ He contended that officers spent too much time on writing tactics and too little on writing the fourth paragraph, which explained how the commander was to supply his troops.²⁹

Coalition Warfare

During World War I, the allied coalition did not achieve any semblance of unity of command until late in the war. Conner predicted that in the next global war the United States would be forced to fight in a coalition. No nation had been given outright field command of troops of another nation, but Conner believed America should insist there be a unified high command possessing ultimate authority.³⁰ The armies of a coalition would have to be coordinated, and the most practical method available to a supreme commander was persuasion.³¹

Conner's accounts of his AEF experience left indelible impressions on Eisenhower. In July 1942, Eisenhower had been in London only 11 days when he wrote Conner about issues he was having with his staff that were similar to the issues Conner had faced during World War I. Eisenhower was almost dismissive of the difficulties of making firm agreements with Allies and instead reeled off a list of familiar internal organizational problems. He assured Conner the answers would soon come to him but that he was struck by the similarities between his situation and those Conner had described.³²

During their discussions, Conner frequently mentioned Marshall, whom Conner considered a brilliant operations officer. Eisenhower first met Marshall while working on Pershing's American Battle Monuments Commission in 1927.³³ Conner repeatedly urged Eisenhower to seek a position with Marshall because "[Marshall] knows more about the technique of arranging allied commands than any man I know."³⁴

When Conner was Pershing's chief of operations he foresaw a global war pitting the industrial nations of North America, Europe, and the Pacific Rim against each

other. His belief came from his observations in October 1918, when negotiations were imminent between Germany and the Western coalition to initiate an armistice. After consulting with Conner, Chief of Staff General James W. McAndrew, Judge Advocate General Walter Bethel, and Pershing met with coalition commanders-in-chief at Senlis, France. At his commander's request, Conner presented to Pershing a formal military recommendation to the Supreme War Council to oppose an armistice with Germany.³⁵ As Pershing's G3 and principal writer of strategy and policy, amalgamation, and AEF independence, Conner accompanied him to high-level meetings.³⁶

History shows that victorious armies often overestimate their enemy's strength and precipitously seek what is often a premature truce.³⁷ The American Civil War was rife with such examples, and Conner and Pershing were witnesses to the Allies using the same flawed manpower estimates to induce Pershing to insert American troops into Allied sectors during World War I.³⁸ They were also reminded of the Armistice of 1871 signed by the French after the Prussians surrounded Paris while French Armies were still in the field. That armistice provoked a rebellion in France led by Montmartre's mayor, Georges Clemenceau.

In 1918, the Americans hoped that by reminding Clemenceau of the events of 1871 he would reconsider his desire for an armistice. America felt that an undefeated Germany would feed political instability in postwar France and central Europe: "An armistice would revivify the low spirits of the German Army and enable it to reorganize and resist later on, and deprive the Allies of the full measure of victory."³⁹ Conner was convinced the Treaty of Versailles had sown the seeds for a future war and urged Eisenhower to be ready for it.⁴⁰

At the War College. After leaving Panama, Eisenhower returned to Camp Meade. Three months later he was ordered to Fort Benning, Georgia, to command the 15th Light Tank Battalion. When

Eisenhower did not receive an appointment to the infantry school at Fort Benning, Conner wrangled a transfer for him to Major General Robert C. Davis's Adjutant General Corps and an immediate appointment to the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth.⁴¹ Eisenhower lived up to Conner's expectations by graduating first in his class and being assigned to the Army War College, where the depth of his mentor's influence became more apparent.

On 15 March 1928, Eisenhower submitted a staff memorandum, "An Enlisted Reserve for the Regular Army," to satisfy a major requirement for the War College. The memorandum detailed that the Army needed 75,000 more men to carry out its missions. The only way to make up the deficiency was to organize all men discharged from the regular Army into an enlisted reserve. His review of several studies and reports provided the manpower numbers, but Eisenhower had actually revisited Conner's lessons. He said the defense of U.S. territory was best served by having sufficient forces to win the opening battles of any conflict so the initial successes "would relieve us of the necessity of waging a long and bitter war with large armies with its consequent losses in men, material, and money."⁴²

Coincidentally, 2 months earlier Conner had published "The National Defense" in the *North American Review*.⁴³ After a thorough historical analysis of national preparedness, particularly during the Civil War, he decried the Nation's tendency to forget the lessons of previous wars, leaving the United States without a force instantly available at war strength. He believed that three battle-ready regular Army infantry divisions and one cavalry division backed by the National Guard would be worth more in actual defense than a million men raised in the second 6 months of war.⁴⁴

Although Conner could not bring Eisenhower's son back or give him back his rank, through true friendship and wise mentorship Conner helped heal Eisenhower's wounds. When Conner died on 13

October 1951, Eisenhower was on maneuvers with the United States Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean, completing his tour as the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe. **MR**

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

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MR Book Reviews

ELLSWORTH BUNKER: Global Troubleshooter, Vietnam Hawk, Howard B. Schaffer, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 2003, 380 pages, \$34.95.

The idea of diplomacy is the reasonable bargaining between men—a formula that fits Ellsworth Bunker's diplomatic career. After a successful business career, he was an ambassador for a succession of presidents, from Harry S. Truman to Jimmy Carter. Bunker helped broker and negotiate agreements over West New Guinea, Yemen, the Dominican Republic, and the Panama Canal, but he might best be remembered as the Ambassador to South Vietnam, 1967-1973.

Bunker behaved as a professional, not a talented amateur. He believed his job was to maintain state-to-state relations and acted as a technician and a craftsman without grand theories of diplomatic relations or America's place in the world. He concentrated on finding solutions to immediate issues to further U.S. foreign policy objectives, which made him a supple negotiator with firm beliefs about the right of self-determination and the improvement of the lives of ordinary people.

Bunker was most effective as a negotiator, in part because of the trust five presidents placed in him. His business experience stood him in good stead as he formulated the principles of a good negotiator, which to a great degree followed maxims formulated by the classic commentators on Western diplomatic practice, then modified to fit 20th-century circumstances. Although every negotiation was different, Bunker believed several common techniques could be followed to ensure success.

Bunker created an informal atmosphere, usually a secluded setting, in which the contending parties could develop familiar personal relations. He offered draft proposals that could

become the basis for bargaining and used small, intellectually supple staffs to quickly anticipate changes before they could be second-guessed. He tried to avoid State Department bureaucratic in-fighting, and for the most part was successful. The only exception was the Panama Canal Treaty, where he defended his work to both the Congress and the American people.

Howard B. Schaffer has written a fascinating biography highlighting the ways military and diplomatic power can work together to settle knotty problems between states. Over the course of his life as a business executive and diplomat, Bunker exemplified patriotic American values in that he was willing to tackle difficult and sometimes arduous and dangerous tasks in the service of the Republic. His diplomatic career epitomizes the ideals of patriotism and selfless service. This biography gives the reader insights into the way diplomacy works on a day-to-day basis and how U.S. interests are furthered through peace and conflict.

*Lewis Bernstein, Ph.D.,
Madison, Alabama*

STATES, NATIONS, AND BORDERS: The Ethics of Making Boundaries, Allen Buchanan and Margaret Moore, eds., Cambridge University Press, UK, 2003, 361 pages, \$27.99.

States, Nations, and Borders: The Ethics of Making Boundaries is a collection of essays written by specialists about the ethical questions surrounding the concept of land and borders. The essays, which include Jewish, Confucian, Christian, natural law, Islamic, liberal, and international law perspectives, are concise and address a variety of topics including how land is considered "holy" within the Jewish tradition.

The book's main strength is that more than one essay is provided for

each tradition to allow for more than one viewpoint. Although the book is not all-inclusive, it certainly has use as an introduction or ancillary to the study of international law as it relates to the contentious topics of borders. The book's main weakness, which really is not a weakness at all, is that the editors did not include more viewpoints.

The standout article, "Making and Unmaking the Boundaries of Holy Land," by Menachem Lorberbaum, explains the arguments that can be directly related to Jewish land claims in Israel. The arguments in the article are succinct and not clouded with theology.

The book's value to the defense community lies in its ability to help the reader understand how other countries arrive at their decisions regarding land rights and border delineation. Overall, I recommend the book.

David J. Schepp, Auburn, Georgia

NEXT OF KIN: A Brother's Journey to Wartime Vietnam, Thomas L. Reilly, Brassey's, Dulles, VA, 2003, 288 pages, \$24.95.

In one of those rare, first-person accounts that bring history to life, Tom Reilly recounts the tale of a remarkable journey that takes him from his boyhood home in rural Wisconsin to a harrowing trek across Southeast Asia during the height of the Vietnam War. Reilly's story, one of loyalty, brotherhood, and dogged determination, captures and holds the reader's attention.

Reilly's story begins in 1958, when, at the age of seven, he loses both his parents. Although he is raised by his sister, Reilly develops a close bond with his brother Ron, who helps define his young life. The brotherhood the two share guides Reilly through his first years and remains central to his existence until he receives official notification as

“Next of Kin” that his brother is a casualty of war: dead as a result of a nonhostile incident in the Long Binh compound north of Saigon. Left with a plethora of unanswered questions, the 19-year old Reilly makes his way to Vietnam in a journey as captivating as it is inspiring.

Reilly, an 18-year veteran of the disaster recovery industry, weaves an amazing tale of brotherly devotion, youthful discovery, and astonishing adventure in his first literary venture. *Next of Kin* is as much a tribute to the bonds of family as it is an expression of gratitude to the man who shaped Reilly’s life. Reilly succeeds in bringing to life yet another name on the Vietnam Veterans Memorial

Next of Kin is a candid, compelling account reminiscent of Michael Takiff’s *Brave Men, Gentle Heroes* (Perennial, New York, 2004). Readers of all backgrounds will appreciate and enjoy Reilly’s story, but military readers will especially relate to the book’s strong sense of brotherhood and honor. The book is a good addition to any collection and one that resonates with the warriors of our trade.

*MAJ Steve Leonard, USA,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas*

WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD SINCE 1815, Jeremy Black, ed., Routledge, London, 2003, 268 pages, \$27.95.

Since the advent of “modernity,” the study of military history in the past half-century, particularly in the West, has focused on the great events in Europe and North America. Wars elsewhere around the globe have been largely ignored. Noted historian Jeremy Black’s essay collection *War in the Modern World Since 1815* redresses the situation and offers a collection of essays written by scholars from diverse historical backgrounds. The essays do not focus on the European way of war, but on the differences and similarities of ways of war that have manifested themselves around the world for the past 200 years. What emerges is a useful and interesting study contrasting military developments of which people in the West

are only vaguely aware.

Traditional European methods of war appear in Black’s book; however, only one essay directly addresses them. Two other essays, which address naval and air power, center on developments in Europe and the United States; a third addresses the U.S. military during the same period. European colonialism is also a subject in essays that examine the past two centuries in China, South Asia, Japan, Latin America, and sub-Saharan Africa.

None of the regional areas studied had the same historical progress. In some cases, social factors were primary; in others economic factors were addressed; in yet others, cultural factors were examined. The essays reveal a vivid portrayal of warfare around the world that differs from the standard vision of Europe at war. The essay on the American military is disappointing as it is merely a chronological narrative that does not delve into the questions of “why.”

Black’s collection is a refreshing study. His breadth of historical analysis ensures the military history student will learn about previously unknown subjects. Considering the various locations in which U.S. military forces are currently deployed, it is wise to gather as much professional historical study as possible. Black’s contribution will be most useful in that undertaking.

*MAJ Michael A. Boden, USA,
Hohenfels, Germany*

CIVIL WAR IN KANSAS, Roy Bird, Pelican Publishing Company, Gretna, Louisiana, 2004, 152 pages, \$9.95.

Military operations on the Kansas-Missouri border between 1854 and 1865 provide classic lessons learned for today’s military professional. Union officers contended with guerrillas, vigilantes, armed gangs, and uniformed conventional forces in an area that had scarce resources and little law and order. In the *Civil War in Kansas*, Roy Bird suggests that Union forces’ heavy-handedness increased the ranks of Confederate forces and created terrorists such as Jesse James, William

Quantrill, and Cole Younger.

Although not intended as a reference source for the Kansas-Missouri border war, the book does introduce bloody operations in the region and address Kansas and Missouri’s political settings before the outbreak of war; depict key leaders involved in operations on the border; offer a general timeline of key events in the region; and feature major events and battles that shaped military operations on the border.

*MAJ John Carrico, USA,
Washington, D.C.*

50 BATTLES THAT CHANGED THE WORLD: The Conflicts that Most Influenced the Course of History, William Weir, New Page Books, Franklin Lakes, NJ, 2004, 320 pages, \$17.95.

In the tradition of Edward Creasy, J.F.C. Fuller, and Sir Basil H. Liddell-Hart, William Weir puts together a subjective list of important battles. A well-written introduction lays out the rationale for his particular approach. Weir meshes together the battles he feels ensured democracy and freedom, describes battles that gave Western civilization domination over the East, and provides examples of the political decline of the West—a recent trend in the examination of world history.

Weir thoroughly researched the battles he includes in his book and has a good grasp of their effect on the world. He includes several appendices, one of which includes several battles that did not make his list for more extensive treatment. He also includes a bibliographical glossary that addresses major leaders of the battles, a glossary of military terms, and a thorough index.

A chronological listing of battles is broken down by five different criteria:

1. A straight historical chronology, which is helpful because the book lists battles by order of importance, and often jumps from ancient to modern times and back again.
2. A list of battles pertaining to the development of democracy.
3. Battles of East versus West.
4. Battles dealing with European nationhood.

5. Battles reacting to Europe's domination and control.

I have a few criticisms: the bibliography, while extensive and complete, does not cross-reference battles; there is a lack of maps; it is difficult to keep up with national and cultural boundaries because battles cross vast time spans; there is little for those interested in troop movements; and the space allotted to each battle is insufficient.

In every entry, Weir attempts to define the world, provide insight into the mindset of military leaders on both sides of a battle, and describe the battles themselves. Doing this is a daunting task, and Weir's writing style suffers for it. While his narrative is informal and relaxed, a more structured approach would have better defined characters and events.

Weir concludes each entry with a brief discussion of how the battle affected the world or laid the foundation for the present world culture.

The book is best used as an introduction to battles for those new to military history. Although Weir obviously put a lot of work into the book, he does not explore each battle in enough detail to be of use to more than the casual reader.

*CPT Stephen R. Spulick, USA,
Schwetzingen, Germany*

VICKSBURG: The Campaign that Opened the Mississippi, Michael B. Ballard, The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 2004, 490 pages, \$39.95.

Michael B. Ballard's *Vicksburg: The Campaign that Opened the Mississippi* details the struggle for Vicksburg, Mississippi, and its corresponding portion of the Mississippi River. Ballard describes General Ulysses S. Grant's Union forces overtaking Confederate General John C. Pemberton's resource-poor forces to open the Mississippi River and split the Confederacy.

Ballard uses personal letters, diaries, memoirs, reports, and historical data to develop the history of the struggle for Vicksburg. He describes Grant's many attempts to gain control of the Mississippi River; his final siege of the city; and the reasons for his setbacks. Ballard discusses why Union forces

conducted "hard war" in response to Confederate guerrilla tactics and cavalry raids. He also describes the long-term effects the battle had on the local population in the Big Black River Bastion between Vicksburg and Jackson, Mississippi.

Vicksburg is a compelling, detailed history of Civil War leaders overcoming opponents who were equally committed to their causes and of the complexities that result from this type of warfare. Ballard's book is a tribute to the courage, determination, and skill on both sides of the struggle.

*Major Jeffrey L. LaFace, USA,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas*

FINISHING BUSINESS: Ten Steps to Defeat Global Terror, Harlan Ullman, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 2004, 241 pages, \$29.95.

Harlan Ullman, the former naval officer who popularized the phrase "shock and awe," in a book by the same name (Kesinger Publishing, Whitefish, MT, 2004) diagnoses the failures in America's role in the Global War on Terrorism in his current book, *Finishing Business: Ten Steps to Defeat Global Terror*, which is a starting point for anyone attempting to rethink the Global War on Terrorism.

Ullman suggests that America should recognize it cannot win the Global War on Terrorism as presently conceived. Radical Islam poses a political danger to America and threatens "massive disruption through real or threatened terrorist attacks." Ullman further asserts the U.S. Government (as currently organized) cannot protect its citizens. He calls for governmental reform, congressional discipline, safeguards for individual liberties, and a conceptual shift from national defense to national security. Finally, Ullman recommends a comprehensive rather than a specific solution to global problems, and suggests that America "expand regional security arrangements more broadly."

Arguing that America is not fighting a war against terrorism but against militant Islamic fundamentalism, Ullman says America should think of the Global War on Terror-

ism in terms of a struggle against an opponent and ideas rather than against a method. Ullman's ideas are interesting, but some of his recommendations are likely beyond reach. He posits that the struggle against radical Islam will not end until the Israeli-Palestinian and Pakistani-Indian conflicts are resolved, and that is not likely to be any time soon. Establishing a national security university (a broader version of the National Defense University) to educate a broader section of America's government in national security is more within reach.

Finishing Business has interesting, creative ideas. Though some are impractical, some might conceivably be implemented. Many more need further analysis.

Mitchell McNaylor, Gainesville, Florida

NO END IN SIGHT: The Continuing Menace of Nuclear Proliferation, Nathan E. Busch, The University Press of Kentucky, Lexington, 2004, 490 pages, \$40.00.

No End in Sight: The Continuing Menace of Nuclear Proliferation addresses the theoretical debate over whether nuclear weapons proliferation enhances or diminishes international stability. Some rational-choice theorists (proliferation optimists) argue that proliferation helps deter major war by creating a threat of nuclear escalation, making the potential costs of war higher than the projected gains. These theorists argue that because nuclear weapons are so valuable, regimes will be motivated to ensure nuclear security and safety.

Competing theorists (proliferation pessimists) reject the rational-choice model in whole or argue that safety and security concerns surrounding proliferation outweigh deterrent benefits. Nathan E. Busch looks at the record of several current and potential nuclear states to assess their command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) functions and their discipline in fissile material protection, control, and accounting (MPC&A) to see which position is better supported.

Busch has meticulously documented case studies, (there are 97 pages of endnotes); however, the

sensitive nature of the information results in a lack of comprehensive data regarding C3I for cases other than those in the United States. Likewise, the top-secret nature of nuclear weapons programs, particularly clandestine efforts, makes it impossible to thoroughly evaluate MPC&A. Accordingly, much of the analysis is built on extrapolating measures from nonnuclear or foreign programs and assuming similar application in a nuclear context.

Busch concludes that proliferation is destabilizing because states with new nuclear weapons programs appear unable or unwilling to install high-tech security features on weapons; are incapable of developing reliable early warning systems that would permit other than launch-on-warning strategies; and are unlikely to observe strict discipline in securing fissile material. He also emphasizes the danger of domestic political instability, citing post-Soviet Russia's difficulties in ensuring nuclear security. Although such arguments raise points of serious concern, the speculative nature of the available evidence makes this conclusion simply one alternative.

Proliferation optimists note that no major war has ever been directly fought between two nuclear powers, nor has a nuclear weapon ever been fired in an inadvertent, unauthorized, or accidental manner. Moreover, to date we have no knowledge of a successful theft of a nuclear weapon, and the only major nuclear accidents we know of originated from civil nuclear programs rather than weapons programs. While the book is a valuable addition to the proliferation debate, the reality of limited information impedes the book's central inquiry.

Clifton W. Sherrill, Ph.D., Tallahassee, Florida

NASHVILLE: The Western Confederacy's Final Gamble, James Lee McDonough, The University of Tennessee Press, Knoxville, 2004, 358 pages, \$33.46.

Faced with overwhelming odds against an army twice its size and leading a half-starved, poorly-equipped force during a winter campaign, Confederate General John

Bell Hood never had a chance to reclaim middle Tennessee from the Union Army. Hood's poor command decisions only made a bad situation worse, and in effect, doomed his southern forces.

Hood missed an opportunity in Franklin, Tennessee, to strike Union forces on the march and ordered a frontal assault into the teeth of the Union's main defense. Once at Franklin, conditions were set for a successive disaster at the battle of Nashville. Although Hood chose to take the defensive rather than capture Nashville proper, he did not have the forces necessary to withstand a major Union assault.

James Lee McDonough points out Hood's poor command decisions while pointing out the heroic accounts of individual soldiers and regiments. Unfortunately, the story is difficult to follow because McDonough tries to explain unit movements and tactical maneuvers without using adequate graphics. He provides only two simple sketches of Nashville, one from 1864 and one from 2004. The maps add little information for those unfamiliar with Nashville and are not precise enough to provide meaningful information for those who are familiar.

The book is a worthwhile study in battle command, however, and provides a good analysis of the complexities and interaction of decisionmaking at the tactical and operational levels.

LTC Scott A. Porter, USA, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

LAST MAN OUT: Glenn McDole, USMC, Survivor of the Palawan Massacre in World War II, Bob Wilbanks, McFarland & Company, Inc., Jefferson, NC, 2004, 179 pages, \$29.95.

*Acts of Injustice done
between the setting and the
rising sun
In history lie like bones,
each one.*

—W.H. Auden, *The Ascent of F6*

Throughout the history of warfare, mankind has chronicled human suffering and the extraordinary accomplishments of men and women motivated by survival and love of

country. Bob Wilbanks explores these extremes in the Pacific Theater during World War II by examining the ordeals of Glenn "Mac" McDole, one of 11 survivors of Palawan Prison Camp 10A (a camp located on a remote Pacific island).

At the outset of war, Japan's armies captured thousands of American and Allied soldiers, sailors, marines, and civilians. These prisoners of war (POWs) and internees were held in camps extending from Burma to the Philippines and even to mainland Japan. Regardless of location, the Japanese treated all captives with the same contempt: starvation, disease, beatings, torture, and execution were the norm.

Wilbanks's biography follows McDole from his enlistment in the U.S. Marine Corps in 1940 to his retirement from law enforcement in 1989. Exceptionally researched and written, this book provides valuable insight into the Imperial Japanese Army's initial exploits in the months following the attack on Pearl Harbor; the brutal fighting at Cavite, Los Banos, and Fort Hughes; the siege of Corregidor; and the subsequent capture and imprisonment of Soldiers, Sailors, Marines, Filipino troops, and civilians.

Firsthand accounts of terrible camp conditions, horrific treatment endured by McDole and his comrades at the hands of Japanese soldiers and prison guards, and daily fights for survival make this book worth reading. More important, the book brings to light the little publicized massacre of 139 American POWs. Wilbanks describes how the Japanese used false air raids to get prisoners into underground shelters, then poured gasoline on top of them and used dynamite and machineguns to murder them. The 11 men who escaped survived the ordeal by hiding in coral caves, swamps, and jungles. Wilbanks details the roles they played during the war crime trials in Yokohama, Japan, in November 1945 for "minor" war criminals.

The book is an excellent companion to Edward Flanagan's *Angels at Dawn: The Los Banos Raid* (Presidio Press, a Division of Random House, Westminster, MD, 1999); Judith L. Pearson's *Belly of the Beast I* (New American Library, New York, 2001);

and Hampton Side's *Ghost Soldiers: The Forgotten Epic Story of World War II's Most Dramatic Mission* (Doubleday, New York, 2001).
LTC Edward D. Jennings, USA,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

THE UNITED STATES 15TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN CHINA, 1912-1938, Alfred Emile Cornebise, McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers, Jefferson, NC, 2004, 284 pages, \$45.00.

Alfred Emile Cornebise's *The United States 15th Infantry Regiment in China, 1912-1938*, provides insight into an exotic, almost forgotten era of U.S. regimental annals. The 15th Infantry Regiment's (IR) experience in China from 1912 to 1938 epitomizes the U.S. Army's small constabulary forces that existed before the massed armies of World War II.

The 15th IR, which operated as an isolated garrison in China, had an ambiguous mission that caused it to drift from usefulness to anachronism. Originally sent to protect U.S. citizens' rights and properties during the instability of the Chinese monarchy in 1912, the 15th IR stayed on as a symbolic presence until recalled because of heightened Japanese aggression and American isolationist tendencies in the late 1930s. During this period, 15th IR personnel became the "great observers" of the evolution toward a modern China.

The book is not about U.S. military policy in China but is, rather, a detailed look at the 15th IR's men, environment, and regimental lives. Here, the book succeeds admirably. Cornebise successfully links future military leaders George C. Marshall, Albert Wedemeyer, Joseph Stillwell, Matthew Ridgeway, and Walton Walker with the 15th IR and describes the challenges and lifestyle these men encountered. In particular, Cornebise draws conclusions about how Marshall and Stillwell's stints with the 15th IR affected their careers. He references other future generals in the text but leaves the reader wondering what happened to them. Adding an appendix that lists the general officers of the 15th IR would have been helpful.

A solid bibliography of primary

and secondary sources draws material from the *The Sentinel*, the 15th IR's newspaper. Unfortunately, to compensate for the newspaper's omission in the historical record, Cornebise tends to overuse it in the text.

I strongly recommend the book to scholars interested in the U.S. Army during the interwar years. The book provides a window into this period through the eyes of the 15th IR, whose unusual setting sets it apart from other military histories of the era.

Kevin D. Stringer, Ph.D.,
Zurich, Switzerland

KIMMEL, SHORT, AND PEARL HARBOR: The Final Report Revealed, Fred Borch and Daniel Martinez, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 2005, 220 pages, \$25.95.

The word "final" in the title of Fred Borch and Daniel Martinez's *Kimmel, Short, and Pearl Harbor: The Final Report Revealed* is not an empty claim. This indeed should be the final assessment of whom to blame for what happened at Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941.

The reader who knows little about Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel and Major General Walter C. Short's conduct on 7 December can learn here all they need to know. Countless books and reports look at other aspects of the attack, but this one clearly and objectively tells the story of how loyal and embittered champions of Kimmel and Short have attempted to clear their names.

The core of the book is the 1995 "Dorn Report," named for Undersecretary of Defense Edwin Dorn, who at the request of Senator Strom Thurmond investigated the question of posthumously promoting Kimmel and Short. The officers' families and supporters saw such promotions (restoration of Kimmel's rank to four stars and Short's rank to three stars) as a vindication of the officers' behavior at Pearl Harbor. Kimmel and Short advocates hoped that Dorn's investigation would be objective and shorn of military bias. Borch and Martinez clearly show that the advocates' hopes were fulfilled.

Borch, a career Army lawyer, was assigned by Dorn as an investigator and one of three writers of the report. Martinez is a respected historian highly knowledgeable about the Pearl Harbor attack. Their annotations include succinct explanations of murky military personnel regulations; a devastating 5-1/2 page critique that shows how Kimmel and Short's "mental unreadiness" radiated through the Navy and Army command structures; and how "no one else in Hawaii was mentally prepared either." Borch and Martinez named other general officers who were also relieved of command primarily because of judgment errors during World War II.

The authors link Kimmel and Short's professional actions directly to the promotion issue that launched the investigation: "Given their errors in judgment, and the death and destruction that followed from these mistakes, the loss of a few stars is not much to ask of them."

Tom Allen, Bethesda, Maryland

ALL BRAVE SAILORS: The Sinking of the Anglo-Saxon, August 21, 1940, J. Revell Carr, Simon & Schuster, New York, 2004, 363 pages, \$26.00.

Just when you think every conceivable subject of World War II has been visited, along comes J. Revell Carr's *All Brave Sailors*. Carr recounts the little-known World War II story about the survivors of a tramp steamer sunk in the summer of 1940.

As former director and president of Mystic Seaport, Connecticut, Carr became interested in the 18-foot "jolly boat" that carried the survivors of the British tramp steamer *Anglo-Saxon* on their ill-fated 70-day journey. Carr also tells the story of the German surface raider, *Widder*, which was responsible for sinking the steamer. Carr's insightful account personalizes a seldom-chronicled area of World War II and the significant contributions of the Allied merchantmen and the German Reich's equally committed sailors.

Carr's meticulous investigation of the *Anglo-Saxon's* sinking is

impressive. Readers will appreciate the careful research into the various crews' characters, especially Hellmuth von Ruckteschell, the captain of the *Widder*, who was eventually tried as a war criminal.

Military history readers will benefit from this enthralling account of a little-known World War II action. *All Brave Soldiers* highlights the best of man's perseverance and the evil he is capable of during wartime.

**LTC Timothy McKane, USA, Retired,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

UNDERSTANDING TERROR NETWORKS, Marc Sageman, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 2004, 220 pages, \$29.95.

The deluge of terrorism "experts" since the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks makes it hard to know who is real and who is a poseur. Marc Sageman is real.

Sageman, a foreign service officer in Afghanistan from 1986 to 1989, lived among the Mujahideen and battled the Soviet Army. Returning from Afghanistan, he worked in America as a forensic psychiatrist applying theories of antisocial behavior to murder investigations and earned a doctorate in political sociology focusing on terrorist-group dynamics.

Sageman brings his wealth of knowledge to bear from an empirical case study of nearly 200 captured or documented Mujahideen. His results form the foundation of *Understanding Terror Networks*. He refines the perspective from which so much knee-jerk terrorism analysis has been done since 11 September. By taking a measured look at the facts, he hopes to "go beyond the headlines and journalistic accounts [of jihadist terror] and stimulate a more sophisticated discourse on the topic."

Theoretical pitfalls to be avoided in terrorism analysis are a product of the intelligence analyst's professional culture. Intelligence analysts tend to base their research only on classified and, presumably, privileged intelligence reports. Sageman argues that more information is always better than less, and classi-

fied intelligence might not deserve its privileged place in intelligence research. The intelligence world's culture of secrecy also discourages peer review of analysis, a sine qua non of good research in any rigorous discipline. Because analysts and officials are eager to arrive at hard-edged assessments to hang policies, Sageman argues they push premature thinking through a narrow review process that arrives at half-baked conclusions.

Intelligence analysts are also inclined to assume Islamic terrorists' recruiting processes are like the classic agent-acquisition model in espionage—a candidate is spotted, developed, and won over by the assiduous efforts of the recruiting organization. What little we know about jihadists, however, seems not to fit the spy paradigm. In a case study of nearly 200 Mujahideen, Sageman concludes most of them joined the global jihadist movement on their own initiative. They were not recruited by Al-Qaeda representatives.

Understanding Terror Networks has a few faults. The index lacks detail, and Sageman spends an unseemly amount of energy arguing that the CIA's involvement in the Afghani jihad—an enterprise in which he shared—was not responsible for the "blowback" of Islamic terrorism against the West. Still, Sageman's critique is valuable. Terrorism analysts should read the book to correct some of their profession's assumptions. The concerned citizen will gain a sobering sense of the pervasiveness and stealth of potential jihadist networks around the globe.

**Matthew Herbert,
Camp Bondsteel, Kosovo**

ACE OF SPIES: The True Story of Sidney Reilly, Andrew Cook, Tempus Publishing Limited, Gloucestershire, United Kingdom, 2004, 350 pages, \$22.95.

Sidney Reilly, fluent in Russian, French, German, and English, was the British secret service agent who plotted to overthrow the Bolshevik government, but in 1925 was caught, interrogated, and executed. He is buried in the inner yard of the

Lubyanka secret police headquarters in Moscow. A gambler and a womanizer, Reilly enjoyed the lifestyle of the monied class, but he was no James Bond. He was an opportunist, a flim-flam man, a likeable scoundrel and, most likely, a murderer. Many of his deeds were of his own invention, but his future biographers recorded them as truth.

Reilly was a master spy, con artist, serial bigamist, and also a man of mystery. Several books and magazine and newspaper articles have been written about him. Reilly was also the inspiration for Ian Fleming's James Bond series and the subject of a 1983 BBC miniseries, *Reilly: Ace of Spies*. So, what could one more book about a century-old spy tell us? Plenty, it turns out.

Most books about Reilly were written by his fans, a wife (Pepita Reilly), the son of a famous fellow agent (Robin Bruce Lockhart), and enthusiasts such as Fleming, Michael Kettle, Andrew Lycett, and Edward Van Der Rhoer. Andrew Cook is none of these. He set out to penetrate and debunk the myths and legends surrounding Reilly (many created by Reilly himself) to discover Reilly the man.

Cook, who frequently writes about espionage, served as an aide to Britain's Secretary of State for Defense, George Robertson. Cook had access to closed MI6 documents and to closed or restricted records in Britain, Canada, Germany, Japan, Poland, the Ukraine, and the United States. He also had access to intelligence files, personal testimonies, and an actual Soviet participant. He supplemented these records by examining available passport and birth records, academic transcripts, immigration documents, marriage certificates, military records, and business records.

To appreciate Reilly the man, the reader should first know Reilly the legend. Cook penetrates Reilly's mythos, but does not tell the actual story. Reilly seems destined to remain one of Britain's best-known secret agents along with the fictional characters of James Bond and Austin Powers. While Cook's tome helps penetrate Reilly's mystery, he raises other questions, such as, how Reilly

beat the vetting process. He clearly did not, in the argot of Austin Powers, "Behave!"

**LTC Lester W. Grau, USA,
Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

MASTERS OF CHAOS: The Secret History of the Special Forces, Linda Robinson, PublicAffairs, New York, 2004, 416 pages, \$26.95.

"Humans are more important than hardware" is a Special Forces truism that informs this riveting account by Linda Robinson, a respected journalist with an extensive background in military affairs. Robinson bases her informative and penetrating book on in-depth research, numerous interviews, and firsthand observations of the U.S. Army Special Forces in the field. Avoiding the breathless prose too often used to portray those who wear the Green Beret as Rambo-like supercommandos, Robinson depicts her subjects as flesh and blood. The reality is impressive enough.

The book's subtitle is misleading. There is nothing "secret" here; this really is just a history of the last 20 years or so of an organization that is now more than 50 years old. These specially selected and trained soldiers certainly are "masters of chaos." While all battlefields are chaotic, Special Forces often find themselves in particularly complex operational environments. Only a special breed of person can operate far beyond the reach of supporting ground forces and live among indigenous peoples while training them in guerrilla warfare or conducting strategic reconnaissance and direct-action raids. Those best suited to these demands typically display a unique blend of toughness, sensitivity, independence, and self-discipline.

Robinson introduces the reader to two-dozen officers and noncommissioned officers who qualified for Special Forces in the early 1980s. She follows them through 15 years of deployments to El Salvador, Panama, Operation Desert Storm, Somalia, and the Balkans. While recounting their successes—and occasional failures—Robinson not only illuminates their tactics and techniques, she captures the peculiarly collaborative culture of the operational detachment or "A

Team," where competence confers at least as much credibility as rank. Fully half the book describes the soldiers' exploits in Afghanistan and Iraq following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks. Here, in their most prominent combat employment since Vietnam, Special Forces achieved results out of all proportion to their numbers, the sine qua non of special operations.

Robinson concludes her book with cautions and reflections about the future. Special operations forces are an extraordinary asset, but they cannot be mass produced nor created quickly or cheaply. And, while they can accomplish great things, particularly at the murky intersection of diplomacy, intelligence, and military force, they are not a panacea or substitute for other tools of national power. Nevertheless, given their capabilities and recent successes, they are likely to play an increasingly important role in our engagements abroad.

**COL Alan Cate, USA, Retired,
Carlisle, Pennsylvania**

ARTILLERY OF THE NAPOLEONIC WARS, 1792-1815, Kevin F. Kiley, Stackpole Books, Mechanicsburg, PA, 2004, 256 pages, \$34.95.

Kevin F. Kiley, a former artillery officer, has given us a loving treatment of a topic obviously near and dear to his heart—artillery equipment, tactics, and organization during the Napoleonic Wars. His book is a wealth of detail and a wonderful source work on the era. He is not really arguing anything new from the standpoint of artillery use during this era; however, he does reinforce the increasing importance of artillery on the battlefield and its concurrent importance to emerging combined arms tactics.

Kiley painstakingly highlights the evolution of 18th-century artillery systems culminating in Lieutenant General Jean-Baptiste de Gribeauval's famous system of boring out cannon barrels instead of casting the bore into the piece, which allowed for finer tolerances. Especially noteworthy are numerous block quotes pertaining to artillery by de Gribeauval, Baron Jean du Teil, and Jacques de Guibert to whom Emperor Napoleon Bona-

parte owed so much.

However, the book is more than just a paean to the French. (It describes the artillery of all the major European armies, and the last chapter addresses artillery as the key to American General Andrew Jackson's victory at the Battle of New Orleans.) But the book's principal focus is on the French system, especially its tactics and leadership. The epilogue addresses the Old Guard artillery at Waterloo.

The book uses a mixture of secondary and primary sources and is especially well done with respect to line charts and plates that add value to technical discussions in the narrative. Napoleonic scholars will find the book, especially the technical portions, a valuable addition to their libraries. It should be of interest to general military historians.

**CDR John T. Kuehn, USN,
Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

CLAUSEWITZ AND AFRICAN WAR: Politics and Strategy in Liberia and Somalia, Isabelle Duyvesteyn, Frank Cass Publishers, London, 2004, 160 pages, \$115.00.

Clausewitz and African War: Politics and Strategy in Liberia and Somalia lies at the intersection of political science and war studies. Originally a doctoral dissertation at King's College, London, this work is now recast as a book. Its author, Isabelle Duyvesteyn, is a lecturer at Utrecht University in the Netherlands.

Prima facie, this book seems germane to the military reader since its title implies an analysis of failed states and small wars, and an argument in favor of or against the continued relevance of the theories of military strategist Carl von Clausewitz. However, this book is only of marginal use to *Military Review's* readers because it offers a somewhat self-evident and nearly tautological framework for analysis.

Duyvesteyn's principal aim is to refute the notion that Clausewitz's work is irrelevant to non-Trinitarian wars by proving that these wars are essentially Trinitarian. Her comparative analysis focuses on the wars in Liberia and Somalia during the early 1990s.

The book begins with a short explanation of Trinitarian war, non-

Trinitarian war, and Duyvesteyn's hypotheses. She provides short overviews of the conflicts in Liberia and Somalia, which any military reader familiar with those conflicts can rapidly skim. Three chapters analyze and compare the wars through the lenses of three stated variables: political actors, political interests, and political instruments in the context of conventional war. The book concludes with policy implications for similar future interventions. Although some of Duyvesteyn's proposed solutions to these implications are rather Pollyanna-ish, this section of the book is most relevant to military professionals. Principally, Duyvesteyn argues that the three components of the Clausewitzian trinity—the state, the army, and the people—are still present in wars with nonstate armed groups in failed states.

Duyvesteyn substitutes the idea of "political actors" for the actual legal entity of the state. Her supporting postulation is that actors undertaking armed conflict in failed states are in fact political actors who fight for political interests, pursue political interests, use military force as a political instrument, and fight conventionally. Curiously, perhaps to complete Clausewitz's timing, she considers it necessary to prove that the factions in these types of wars fight conventionally. For example, she says: "The use of the military instrument for political purposes in a conventional manner will further prove the continuing validity of Clausewitzian thinking."

Clausewitz and African War describes topical subjects. Its analysis of these wars raises issues and challenges that the U.S. military is still confronting in Afghanistan and Iraq. The conclusion poses three principal questions: What do you do with the leaders of armed factions? Do you disarm them or establish security first? How do you win over a population that has been brutalized by conflict? Duyvesteyn also emphasizes the enduring questions of conflict that must be answered before the United States and other Western militaries undertake these types of interventions: Who is fighting, why are they fighting, and how are they fighting?

The book has two flaws that make

reading a bit onerous: Duyvesteyn uses passive voice and her syntactical constructs are bothersome. Also, she poses a theoretical framework that postulates that Clausewitz is still germane to non-Trinitarian war by attempting to demonstrate that two such wars were in fact Trinitarian, which seems somewhat tautological.

LTC Robert M. Cassidy, USA, Kuwait

AIRPOWER ADVANTAGE: Planning the Gulf War Air Campaign 1989-1991, Diane T. Putney, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, Air Force History and Museums Program, 2005, 362 pages, \$19.95.

Airpower Advantage is an excellent history of planning for the Persian Gulf War air campaign during 1989 and 1990. Diane T. Putney, a professional historian with 20 years experience with the U.S. Air Force, draws extensively from archival documentation, interviews with air planners, and postwar reports to produce a thorough, well-researched book that might well be a definitive history.

Putney reviews the planning process from the prewar operations plan through the initial plan prepared by the Air Staff's Deputy Directorate for Warfighting Concepts (also called Checkmate), through Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm planning, through the integration of Army ground campaign planning, through the merging of the four phases, to the execution of the campaign. Of note is that the book focuses on planning for the air campaign but spends only about 20 pages on execution and, despite the title, does end with the war in 1990.

The book details the role of the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC); the roles and relationships between the joint staff and the combatant commander; the roles and relationships between the JFACC and his staff and units; and the professional complexities of national intelligence support, imagery dissemination, battle damage assessment, and the use of a master attack plan (MAP) to help in producing the air tasking order (ATO). The MAP was a noteworthy innovation by Air

Force Lieutenant Colonel David Deptula, who viewed the ATO as an administrative vehicle to get the plan out to units. Deptula believed the United States should not associate *planning* with the ATO, but, instead, should associate *processing* with the ATO.

While General H. Norman Schwarzkopf expected an air campaign with four distinct phases, the final product was a merging of the four phases with overlap and shifting emphasis during every phase. Of interest is that well-planned ATOs were prepared for only the first two days. After the first two days went smoother than anticipated, it was apparent it would have been useful to have a basic, preplanned ATO on which to build. Finally, Putney addresses concerns from the corps commanders that airpower was not responsive to their concerns, making the point that airpower was responsive to the theater commander's priorities and serviced all targets, although not necessarily when the corps commanders wanted.

While readers with a knowledge of the U.S. Air Force's organization, its doctrine, and the tactical air control system will enjoy the book, all readers interested in the operational level of war should also explore Putney's work.

LTC Christopher E. Bailey, USA, Charlottesville, Virginia

THE FORGOTTEN HEROES: The Heroic Story of the United States Merchant Marine, Brian Herbert, Tom Doherty Associates, LLC, A Forge Book, New York, 320 pages, 2004, \$24.95.

Brian Herbert is a *New York Times* bestselling author of several novels related to the *Dune Saga* (Orion Publishing Co., Great Barrington, MA, 1981), created by his father Frank Herbert. Brian Herbert is also an author of original publications in his own right. *The Forgotten Heroes: The Heroic Story of the United States Merchant Marine* (USMM), is one of those.

The USMM has contributed to America's defense from the American Revolution to the present, but has not been recognized for its contributions during World War II. *The Forgotten Heroes* chronicles

the USMM's actions during World War II.

Paraphrasing Brian Herbert: the USMM, while not an armed service, faced death and destruction on all the fronts on which U.S. armed services fought. According to the War Shipping Administration, the USMM suffered the highest rate of casualties of any service during World War II.

One reason the USMM is not as recognized as the Army or Navy is it did not record the events in which it participated. Also, the official policy was that because USMM personnel were civilians they did not deserve the same recognition as uniformed services. Eventually, this policy was changed, and USMM personnel received U.S. Armed Services decorations as civilians serving under Navy and Army authority. In 1945, once the war was over, the USMM continued to serve by transporting personnel and cargo to and from recovering nations.

*Richard L. Milligan,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas*

CIA SPYMASTER, Clarence Ashley, Pelican Publishing Co., Gretna, LA, 2004, 350 pages, \$24.95.

The continued Global War on Terrorism highlights the importance of traditional, old-fashioned spying. In an age where the lone actor has re-

placed the nation-state as the prime threat, the importance of human intelligence (HUMINT) has superseded technical disciplines such as imagery and signals interception.

In *CIA Spymaster*, Clarence Ashley delivers a biography of perhaps America's best HUMINT-er, George Kisevalter, who, ironically, was born in Tsarist Russia. Kisevalter left Russia after the Bolshevik Revolution and eventually became a case officer for the CIA. He possessed an excellent memory, had a way with people, and had a facility for languages. The White Russian expatriate was also an ardent anti-communist.

Ashley uncovers the guts of Kisevalter's operations, in particular how he handled, debriefed, and protected the identities of his most important agents, including two highly placed Soviet moles—Lieutenant Colonel Pyotr Popov and Colonel Oleg Penkovsky. Popov gave the Agency its first serious look at the inner workings of Soviet Military Intelligence and identified several Soviet agents working inside the United States. Penkovsky delivered reams of documents, including details about Soviet missile and nuclear weapons systems—information that was later used to craft America's response to Khrushchev's deployment of missiles in Cuba. Kisevalter's spies stole thousands of classified

documents for the CIA during the 1950s and 1960s.

Ashley and Kisevalter were close friends. After Kisevalter's death in 1997, Ashley created a history for Kisevalter's family from taped debriefings about many of Kisevalter's exploits. He describes Kisevalter's life and service to the CIA in exquisite detail. Ashley's unique access to Kisevalter is a strength and weakness for the book. He presents lengthy first-person accounts about Kisevalter's cases. In some chapters, however, Ashley uses pages of Kisevalter's quotes, seeming hesitant to describe events in his own words. While it is understandable that Ashley eulogizes his friend when he talks about the CIA, it means readers interested in intelligence must wade through mundane details to experience masterful espionage. For example, when describing Kisevalter's civilian life Ashley includes the entire chemical process used to extract retinol from alfalfa.

Intelligence specialists and espionage aficionados will benefit most from reading *CIA Spymaster*. Other books might give better descriptions of the Cold War, the CIA, and human intelligence, but Ashley successfully delivers the "history of the man" who was the CIA's best Cold War case officer.

*CPT Andrew R. Marvin, USA,
Honolulu, Hawaii*